



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A PRIMORDIIS VITAE CLAUSTRALIS CONSODALI

AD PERPETUAM IN PERICULO AUXILII MEMORIAM

FROM A FRIAR'S CELL

By FR. VINCENT MCNABB, O.P.

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CHAPTER I

ST. DOMINIC

ON Friday, August 6th, 1221, at noon, Dominic Guzman died, as he had prayed to die, amidst his brethren of Bologna. Having no cell of his own, for "he had the whole world for cell," he died in the cell of one of the brethren. Having no clothes but those he wore, for "he had put on the Lord Jesus Christ," he died in the borrowed clothes of one of the brethren. It was the death of an apostle, fitly following the life of an apostle.

Few men of any age have been so qualified to be an apostle. His Spanish blood was of the best in Europe; but it was the best warrior blood. Many of the future dreams and ideals of the apostle may have been suggested to his mind by the grim frontier fortress of Calaroga, where he passed the first seven years of his life.

It is hard to find any saint, and especially any founder-saint, who was so essentially a cleric, that is "a child of the Church." This was everything to him in the perilous days when he was adventuring into new ways of doing the Church's work of saving souls. At seven years old, when, as the theologians nobly say, "he had reached the age of reason," he left home with all its joys, for Gumiel d'Izan,

where his uncle was Archpriest. He could hardly have known that he was beginning the long, hard apprenticeship of an apostle. Education in such a home of learning was essentially a learning of realities. Like many of his schoolfellows, the primer from which he learned his letters was the Book of Our Lady's Hours ! Perhaps, as some of his schoolfellows, he had his first lesson from his Lady's Book, as it rested on her altar in the great church. The neighbouring Premonstratensian Abbey of Pena was too close to Gumiel d'Izan for us to neglect the Premonstratensian tradition that his youth was largely influenced by the Augustinian Rome. Perhaps it was there that, under the keeping of St. Augustine, he learned to love those songs of the Church which later on he was to sing to Europe as he travelled on his tireless apostolate.

It was well for Dominic Guzman that he passed from this Augustinian atmosphere to a University. Both these influences were characteristic of the Church of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The years he spent at Palencia amidst the students of the University completed his apprenticeship as a teacher and preacher of the Word of Truth.

From a worldly point of view the ecclesiastical career of Dominic Guzman was now achieved. His birth, his talents, his learning were a unique key which might be expected to open the door to the highest ecclesiastical dignities. Indeed,

we may almost say that he took the first steps in his career when in his thirty-third year he was on a royal embassy to bring back the bride who was to have been his future queen.

A journey through Languedoc and a long night's victorious discussion with an Albigenian innkeeper suddenly awoke his apostolic heart. Not everyone who lives in "the whitening harvest-field of souls" can "lift up his eyes and see" that it is a harvest-field, and that it is white for reaping. It was not dismay but hope that thrilled the apostolic heart of St. Dominic when he realised two profound truths. The first was that the Ship of the Church was in danger of sinking; the second was that as the danger had been brought about by men's, and especially Churchmen's, sloth in using the covenanted boons of God, the danger could be met only by a return to the priceless heritage of God's truth and grace, that is, to preaching and the sacraments. A kindred conviction was reaching the kindred heart of the Umbrian Poverello. To him it came by way of revelation, whereby he saw in a mystic showing three churches almost in ruins. But the mind of Dominic saw few revelations save those compounded of his God-given faith and reason.

What manner of man Dominic the apostle seemed to the men who knew him best may be judged by their sworn witness after his death. The formal testimony given before his canonization is a fragment of medieval mysticism almost

without rival. Throughout its legal brevity and restraint may be felt the enthusiasm which the children of Dominic Guzman still give to the Master to whom they liken none but the giants and heroes of the Church.

The witness of St. Dominic's fellow-apostles is monotonous in superlatives. Rudolf of Faenza : "*Item.* He said that Dominic sought the salvation of all souls, both Christians and Saracens, and especially of the Cumans and others. And he was the most zealous seeker after souls he ever saw. And he often said he longed to go to the Cumans and to the other nations." A more daring witness was given by Fra Ventura : "He was such a lover of souls that he stretched his charity and compassion not only to the faithful, but even to the heretics and pagans and even to the souls in hell. Greatly did he weep for them. Great, too, was his fervour in preaching and in sending others to preach."

His successor, Bd. Jordan of Saxony, himself one of the most lovable saints and apostles of the thirteenth century, could write of his hero : "All men he welcomed within the wide bosom of his charity ; and since he loved all, he was beloved by all. To be glad with those that are glad, and to weep with those that weep he took upon him as his right. He overflowed with mercy and outpoured himself wholly in the care of souls and in compassion for the sorrowing."

These witnesses have crystallized into phrases

which give St. Dominic almost a place apart amongst the apostles : " He prayed God to place him as a stone in the mouth of hell, to keep sinners from falling therein. . . . No one ever looked upon him that did not love him." Though he lived and moved unarmed in the midst of the fierce Albigensians, none ever harmed him more than by cutting keepsakes from his habit, till it reached scarcely beyond his knee !

An apostle, so thought this authentic apostle, must be poor. He remembered the phrase of the Dux Verbi : " as poor, yet enriching many." Rudolf of Faenza, the parish priest turned friar-preacher, who gave his church to the friars and watched over his hero as a mother watches her child, said with accustomed terseness : " I never saw him sleep in a bed of feather or on a mattress until he was dead. Then he lay on a mattress." A man who has no home, no cell, no change of clothing, no bed to lie on save the stone floor of his Lady's altar is after the image of Him Who had not whereon to lay His head.

Six times in a few years did Dominic walk across Europe in pursuit of souls. It is almost true to say of him that he sang his way across Europe. Yet it was never a song of his own composing he sang. All his songs were those of the Church—the Veni Creator Spiritus, the Ave Maris Stella. St. Dominic was of those great souls who have no further desire than the Church's best. He composed no new song. He took care, like his Master, to leave no written

rule or word of his own lest men should remember him !

But his children have remembered his desire to be forgotten and have never forgotten him. To them he is such a priceless heritage that they are jealous of sharing him with others who might give him only a lesser love. Seven hundred years of trial have done nothing to break the unity of Dominic's family ; because in every crisis which threatened to break them apart they have remembered their Father and were one.

CHAPTER II

SOME DANGERS OF PSEUDO-MYSTICISM

EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

SEEING that His Holiness Pope Benedict XV¹ has recommended St. Thomas as a “ great Doctor ” of what is commonly called “ Mystical Theology ” we make no apology for setting down two important texts from the *Summa Theologica*. Dealing with the gift of the Holy Ghost called Wisdom St. Thomas says :

“ Wisdom denotes a certain rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of judgment is twofold : first, on account of perfect use of reason ; secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about which one has to judge. Thus about matters of chastity a man after inquiring with his reason, forms a right judgment, if he has learned the science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity, judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality.

“ Accordingly it belongs to the Wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about divine things after reason has made its enquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about them on account of connaturality with them : thus Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* ii), that Hierotheus is

¹ Epistola ad R. P. Octavium Marchetti S. J. de Schola Theologiae Ascetico-Mysticae in Gregoriana Universitate.

perfect in divine things, for he not only learns, but is patient of divine things.

"Now this sympathy or connaturality for divine things is the result of charity which unites us to God, according to I. Cor. vi. 17. *He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.* (IIa. IIae., Qu. 45, Art 2)."

The second passage will serve as a commentary on the first.

"There are three ways of knowing a thing. First, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at times to some . . . Secondly, a man may of himself know something and with certainty; and in this way no one can know that he has grace . . . Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God, and of despising wordly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin . . .

"Those things which are in the soul by their physical reality are known through experimental knowledge; in so far as through acts man has experienced of their inward principles: thus when we wish we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the functions of life we perceive that there is life in us . . . Whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it is otherwise with grace and charity and suchlike, which perfect the appetitive faculty." (Ia IIae., Qu. 112, Art. 5).

As the operations of the will, being essentially mysterious to the intellect, have no sufficient terminology they present many pitfalls to the semi-skilled ascetical practitioner. The entirely unscientific ascetic like St. Teresa or Bernardette Soubirous, whom God delights to honour, makes no pretence to scientific accuracy. These

mistresses of vision describe their supernatural symptoms with all the practical accuracy of a patient describing his ailments to a skilled doctor. But great havoc is made of their precious materials by the unskilled practitioner who attempts to translate these phenomena of the spiritual life into scientific terms. It is as if someone should undertake to translate a Chinese masterpiece into English on the strength that a long sojourn in Hong Kong had taught him to speak and write "pidgin English."

When reading what are called *Mystical books*, how commonly do we meet in the treatise on Contemplative Prayer such phrases as "The soul in this state is conscious of the divine presence. The soul knows God directly. This is no longer the dark knowledge of faith. A new light is added to faith. The soul has experimental knowledge of God." Phrases like these are assuredly patient of a right meaning; if only because the terminology of the spirit is not authoritatively settled. But assuredly also these phrases are patient of a wrong meaning which may lead, as wrong meanings have always led, souls into heresy. Thus the idea that some new light, *which is not faith*, comes to the soul in Contemplation may lead to a species of Ontologism. The series of lights is complete, viz. : Light of Reason, Light of Faith, Light of Glory. There is no fourth light in the same series as these three. If the theologians speak

of the Light of Revelation or Prophecy or Inspiration, it is in a different series. To explain this fully would overtax our space. But as no other light than that of Glory can come to Faith (in this series), any assertions that contemplative or unitive prayer is a new light added to faith will seem to mean that even in this life the ordinary soul is capable of the Beatific Vision.

This dangerous inaccuracy is further facilitated by the ambiguous use of the phrase "Experimental Knowledge" of God. It is common enough to distinguish between scientific and experimental or empiric knowledge. Thus a botanist who had never seen a certain species of orchid, might yet have a most accurate and detailed scientific knowledge of it. On the other hand the Burmese coolie who gathered the orchid in the jungle, while having no scientific knowledge of it, would have an experimental or empiric knowledge of it. This experimental or empiric knowledge the scientific botanist would have when with his own eyes he saw the orchid. By experimental knowledge, therefore, is commonly meant the direct, concrete, face-to-face knowledge of an object. But it is clear that even by the highest ordinary contemplative prayer the human soul *does not* enjoy the direct face-to-face knowledge of God. To say that it did enjoy this knowledge would be to admit that contemplation was the enjoy-

ment of the Beatific Vision. This would be a form of Ontologism.

The two extracts from St. Thomas, if carefully studied, should serve to give spiritual caution and a terminology. In the first extract St. Thomas points out how the gift of Wisdom, on which all special and supreme charismatic movements of the Holy Ghost are based, enables the soul to judge of divine things (even of the divine presence in the intellect or will), not by any process of reasoning, but by a certain divine instinct or connaturality springing from charity. Though St. Thomas does not here use the phrase *experimental knowledge* he would not be concerned to deny it. He would admit that the soul was enabled by the gift of Wisdom to have an experimental or empiric knowledge of God's presence within it.

But the second extract shows with what care St. Thomas would surround and condition this statement. He would clearly distinguish between the intellect and the will. He would insist on the fact that we are less conscious and certain of operations of the will than of operations of the intellect. He would also insist that immediate divine operations of the intelligence, though perhaps a guarantee of faith are not a guarantee of charity. Even such gratuitous graces as prophecy and miracle-working are not a sign of sanctifying grace.

It would then be quite clear that even when the intellect of a man was divinely moved and

was quite certain that it was divinely moved this man would not have direct vision of God present in the intellect, but would be led by faith ; and could not be certain of God's presence in the will by grace or charity. To say the first would be a form of Ontologism. To say the second would be to deny the doctrine of the Council of Trent. " No one can tell with the certitude of faith which admits of no error, that he is in a state of grace." (Sess. vi. c. 9).

The conclusion not to be drawn from God's action in the intellect, may still less be drawn from God's action in the will. When the human will is *de facto* moved by God, the person so moved is not certain that this soul is in state of grace. Writers are guilty of ambiguous and dangerous language when they say that in contemplative prayer, or otherwise, the soul is conscious of the divine Presence. This certitude of the divine Presence may mean that the soul has conjectural knowledge that it is in a state of grace ; because it has actions attributable to God, and has reasoned from effect to cause ; or it has certitude of God's three-fold presence in it as in all created things.

There are thus, two great errors to be explicitly and persistently avoided in all quasi-scientific books that undertake to speak of Prayer or of Union with God. The first error is that the intellect of man has any direct sight of God in Himself ; and not only in His effects or signs. The second error is that the soul of

man can be quite certain that it is in grace, in other words that it loves God with divine charity and that God loves it as bestowing divine charity. In other words no ordinary union of the soul with God on this earth means the presence of God in the soul as the direct object of vision or as the conscious and certain object of divine love. We advisedly use the adjective *ordinary* because it is the teaching of St. Thomas that St. Paul in the divine light which turned his soul, saw the Beatific Vision by way of act, though not of habit. Moreover as the Council of Trent teaches, a special divine revelation may give to some favoured soul the certitude of their charity, and even of their perseverance in charity until death.

CHAPTER III

THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

THE WITNESS OF SCRIPTURE

. . . Unigenitus Dei Filius Jesus Christus . . . venturus in fine saeculi, judicaturus vivos et mortuos et redditurus singulis secundum opera sua, tam reprobris quam electis, qui omnes cum suis propriis resurgent corporibus, quae nunc gestant ut recipiant secundum opera sua, sive bona fuerint sive mala.

“ THE only begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ,
“ who will come at the end of time to judge the
“ living and the dead, and to reward each accord-
“ ing to their deeds, both the reprobate and the
“ elect ; all of whom will rise with their own
“ proper bodies which they now bear, so that
“ they may receive according to their deeds,
“ whether good or evil.”

I.—MEANING OF THE DOCTRINE.

This dogmatic decision of the Fourth Lateran Council held in the year 1215 A.D., will serve as the authority and guide in what we shall say about the Resurrection of the Body.

1. We must begin by saying that the doctrine of the Resurrection is an object of faith, which natural reason can neither prove nor disprove. St. Thomas says (4 Dist. 43, Qu. 1 Art., Qua. 3), "The Resurrection, simply speaking, is miraculous; and only relatively natural." Therefore, as natural Reason deals only with the series of natural causes and effects whereas Faith deals also with the series of miraculous causes and effects, the Resurrection of the Body can be accepted with certitude only by those who accept the authority of the Teaching Church.

2. We have given the dogmatic decision of the Lateran Council, because it is the fullest expression of the doctrine which is now of divine faith. The Apostles' Creed contained the words, *Σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν* (the resurrection of the flesh). In the Nicene Creed (drawn up by the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381) this was changed into the phrase *ἀνάστασιν νεκρῶν* (the resurrection of the dead).

The two phrases denote the same doctrine. But the change of the phrase "Resurrection of the Flesh" into the "Resurrection of the Dead" had two advantages. First, it was more Scriptural. The phrase "Resurrection of the Flesh" is nowhere to be found in the New Testament. But the phrase "Resurrection of the Dead" is found again and again either identically or equivalently.

The second advantage was that the phrase

" Resurrection of the Flesh " did not so satisfactorily silence those who thought that there need be no physical death antecedent to the glorification of the body. Milleniarists, who dreamt of a heaven on earth, were not inclined to believe that they could enter this heaven only through the gate of death. This wrong view was more directly countered by the phrase " Resurrection of the Dead " than by the phrase " Resurrection of the Flesh." Yet both creeds meant to define the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Flesh or Body from death to everlasting life.

3. The Lateran dogma includes two doctrines : (a) The Resurrection of all mankind, and (b) the Resurrection of the identical body of each person.

The full doctrine of the Resurrection contains these two points ; but as the general Resurrection is not commonly denied and, moreover, as it may be taken to be included in the resurrection of the identical body, we shall explain and discuss the latter doctrine alone.

4. It is then the *de Fide* doctrine of the Catholic Church that all men shall not only rise again with a body, but shall rise again with the same body they have had on earth.

For the moment we may remark that, according to this doctrine, the good and wicked will alike arise with their bodies. To be committed again to a body will not be either a supernatural punishment or a supernatural

reward, but will be the supernatural accomplishment of a natural desire and state.

5. Moreover, the body which each human being will possess for ever will be his own body which he now has. It will not be his own merely because after the Resurrection it will belong to him and to no one else. It will not be a body that is given to him. It will be his own present body which will be given back to him.

So much is *de fide* of a Roman Catholic. But it is not yet *de fide* how much is meant by the phrase "their own proper bodies which they bear." Catholic theologians here are found to differ (a) since there is a group who hold that the Resurrection of the Body does not mean that the soul will be re-united to any particle of matter which belonged to its former body. The body which the human being will possess will be called "the same body," because it will be quickened by the same soul. For these theologians, identity of the soul suffices for identity of the body.

(b) The larger group of theologians follow St. Thomas Aquinas in holding that mere identity of soul is not sufficient for identity of body. The soul must be reunited to at least some of the matter that once essentially belonged to it. The chief reason for holding this opinion is the phrase of the creeds *ἀνάστασις* (resurrection). If any matter could be formed by the soul, then the Church's Creed need not be, "I believe in the resurrection of the body," but "I

believe in the formation of the body." The theological discussion between these two groups of thinkers is, however, of so intricate a nature that we can leave it with this brief indication of its outline.

II.—THE WITNESS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

6. Having explained the meaning of the Lateran decision, we may now presume to analyse the *New Testament* basis of the doctrine.

(a) We shall not deal with the proofs that may be adduced from the Old Testament. If it is true, as it seems to be true, that the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, like the doctrine of the Trinity or the Incarnation, is foreshadowed and foretold rather than revealed in the Old Testament, we may be content to refer to these foreshadowings which were differently interpreted by such loyal groups of Jewish thinkers as the Sadducees and the Pharisees. The Book of Job has summed up these dim shadows in its poignant hope :

I know that my Redeemer liveth
And in the last day I shall rise out of the earth
And I shall be clothed again with my skin.
And in my flesh I shall see my God.
(Job xix. 25, 26).

(b) If we hold that the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body is revealed in the New

Testament, that is, if we hold that Jesus Christ clearly revealed the Resurrection of the Body, we must look for this revelation primarily in the Gospels. But in this matter, as elsewhere, the Gospel texts must not be dealt with merely mechanically, and, as it were, by a show of hands. This is a valid as well as a valuable way of investigating an alleged doctrine. But the New Testament, and especially the Four Gospels, are too organic to be fully expressed by a mere mechanical interpretation. If history is but a mode of psychology, no sufficient valuation of its contents can be other than psychological. To interpret the four Gospels needs a certain knowledge of the four gossellers.

(c) Let us begin the interpretation of the four Gospels by the principles that the Revelation granted to mankind by Jesus Christ was primarily Jesus Christ. The (*Λόγος*) or Word was Himself the revealed Word. He was the Light that needed no further light to make Him manifest. He was the ultimate Truth, who could be identified and recognised rather than proved. The essential revelation of Jesus Christ was something that He was and did rather than something that He said.

(d) We may go a step further and say that Jesus Christ's essential Revelation of the Resurrection of the Body was the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. It was not so much any previous or subsequent word He had spoken about it. St. Thomas completes this thought by the

profound principle that the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is the efficient and exemplar cause of our resurrection. (III Pais., Qu. 56, Art. 1, ad 3^m).

(e) With these principles in mind let us deal with the witness of St. Mark's Gospel ; in other words, with the witness of St. Peter.

7. There is a detailed account of the Resurrection of the identical body of Jesus Christ on Easter Sunday (ch. xvi.).

The *fact* of the Resurrection is supplemented by the *mode*. And after that He appeared in another shape (*μορφῇ*) *i.e.* His body could now change its shape. The account St. Mark gives of the Resurrection¹ is so succinct as to be chosen by the Liturgy for the Gospel of Easter Sunday.²

The additional traces of the Resurrection are significant.

(a) There is the saying of Herod recorded by the three Synoptists, " John the Baptist is risen again from the dead " (Mk. v. 4 ; Matt. xiv. 2 ; Lk. ix. 7).

(b) There is our Blessed Lord's prophecy of the Resurrection. This was made after the Transfiguration, and is recorded by St. Mark

¹ A further motive of the Church's doctrine may perhaps be found in the traditional belief in the Assumption of our Blessed Lady's incorrupt, and therefore identical, body into heaven.

² We make no pretence of solving the vexed question of the authenticity of Mk. 9—20. Its canonicity is assured, and is sufficient for the aim of this study.

and St. Matthew alone (Mk. ix. 9; Matt. xvii. 9).

(c) There is the answer to the Sadducees, who said "there was no resurrection." To them our Blessed Lord replied, "Do ye not therefore err because you know not the Scriptures nor the power of God? For when they shall rise again from the dead they shall neither marry nor be married, but are as the angels of God" (Mk. xii. 4). This scene is common to the three Synoptists (Mk. xii. 24—26; Matt. xx. 25—33; Lk. xx. 29—38).

(d) A further element in our Blessed Lord's revelation of the Resurrection is the miracle of raising from the dead. St. Mark, St. Matthew and St. Luke all record the raising of the child, daughter of James, all record that death had touched her so lightly that Jesus called it sleep (Mk. v. 39; Matt. ix. 24).

We may synthesise this sufficient doctrine of St. Mark's Gospel. We are given the essential revelation of the fact and mode of the Resurrection of our Blessed Lord's body—together with a preliminary prophecy of it—and the common Jewish doctrine together with a defence of this against a casual interpretation, and all this confirmed by the miracle of raising a child from the dead.

8. St. Matthew has all that St. Mark has, together with some characteristic matter of his own.

(a) Alone he gives our Blessed Lord's com-

mission to the Apostles . . . "raise the dead" (x. 8).

(b) With St. Luke he gives in the message to St. John the Baptist . . . "the dead rise again" (xi. 5 ; Lk. vii. 22).

(c) Alone he gives our Blessed Lord's words to the High Priest . . . "hereafter you shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the power of God" (Matt. xxiv. 64).

9. St. Luke, the physician, could not fail to be interested in the ultimates of human life. It is characteristic of him that he has given us the fullest identifications of Jesus Christ's birth and resurrection to life.

(a) It is therefore to be expected that this medical man has given us something like the fulness of a medical diagnosis in describing the identification and signs of Christ's risen body. The last chapter (xxiv.) of his Gospel is a minute study not only of the fact and mode of Jesus Christ's risen life, but of the various signs of this life which Jesus Christ gave his apostles.

We must especially notice the scene where Jesus says, "See, my hands and feet, that it is I myself. Handle and see ; for a spirit (*πνεῦμα*) hath not flesh and bones as you see me to have" (Lk. xxiv. 39).

Again "They offered Him a piece of a broiled fish and a honeycomb. And when He had eaten . . ." (*ibid.* 40).

(b) A slender addition to the resurrection

doctrine, peculiar to St. Luke, is in the parable of Dives and Lazarus. And He said to them, "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they believe if one rise again from the dead" (Lk. xvi. 31).

(c) St. Luke is unique in recording two confirmatory miracles. He gives the raising of the daughter of Jairus from a death so recent as to resemble sleep; but he further gives the raising of the son of the Widow of Naim from death so undeniable that already the body was on its way to the tomb (Lk. vii. 12, 15).

10. St. John's characteristic resolve to complete rather than to repeat the Synoptists has led him to give us valuable supplements to the Resurrection doctrine.

(a) The Resurrection of our Blessed Lord in *fact* and *mode* is described by St. John with extraordinary detail. One might almost see in it the cherished memories of an old man standing on the brink of the tomb. Alone St. John had recorded the piercing of the side of our Blessed Lord (John xix. 34) on the cross, and not without a purpose. Where St. Luke records that the risen Saviour invited the disciples to *see* His hands and His feet, St. John records that "He showed them His hands and His *side*." The disciples, therefore, were "glad when they *saw* the Lord" (John xx. 20). But sight was to be confirmed by touch, in order that identification might be complete. Then He saith to Thomas, "Put in thy finger hither and see my hands,

and bring hither thy hand and put it into my side " (*ibid.* 27).

(b) St. Mark and St. Matthew substantially agree in giving the testimony of the false witnesses before Caiaphas, the High Priest. These witnesses accused our Blessed Lord of having said that He would " destroy this Temple made with hands, and within three days I will build another not made with hands " (Mk. xiv. 58). But St. Mark added, " Their witnesses did not agree " (59).

In this disagreement of the witnesses, it might have been doubted whether the so-called prophecy was not a mere invention of the false witness. St. John, with his constant desire to support the value of St. Mark's Gospel, assures us that the prophecy was not a perjury or false witness, but a prophecy of the resurrection of Jesus Christ's *Body*. " He spoke of the temple of His body. When therefore He was risen again from the dead, His disciples remembered that He had said this " (John ii. 21, 22).

(c) St. John, who has not recorded our Blessed Lord's apologetic references to the resurrection against the false views of the Sadducees, has been careful to record His direct references. The fifth chapter, with its cure of the man at the pool of Bethesda and its heated discussion, might be looked upon as a sermon to Jerusalem on the Resurrection of the Body. The whole chapter should be read: " For as the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life, so the Son also

giveth life to whom He will . . . (25). Amen, amen, I say unto you that the hour cometh, and now is when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live . . . (28) . . . the hour cometh wherein all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God (29). And they that have done good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of judgment." These two chapters are a unique contribution to the doctrine of the Resurrection.

(d) Moreover, St. John has made us all his debtors by recording that our Blessed Lord connected the raising and glorification of our dead bodies with His condescension and humiliation in the Blessed Sacrament. The sixth chapter of St. John's Gospel might almost be called a second sermon on the Resurrection of the Body, preached not to Jerusalem and Judea, but to Capernahum and Galilee. Again this chapter, as the preceding chapter, should be studied in full, especially 37. "Now this is the will of the Father who sent me, that of all that He has given me I should raise it up again in the last day" (40) . . . "I will raise him up in the last day" (44). "I will raise him upon the last day (50). If any man eat of this bread he shall live for ever (55). He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up on the last day."

Our Blessed Lord has here pointed out the mystic connection between His own Body, which will last to eternity. (1) The Resurrection of the *body* unto life everlasting will depend on the reception of the Sacramental Body of Jesus' Church. In other words, the Holy Eucharist is supremely the "Sacrament of the Living." (2) The difficulties which the human mind sees in the resurrection of the identical body from the ashes of death are paralleled and indeed outdone by the difficulties of the body of Jesus Christ in its sacramental existence. It would seem that if reason can accept the dogma of the body of Jesus Christ existing with all its accidents under the accidents of bread, there is no great mental hardship in accepting the resurrection of our identical body.

(e) Like the Synoptists, St. John records a confirmatory miracle, the raising of Lazarus (John xi.). It was well chosen for its purpose of confirmation. The miracle of giving back life to a dead body was not wrought on one so recently dead that death seemed but sleep; nor yet on one who, dead a few hours, was on his way to the grave; but one whose body after three days burial under a tropical sun was already undeniably corrupt. It is this stench of Lazarus' tomb "that smells sweet and blossoms in the dust," reminding us that though corruption of the flesh has taken away from our body something that once belonged to it, God will undo this corruption and give us back the body

that was once ours. Thus St. John has reminded us that one of the greatest of his Master's miracles was a victory over that corruption which seems to make the resurrection of the identical body impossible.

II. This manifold witness of the Gospels to the resurrection of the body prepares us to see how largely the preaching of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ entered unto the apologetics of the early apostles.

(a) St. Peter's first defence of the Church before the people boldly said (Acts iii. 15) : " But the Author of Life you killed ; Whom God raised from the dead, of which we are witnesses."

Other explicit references, not to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, but to the general Resurrection of the Dead, are to be found in Rom. viii. 23 ; Cor. iv. 16, showing that at the time when the apostle wrote this second group of epistles the thought of the Resurrection was habitual with him. Already in Thes. iv. 16, he had tried to comfort the Greek mind of the Macedonians with the example of Christ's risen body. Later on, the same conviction of Christ's Resurrection being the cause and exemplar of our Resurrection found its expression in the last group of Epistles written from his prison in Rome, where he was awaiting trial and perhaps death. It is this circumstance which gives a peculiar power to the texts, Eph. i. 20 ; ii. 4, 6 ; Php. iii. 11, 21 ; Col. i. 18 ; ii. 12. Already the writer of the Epistle could

write . . . " Of the doctrine of baptisms and impositions, of hands, and of the *resurrection of the dead*, and of eternal judgment " (Heb. vi. 2). In this final fragment of the New Testament the doctrine had received a formulation which was to pass bodily into the Catholic Creed.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

THE WITNESS OF REASON

WE have said that the Resurrection of the Body, being a revealed mystery, is not provable by reason, but is acceptable only on authority. As a preface to "the Witness of Reason," we set down the principle of St. Thomas :

"Whoever tries to prove" (a mystery of faith) "by natural reason derogates from faith in two ways :

"*First*, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible things that exceed human reason : wherefore the Apostle says that *faith is of things that appear not* (Heb. xi. 1).

"*Secondly*, as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in the endeavour to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent he falls under the ridicule of unbelievers ; since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such grounds.

"Therefore we must not attempt to prove what is of faith except by authority alone, to those who receive the authority ; while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible" (1^a Qu. 32, Art. 1, Eng. tr.).

". . . Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of faith can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments against faith cannot be demonstrations but are difficulties that can be answered" (1^a Qu. 1, Art. 8, Eng. tr.).

With these words of wisdom, which should

not be forgotten, we now pass from the Witness of Scripture to the Witness of Reason to the Resurrection of the Body. It is significant that in replying to the Sadducees our Lord said : " You err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God " (Matt. xxii. 29).

In other words, the revelation of Scripture is helped out by what our reason tells us of the omnipotent power of God. Here more explicitly than elsewhere St. Thomas will be our guide.

(a) The first principle of reason is that the soul, as an intellectual and therefore simple substance, is naturally incorruptible and immortal (1^a Qu. 75, Art. 6).

(b) The second principle of reason is that the soul is not man (1^a Qu. 75, Art. 4). Even in the common speech of the people, that quarry of sound thinking, man is not said to be a soul, but to have a soul.

(c) The third principle of reason is that as man is not a soul, man is a soul and body. In other words, the body belongs essentially and not accidentally to the personality of man. It is almost incredible how common is a certain mild form of Manicheism, which seems to depreciate the human body as almost the sole source of sin, instead of being but a joint source and perhaps the lesser source in union with the soul. It must have been forgetfulness of the essential goodness of the body and of its essential union with the soul that dictated such words as the following :

“ As long as we suppose the mystery of death to be the division of soul and body, so long we must cling with a deep love to those remains which yet we are forced to regard with a kind of loathing. We shall be ready to believe stories of miracles wrought by them ; we shall be half-inclined to worship them. Or if we reject this temptation—because Romanists have fallen into it—we shall take our own Protestant way of asserting the sanctity of relics by maintaining that at a certain day they will be gathered together, and that the very body to which they once belonged will be reconstructed out of them . . . If we did attach any meaning to that expression upon which St. Peter at Jerusalem, St. Paul at Antioch, dwelt so earnestly, that Christ’s body saw no corruption—*we should not dare, I think, any longer to make the corrupt, degrading, shameful accidents which necessarily belong to that body in each of us*, because we have sinned, the rule by which we judge of it here. How much less should we suppose these to be the elements out of which its high and restored and spiritual estate can ever be fashioned ” (Fr. D. Maurice, *Theological Essays*, 5th Ed., pp. 143, 151), quoted by H. D. A. Major, *A Resurrection of Relics* (Blackwell, 1922, pp. 49, 50).

1. It is difficult to find the exact meaning behind these words. The phrase “ corrupt, degrading, shameful accidents which necessarily belong to that body,” etc., seems to suggest either that sin has changed the substance of the body or that the body is the creation of a Manichean principle of evil.

2. It is evident that if from these “ corrupt, degrading, shameful accidents ” there can be no fashioning of a spiritual estate for the body, still less can there be such a fashioning for the soul. It is clear that the qualifications, “ corrupt, degrading, shameful,” which are

largely metaphorical when applied to the dying or dead body, are literal when applied to the dead soul. It is therefore evident that the incorrect doctrine of the death and resurrection of the body will lead to the denial of the spiritual resurrection and death of the soul.

3. It is astonishing that men like Maurice are found to belittle the human body as if it was no part, or no essential part, of our being, when it is a question of the Resurrection. But in other matters, as, for example, in the matter of Asceticism, they are found to exalt the human body as if it were a great and even a noble part of our being. Indeed, how otherwise could they retain a high opinion of human beings whose activities and pleasures are for the most part concerned with the body? How, too, could it be said, as it has been said by some, that the bodily procreative act is man's highest act?

From these exaggerations, and consequent contradictions, we are spared by the Catholic doctrine that the body is essentially good and is essentially joined to the soul as part of the human personality. St. Thomas has summed up the value of this in these words :

“ If the resurrection of the body is scorned, it is not easy, nay, it is hard, to hold the immortality of the soul. For it is evident that the soul is joined to the body naturally ; since to be separated from it is against nature and is accidental (*per accidens*). Hence the soul separated from the body is imperfect as long as it is without the body. But it is impossible that what is natural and essential (*per*

se) should be finite and, as it were, nothing, whereas what is unnatural and accidental should be infinite. This would be the case if the soul were to endure without the body. Hence the Neo-Platonists who admitted immortality supposed reincarnation ; but this is heretical. Hence if the dead do not rise again our only hope would be in this life." (In. I. Cor. xv).

(d) The fourth principle of reason is the goodness not only of the body, but of matter. Those who, in order to deny the resurrection of the body, are obliged to deny the goodness of matter, must find themselves in opposition to modern science, on two counts :

First, modern science, by its own definition, is mostly, if not wholly, concerned with what it perceives by the five senses ; in other words, with matter. Now unless matter is essentially good, then modern science is mostly evil !

Secondly, if science is the knowledge of what comes to us through our bodily senses, and in the next world we have not bodily senses because we have not a body, then the next world will have no science !

(e) Sometimes it is urged that modern science, with its new views of matter, has made it impossible to believe the Resurrection of the Body.

Mr. H. D. A. Major, in *A Resurrection of Relics*, quotes the following authorities :

Bishop Goodwin of Carlisle : " The view of the possibilities of the future resurrection is one *which our present knowledge of matter* and its laws renders it imperative on

all wise men to discard. Matter which appertains to one body at one time appertains to another body at another. The notion of particle being joined to particle, so as to reform a certain body involves an impossibility (*The Foundations of the Creed*, 2nd ed., p. 384).

" . . . It is the enunciation of a theory which a knowledge of the laws of matter shows to be untenable " (*Ibid.* 390).

Canon C. H. Robinson, D.D. : " The belief was widespread in early times that the material bodies of Christians would one day be literally resuscitated and would rise from their graves in a form visible to material eyesight. . . . Modern science by showing that the particles of matter of which our present bodies are composed have previously formed part of the bodies of other beings, has rendered such a belief impossible " (*Studies in the Resurrection of Christ*, 1911, pp. 13—17).

The most unscholarly, not to say uncharitable, quotation made by Mr. Major is from the same Canon Robinson, D.D. :

" . . . In an age when physical science had hardly come to the birth, and when a man would have been excommunicated or put to death as a heretic had he ventured to suggest that the particle of matter of which his body was composed might already have formed part of the bodies of others who had lived and died before him, the only way by which a belief in the preservation of human identity could be expressed in unambiguous terms was by the use of the language which was adopted in the Creed " (*sic!*) *Ibid.*

On this we may say four things.

Firstly, this view of the constant flux of matter in the human body is so old that in the thirteenth century it has been elaborated by St. Thomas in a manner that almost defies the

untrained thought of our day. If excommunication and death awaited the daring thinker who would have propounded the "modern" theory, then through some miscarriage of justice the Angelic Doctor died a natural death in full communion with the Holy See !

It is almost incredible that a Doctor of Divinity should have made any such statement, and still more incredible that it should be quoted by one who holds an influential place at the University of Oxford. It will go far to discredit the Modernist claim to scholarship, which we have hitherto admitted on the claim of the Dean of Carlisle.

Secondly, if the physical theory that the body is a passing flux of material particles disproves the survival of the body, then a kindred theory would seem to disprove the survival of the soul. For, it is argued by very subtle thinkers that what we call the soul is but a series of states of consciousness—indeed, of states of present consciousness which as such are not sufficient to guarantee us the certitude of their being in organic unity with past consciousness.

If it be urged that although there is a succession of States of Consciousness, yet there is an abiding unity, it may be urged in reply that *mutatis mutandis* the same applies to the body. The patent empiric fact is the persistent unity, the scientific deduction in the flux of elements.

Thirdly, granted the fact—which personally I cannot call a verified fact—of the constant flux

of particles in matter, it would seem that this does not disprove, but rather seems to prove the possibility of bodily resurrection. The alleged fact is that every particle in a body changes, and yet that the body remains the same.

Now consider the opposite theory, that no particle ever changes in a body. If this theory were true, there would be no evidence that a body can remain the same with change of matter. But as death does make a change of matter, the evidence for this theory would go to prove that a change of matter betokened a change of soul ; in other words, that death makes it impossible that the same body should rise again.

Fourthly, the modern recent theories of matter are almost overwhelming on the side of the resurrection of the body. A recent scientific writer in *The Times* summed up the present views of the Nature of Matter :

“ On the physical side the phenomena of light, electricity and magnetism are all being explained in terms of the electron. On the chemical side the properties and qualities of the arrangements of identical electrons are being explained in terms of the arrangements of identical electrons in different systems. There is, in fact, one unit of matter, the electron. And this unit of matter is itself immaterial ” (*The Times*, 7 March, “ The Progress of Science ”).

“ Modern Science,” by saying that the unit of matter is itself immaterial, can hardly be taken to deny the possibility of the resurrection of the

body ; unless indeed it denies the immortality of mind, *i.e.* of the soul.

(e) The fifth principle of reason is that the soul is the *Causa Efficiens* of the Body from the moment of its union to the body.

When the soul is reunited to such a part of its body as will allow us to call it the same body, we may well see an instantaneous recapitulation of the formative process. Cytology seems to tell us that the really living essential of the unit-cell is almost infinitesimally small. Yet that microcosm has within it to form the microcosm of the finished organism. If it is only acceleration of motion we need for the full acceptance of the Resurrection or re-formation of the body in modes akin to the formation of the body, science has now given us that almost frictionless multiplying gear which has no limit save the adhesive power of the gear metal.

(f) Perhaps in this hard matter of the bodily resurrection some hope of recalling men to unity may be found in the condition of the risen body. Theology lays it down that not the substance of the body, but only its condition shall be changed. Body will not become spirit ; but whilst remaining body, it will become pliant and obedient to the spirit. Time and space will still remain. Some of the soul's supremacy over time and space will be given by the soul as a dowry to the body.

One last thought may end this defence of the Immortality of Man in terms of the Resurrection

of man's body. The Church in thus seeming to cherish the lesser doctrine more than the greater is keeping her own customary way. When once the doctrine of the divinity of the Son and thus of Jesus Christ was officially defined, the Church was almost more intent on safeguarding His humanity than His divinity. The Oriental disregard for human freedom and personality made little account of denying the human will, and therefore the human freedom of Christ. But the Church understood that the sacred humanity could not be kept with the denial of a human will and freedom ; and that ultimately, though the divinity of Jesus Christ did not rest on His humanity, man's belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ did and does rest on the belief in His humanity.

In a kindred way the Church is certain that, whilst the immortality of the soul does not rest on the resurrection of the body, yet man's belief in one may be imperilled by his disbelief of the other. For this reason the Church seems more concerned for the lesser than for the greater, for the sheath than for the sword, for the husk than for the kernel. Yet it is not in any mistaken view of the scale of values ; but in a consciousness that what is of less importance may be in greater danger of being overlooked ; and that the whole orb of truth, which the Church is commissioned to teach, must find a place not for what is most and best, but for what is all.

CHAPTER V

THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE¹

THROUGHOUT the month of July, and until August 8th, the Bishops in communion with the Sees of Canterbury and York will sit in conference at Lambeth. The War which has given the English speaking peoples, for good or evil, a paramount influence in international politics will therefore add a more than transient spiritual weight to a conference of Bishops discussing world problems in the English tongue.

Even without the gravity which comes to it from the world's greatest war this Lambeth Conference has a significance almost unique. It is no mere local council. Its Bishops are from all parts of the world. His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury in asking Dr. F. B.

¹ As some of my readers have found in my words a sense I did not mean, it is well to say that in making use of the words "Bishop, Church," etc., I have no desire to unsay the "*Apostolicæ Curæ*"; which indeed I fully accept as an authoritative and final pronouncement. With regard to the word "Church" and Churches, further aid toward our readers is to be found in the following document. Before me lies an official "Programme of the Inaugural Meeting of the National United Campaign of the Churches at the Mansion House, London," at which "His Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury" was Chairman and His Eminence Cardinal Bourne proposed the first Resolution. This Meeting was organised by a body entitled "The Temperance Council of the *Christian Churches* of England and Wales." The four Presidents are, His Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, the Rev R. C. Gillie, General W. Bramwell Booth.

Meyer, the President of the Free Church Council, for the prayers and sympathy of the Free Churches, could say :

“ The Lambeth Conference will, so far as we can at present tell, include 107 Bishops from the Dioceses in the Dominions, and the Mission Field, 72 Bishops from the United States of America and about 100 Bishops whose work lies in the British Isles.”

Thus the Council of English-speaking Bishops who will foregather amidst the historic memories of Lambeth will number about three hundred.

It would be idle and perhaps sinful to ignore this unique event. Indeed we can ask, when since primitive times has there been held such a provincial council speaking a modern language ? Only some three hundred Bishops assembled in Ecumenical Council at Nicea to define the *ὁμοούσιος* ; only some two hundred Bishops assembled in Ecumenical Council at Ephesus to define the *Θεοτόκος*.

Moreover, although these Bishops of the Lambeth Conference are to some extent of the same race, yet in this they are not unlike the Fathers of the first four Ecumenical Councils. But if, on the one hand, they are racially a little more of one kindred than these Fathers of the first four Ecumenical Councils, on the other hand they come from dioceses comparable in ecumenical extent only with the Vatican Council, which for the first time in the history of the Catholic Church, drew its members from all the quarters of the earth. In numbers

and in ecclesiastical influence, therefore, the Lambeth Conference of 1920 will be equalled by few if any of the non-ecumenical councils, either in the Eastern or the Western Church.

This phenomenon is all the more impressive because it is less than a century ago since the Church of England seemed dead or dying, even to the eyes of its own children. With the passing of the Reform Bill of 1830, and the Dis-establishment of the Church of Ireland in 1833, such acute minds as Hurrell Froude, Keble and Newman, thought that the Church of England was doomed to death. It was almost in a forlorn hope of raising their Mother from death to life that these men in an Oxford common-room began a movement worthy of the Home of lost causes.

The cause of the English Church seemed to some still more hopeless when Newman, who was the philosopher of the Tractarian movement, left the Church of his baptism, as a seaman leaves a foundering ship. Until Newman's genius and subtlety had written the *Via Media* the Church of England had lacked a philosophy of life; yet the thinker who had begotten this philosophy came to look upon it not as vital thinking but as paper logic, doomed to sterility and death. He was, therefore, speaking not only his own thoughts, but the thoughts of many of his brethren of the English Church, when in his last Anglican sermon, at Littlemore, he thus apostrophised their common mother :

"O my mother, whence is this unto thee, that thou hast good things poured out upon thee and canst not keep them, and barest children, yet darest not own them? Why hast thou not the skill to use their services nor the heart to rejoice in their love? How is it that whatever is generous in purpose and tender or deep in devotion thy flower and thy promise, falls from thy bosom and finds no place within thine arms? Who hath put this note upon thee, to have *a miscarrying womb and dry breasts* . . . And what wilt thou do in the end thereof?"

Nine years later when he preached at the First Provincial Synod of Westminster, the group of prelates gathered together in the little College Chapel at Oscott were touched to enthusiasm by this fugitive from the other camp who spoke to them of a Second Spring. He had the dramatic instinct to see what he had the artistic power to express in words of almost magic eloquence. "And so that high company moves on into the holy place, and there with august rite and awful sacrifice, inaugurates the great act which brought it hither. What is that act? It is the first Synod of a new Hierarchy. It is the resurrection of the Church" (*The Second Spring*).

The course of events has, for the moment, somewhat dramatically belied both these dramatic forecasts. Contrary to the expectations of even the wise, the Church of England has not met an early death. Indeed it may even be said to have risen from death to life. Largely through the influence of the genius and seer who prophesied its dissolution it has gone

on to a fuller life than it has had since the struggles of the sixteenth century. Not even the men who did not follow Newman Rome-wards in 1845, would have prophesied that in less than four score years some three hundred Bishops in full communion with Canterbury and York would meet at Lambeth to discuss the spiritual destinies of the two great States who now control not only London and Washington, but Alexandria, Jerusalem, Constantinople !

Indeed the very words which Newman used in Oscott College Chapel to hearten the First Provincial Synod of Westminster may well find an application in the present state of those in communion with the Sees of Canterbury and York : " It is the resurrection of the Church."

This resurrection has sprung from such resolve, has encountered such opposition, has been fraught with such surprises, and we may truly say, has been crowned with such success that it is one of the chief phenomena of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That a movement beginning in the common-room of one of the lesser Oxford Colleges should have taken less than a century to become almost a world-wide force is a spiritual fact of first importance even to those who are not glad of the fact. Its importance to us, Roman Catholics, is not merely that it has given us two Cardinals, many Bishops, thousands of converts, and a spiritual impulse which can be found even in the vestments the priest wears at the altar, and the

hymns our people sing in their homes. The things it has done within our fold though so great, and indeed unique, are almost unimportant when compared with the things it has done at home in its own fold. In towns like X——, where Nonconformity was supreme, the High Church (or as it now calls itself, the Catholic) party have, by years of hard work, succeeded in capturing the first position amongst the citizens. Nor is it true to think that this position of influence is found merely amongst the well-to-do. The Church of England has bred and reared hundreds of Dollings, men who have lived amongst the poor as poor men themselves. Again, their restoration of liturgical worship has examples even for us within the fold of St. Peter. Their churches are often models of liturgical exactness. To the present writer the history of their Confraternity of the Blessed Sacrament is characteristic and challenging. Before the *Codex Juris Canonici* (Can. 711. §) ordered local Ordinaries to erect the Confraternity of the Blessed Sacrament in every parish, the Catholic party within the Church of England had established their Confraternity throughout the length and breadth of the land. Indeed even now, three years after the publication of the *Codex Juris Canonici*, the Confraternities established by our separated brethren far outstrip ours in number and organisation. In hundreds of churches these Confraternities meet at least once a month to

say as their office the Vespers for the feast of Corpus Christi !

It may, therefore, be said that since the day when J. H. Newman, in parting with his friends at Littlemore, forecast the approaching death of the Church of England, death has been at least delayed. Indeed all or almost all the official steps taken since that day have been towards that full catholic life which we, in the fold of St. Peter, have as our birth-right. This has been said by the Rev. Spencer Jones in his book *The Counter-Reformation*: "So it has come to pass that the movement has realised for itself a constitutional course, beginning where all wholesome movements for reform should begin with the witness of individuals among the inferior clergy who had to suffer persecution, and in many instances imprisonment for the truth's sake, and finding its way gradually to a seat of authority and centre. And thus, unlike the heretical teaching under Elisabeth and Edward VI, the Catholic doctrine, which may have to be tolerated for a time before it can triumph, has won its way so far in spite of force and not by means of it" (p. 114).

Over and against this resurrection of the Church of England from the dead, we have to set the undeniable life, if not growth of the Catholic body in communion with the See of Rome. This life we would be the last to deny ; and this growth we are willing and even anxious

to believe. But are the facts on the side of this belief? We are not sure that they are.

Certainly, if we take a general view of the present position of Catholics in England and Wales, we find that in a population of 36,203,253 (A.D. 1911), there are 1,898,843 (A.D. 1920) Catholics. Catholics are therefore one in every twenty of the population. Again, to take a concrete example suggested by "The Second Spring," in the great city which now contains the Chapel of the First Provincial Synod of Westminster, the estimated Catholic population is less than 35,000 out of a population of a million; or one in every twenty-eight of the citizens of Birmingham. Yet it would be difficult to find a centre of Catholicity more effectively organised than Birmingham. It has been led by most efficient and apostolic Bishops. John Henry Cardinal Newman lived and worked in it for years. It boasts of a Diocesan Seminary, perhaps the most historic in England. It has had a band of diocesan clergy second to none. Yet it would be impossible to say whether its growth has been greater than that section of the Church of England which calls itself Catholic.

All these facts we must face as facts if we are to base conclusions and policy on the rock of truth. Moreover, they give to the Lambeth Conference an importance which is not to be dismissed by mere controversial acerbities.

But our readers may ask, "What is the sig-

nificance of these facts? Are they signs of victory or of defeat? Are they towards hope or despair?" We know not. God knows.

Let us set down the grounds of hope :

1. It is evident that the forward movement amongst those in communion with the Sees of Canterbury and York is a Romeward Movement. Or if that word Rome is still too pungent to be borne, the movement is towards regaining, under a sense of continuity, all those truths, all that sacramental life, all that ecclesiastical communion and fellowship with Christian churches, which in the words of Rev. Spencer Jones, were torn from the Church of England "by an organised conspiracy of fraud and force" (*ibid.*, p. 17).

2. This movement has left its marks even in the official statements of the Lambeth Conferences. There have been spoken on both sides of our separation only too many words which it is well to forget; and only too few which it is well to remember. Even if previous Lambeth Conferences have not always said the word which heals, the last Lambeth Conference (1908) has said a word which at least cannot rankle. In the Report presented to the full Conference by the Committee on Reunion and Intercommunion these wise words found a place: "They (the Committee) desire to place upon record their conviction that no projects of union can ever be regarded as satisfactory which deliberately leave out the Churches of

the Latin Communion" (*The Five Lambeth Conferences*, compiled under the direction of the Most Rev. Randall T. Davidson, D.D., Archbishop of Canterbury, S.P.C.K., p. 426). This pronouncement is in the spirit of the wise words written by Prof. E. A. Freeman (*Ency. Britt.*, Vol. VIII., p. 278). "The Church of England is the daughter of the Church of Rome. She is so perhaps more than any other Church in Europe."

But the Lambeth Conference of 1908 had to look beyond the mere events of the previous twelve years in order to forget the Bull *Apostolicae Curae* under the hunger and thirst for Reunion. Such generosity of forgetfulness does not make for despair.

3. If this last Lambeth Conference was generous in its admission towards its Mother Church, it has been met by admissions no less generous.

When events made it necessary to set an organised Hierarchy over the Roman Catholics of this country, the Church of Rome with singular delicacy, did not set its Bishops and Archbishops in the historic sees of Canterbury, York and the rest. The significance of this delicacy of the successors of St. Gregory cannot at once fully be seen. But if ever a day of reconciliation comes about, this act of the Popes in leaving unchallenged the Sees first created by St. Gregory the Great, may allow us

to see a Cardinal Archbishop of Canterbury singing High Mass in Westminster Cathedral.

4. The *Ecclesia Anglicana* may well expect that its desires for reunion will be met by Rome's traditional breadth of toleration. Of this toleration we have a new proof in the *Codex Juris Canonici*. Though this body of laws has been the elaboration of centuries and is of more importance than Magna Charta, yet its opening canon is, "Licet in Codice juris canonici Ecclesiæ quoque Orientalis disciplina sæpe referatur, ipse tamen unam respicit Latinam Ecclesiam, neque Orientalem obligat" (although in the Code of Canon Law the discipline of the Eastern Church is often mentioned, yet it regards only the Latin Church, and does not oblige the Eastern Church). Now this Eastern Church, which is of such concern to Rome that it exempts it from the normal legislation, hardly numbers one hundred Bishops, whose Sees are amongst nations of little international importance. On the other hand the Bishops in communion with Canterbury and York number over three hundred; and belong for the moment to the two most powerful nations left by the War.

5. Again, it is often felt that the supremacy of the See of Rome has dwarfed the authority of Bishops. But it is the See of Rome, at Trent and Vatican and in the *Codex* which officially exalts Bishops by calling them successors of the Apostles. Pope Leo XIII, in the Encyclical

Satis Cognitum, officially denies that these successors of the Apostles are merely vicars of the Roman Pontiff. In doctrine no other Church has so exalted the Bishops ; and in fact, the Bishops in communion with the Apostolic See, are given more honour and authority than any other Bishops in the world.

6. As the Churches in communion with Rome, and those in communion with Canterbury and York are being slowly emancipated from secular and royal pressure, they begin to feel that the separation between them has not been mainly of their own making. The issues, at least in this country, have been obscured by our forefathers, politically identifying the Crown rights of Christ with the royal pretension of a dynasty. The faith of England has been largely lost in a dynastic quarrel between the House of Tudor and the House of Stuart. The recognition of this fact may be the first step towards its undoing.

7. Much of the spirit that animates the successors of St. Peter is to be found in the noble words uttered by the Right Rev. W. R. Brownlow, D.D., Bishop of Clifton (1896). "Of one thing our Anglican friends may be assured. No jealousy or selfish feeling of personal dignity on the part of the Catholic Hierarchy will ever stand in the way of Reunion. Speaking for myself, I can say from my heart that I should be too thankful to petition the Holy Father for permission to resign my See,

to take down my canopy and throne from the Pro-Cathedral and to lay my episcopal crozier at the feet of a Catholic Bishop of Bristol " (*The Reunion of England with Rome*, 2nd Edition).

We may be asked, " What will be the outcome of the present relation between the Mother-See of Rome and her beloved child Canterbury ? " Again we say, a little sadly, " We do not know." No quarrels are more enduring or more deadly than those between next-of-kin. The issue between mother and child depends wholly upon human wills. But when human wills are set resolutely upon God's truth and God's Will it is hard to find therein any other signs than those that look towards hope.

CHAPTER VI

CANTERBURY AND ROME

A DEEP sense of responsibility urged us to write in our July issue some of the thoughts that filled our soul on the eve of the Lambeth Conference. We were of those who could see, and even profess to see a unique event in the assembly of two hundred and fifty Bishops in communion with the Sees of Canterbury and York. These Bishops, belonging to the two great English-speaking nations, could not discuss after-war problems in the spiritual sphere without wielding a power for good, which, like every other power, might be turned to evil even when used with good intent. It was part of their disarming truthfulness frankly to confess that they had no mandate even from their own Church to say the last word on any subject of spiritual reconstruction. This profession of self-diffidence did not discredit them in our eyes. Rather did it put them apart from that all too numerous group of spiritual reconstructionists whose self-confidence is their chief power for evil. We were therefore ready to listen to whatever issued from the counsels of a group of men whose self-diffidence recalled the prophetic words, "I am not the Christ."

Our readiness to listen was not disappointed. As the result of deliberations lasting some five weeks, the assembled Bishops issued: 1. An Encyclical Letter. 2. An Appeal (to all Christian people on Reunion). 3. Resolutions, eighty in number. 4. Reports of Committees.

We do not think we are exaggerating the result of these deliberations by looking upon them as one of the most important steps towards social reconstruction taken since the outbreak of the Great War. In this we are probably re-echoing the quiet suffrage of the public. Although the Report is a volume of a hundred and sixty pages, costing two shillings, yet the first edition of 15,000 was entirely sold out within seven days. This great sale, which is probably unprecedented, is mainly due to the question of Reunion which the Report placed in such prominence. To quote an unbiassed witness, "The Appeal to all Christian people which was issued a few days ago by the Lambeth Conference has received a most cordial welcome in very various quarters. Churchmen of all schools of thought have expressed their gratitude for this plea for the Reunion of Christendom, and some of the most eminent Free Churchmen have stated their appreciation in the most emphatic way." (*Daily Telegraph*. August 28th).

The Resolutions and Committee Reports deal with Christianity and International Relations—The Church and Industrial Problems—The

Development of Provinces—Missionary Problems—Position of Women—Problems of Marriage—Spiritualism, Christian Science and Theosophy—Reunion. As it is with the question of Reunion that we are concerned we will set down the words of the Encyclical Letter.

. . . God has called into being a fellowship of men, His Church, and sent His Holy Spirit to abide therein, that by the prevailing attraction of that One Spirit, He, the One God and Father of all, may win over the whole human family to that fellowship in Himself by which alone it can attain to the fulness of life . . . The weakness of the Church in the world of to-day is not surprising when we consider how the bands of its own fellowship are loosened and broken.

The truth of this had been slowly working into the consciousness of Christians before the War. But the War and its horrors, waged as it was between so-called Christian nations, drove home the truth with the shock of a sudden awakening. Men in all communions began to think of the Reunion of Christendom, not as a laudable ambition or a beautiful dream, but as an imperative necessity. . . . The great wind was blowing over the whole earth.

Such were the conditions of the time at which our Conference met. *All realised that the subject of Reunion was our most important subject.* The Bishops brought with them into the Conference very various preconceptions. Different traditions, different estimates of history, different experiences in the present, different opinions on current proposals; seemed almost to preclude the hope of reaching any common mind. The subject of Reunion was entrusted to the largest Committee ever appointed in a Lambeth Conference. As their work proceeded, the members of it felt they were being drawn by a Power greater than themselves to a general agreement. Their conclusions were accepted by the Conference under the same sense of a compelling

influence. The decision of the Conference was reached with a unanimity all but complete. It is embodied in our Appeal to all Christian people."

1. "All realised that the subject of Reunion was our most important subject." This is a unique spiritual phenomenon of the twentieth century. It has been forced upon the consciousness of Christianity by the visible failure of Christians to stem religious indifference. To a Roman Catholic who asked a clever, successful, and upright doctor, "Why have you no religion, doctor?" the reply was, "I am a very busy man. I will choose my religion when the clergy have agreed which is the true religion!"

Ministers of religion are slowly awakening to two facts. (a) Christianity is losing to practical indifference. (b) The chief factor in this loss is the disunion of Christians, and especially of the ministers of religion.

2. It is consoling to know that no one is more conscious of these two factors than are these same ministers of religion. Whilst it is mainly due to them that the number of Christians is as large as it is, it is also mainly due to them that the number of Christians is as small as it is, and gradually becoming relatively smaller.

3. It is still more consoling to realise that the movement towards Church Reunion is largely fostered and furthered by ministers of religion. No doubt there is a very helpful backing from the laity; and even a (dangerous?) backing

here and there from the politicians. But the movement, whether amongst English Churchmen or Free Churchmen, has sprung from the ranks of those ministers of religion who have come to feel in the present crisis of religion that unity alone is strength.

4. The two hundred and fifty Bishops summoned from all parts of the world and assembled at Lambeth, were at one with their fellow ministers of religion in seeing the need for religious Reunion. Indeed, they put Reunion at the forefront of their deliberations. Looking upon it rightly as their "most important subject" they dealt with it more determinedly than it had ever been dealt with by them before. They appointed the largest Committee ever appointed by a Lambeth Conference. The Report on Reunion was passed "with a unanimity all but complete." The Bishop of Exeter tells us that of the two hundred and fifty Bishops *only three* were unable to vote for the resolution! (*Church Times*, August 20th.)

II

The causes of the disunion of Christendom are set down with frank humility in the "Appeal."

The causes of division lie deep in the past, and are by no means simple or wholly blameworthy. Yet none can doubt that self-will, ambition, and a lack of charity among Christians have been the principal factors in the mingled process, and that these, together with blindness to the sin

of disunion are still mainly responsible for the breaches of Christendom. We acknowledge this condition of broken fellowship to be contrary to God's will, and we desire frankly to confess our share in the guilt of thus crippling the Body of Christ and hindering the activity of His Spirit.

1. Something may assuredly be wanting to this statement as a formula of faith ; but nothing is wanting to it as a formula of repentance. It may not meet all the theological doctrine of the indefectibility of the Church. But it is a humble denial of the impeccability of Churchmen.

2. Bishops like his Lordship of Zanzibar give this frank acknowledgment an expression still more frank. He writes : " The Bishops are, I take it, prepared *to wash the feet* of their fellow-Christians ; to humble themselves before them if by any means they may be counted worthy to serve them. . . . For myself I am thankful for the Bishops' utterance. It has lifted us to a new level. We are bidden, in effect, exorcise the spirit of sectarianism from all our communions ; to lift up our eyes to the vision of the universal Church and to humble ourselves at one another's feet." (*Church Times*, August 20th.)

Such sentiments have not come to the heart of man from the mere mind of man. A great wind has blown them thither from the mind and heart of God. If we are not within sight of the City of Peace our faces are set eastwards towards its gates.

3. We of the Roman Catholic Church, *i.e.* the *Ecclesia Latina* and the *Ecclesia Orientalis* (*Codex Juris Canonici*. Can. 1), will not allow our separated brethren to accept all the sin of disunion. Long before disunion came, our saints and prophets saw it coming. They denounced it as a crime; but they denounced still more the crimes of those even in the highest quarters which brought it into being.

Even to-day our people are taught to look upon the upheaval of the sixteenth century as an effect of their own sins. "Gradually a regrettable worldliness manifested itself in many high ecclesiastics. Their chief object, *viz.* to guide man to his eternal goal, claimed too seldom their attention, and worldly activities became in too many cases the chief interest. Political power, material possessions . . . earthly interests of various kinds were only too often the chief aim of many of the higher clergy. Pastoral solicitude, the specifically religious and ecclesiastical aim, fell largely into the background, notwithstanding various spirited and successful attempts to rectify the existing evils. Closely connected with the above were various abuses in the lives of the clergy and the people. In the Papal Curia political interests and a worldly life were often prominent. Many bishops and abbots bore themselves as secular rulers rather than as servants of the Church. . . . The scientific and ascetic training of the clergy left much to be desired, the moral

standard of many being very low, and the practice of celibacy not everywhere observed." If we have quoted this passage from such a representative and widely read work as the *Catholic Encyclopaedia* (Vol. XII., p. 700. Art., Reformation), it is not for its authoritativeness, or for our agreement with its findings. Indeed, we should not be surprised if the writer of the article has painted his picture in colours too dark for truth. But for that very reason the quotation is irrefutable as an indication of the Church's present desire to acknowledge its share in the responsibility of disunion. This makes towards hope. When two parties to a quarrel cannot outdo each other in accepting blame the end of the quarrel is in sight.

III

Some noteworthy steps towards Reunion are taken in the following weighty statements:—

Terms of Reunion must no longer be judged by the success with which they meet the claims and preserve the positions of two or more uniting Communion, but by their correspondence to the common ideal of the Church as God would have it to be. . . . So long as there is vital connexion with the Head, there is positive value in the differentiation of the members. But we are convinced that this ideal cannot be fulfilled if these groups are content to remain in separation from one another or to be joined together only in some vague federation. Their value for the fulness of Christian life, truth and witness can only be realised if they are *united in the fellowships of one visible Society whose members are bound together by the ties of a common faith, common*

sacraments, and a common ministry. It is towards this ideal of a united and truly Catholic Church that we must all set our minds (*Encyclical Letter*).

We believe that it is God's purpose to manifest this fellowship, so far as this world is concerned, in an outward, visible and united society, holding one faith, having its own recognised officers, using God-given means of grace, and inspiring all its members to the world-wide service of the Kingdom of God. That is what we mean by the Catholic Church. . . . To this end, we who send forth this Appeal would say that if the authorities of other Communion should so desire we are persuaded that, terms of union having been otherwise satisfactorily adjusted, Bishops and clergy of our Communion would willingly accept from these authorities a form of commission or recognition which would commend our ministry to their congregations (*Appeals to all Christian People*).

. . . Should the Church of Rome at any time desire to discuss conditions of Reunion we shall be ready to welcome such discussions (*Report on Reunion, Part III*).

1. Again let us frankly own that as professions of faith these statements may not have been drawn up with theological accuracy.

But even their promulgators have not wished to make them professions of faith. In a truer sense they are professions of charity. We are not so zeal-blinded as to see in them the dawn of Reunion. But they are the most authentic promise of dawn that has yet appeared in the dark night legacied to us by the sixteenth century.

2. There is a clear, definite enunciation of the necessity of the "Visible Church." This is not to deny—indeed it may even demand—

the necessity of an " Invisible Church " ; since it is not outward, visible professions of faith, but the inner, hidden life of charity that saves the human soul by uniting it to the Soul of the Church.

3. The visible Church is one in faith, in sacraments, in ministry. In the Report of the Committee it is said :

It is of first importance, in order to remove Oriental misconceptions, to make it clear from our formularies that *we regard Ordination as conferring grace, and not only as a mere setting apart to an ecclesiastical office.*

The *Church Times* has some helpful words on this attitude of the Conference. In a leading article (August 27th) it says : " The point upon which most stress has been laid is the patent conviction of the bishops that nothing can be done unless Nonconformists are willing to submit to episcopal ordination. They have in view not only Reunion with Protestants, but Reunion with Rome and the East, neither of which would hear of Reunion on any other basis. . . . (Some Nonconformists) seem to assume that the sacramental theory of the ministry has been abandoned by the Bishops. Of course this is not so." (Then follows the passage quoted from the Report.) . . . " If Rome or the East have doubts " (of our ordination) " we will submit to an ordination which will remove those doubts."

We who lived through the distressing period

before and after the *Apostolicae Curae*, saw such evidence of the human emotions engendered on both sides that we wellnigh despaired of a reconciliation. But the Bishops gathered under the shadow of St. Anselm and St. Thomas at Lambeth have made despair an act of disloyalty to Him who rules the heart.

4. This willingness to serve Reunion even by submitting to re-ordination shows a disposition of such readiness that we can hardly overrate the following significant words: "Should the Church of Rome at any time desire to discuss conditions of Reunion we shall be ready to welcome such discussions." It is nearly three hundred years since words such as these passed between the Mother-Church and its beloved Daughter-Church. They are too fateful, perhaps too official, to be fitly dealt with by a private theologian. They are of the nature of an invitation to proclaim an armistice with a view to a final Peace Conference. The Shepherd who guides his flock where Peter laid down his life for the sheep, will not hear this Voice of the English without feeling his Shepherd heart moved to its depths. Already the Court of St. James's has entered into official relations with the Court of St. Peter's. God grant it may be but a symbol significant and effective of another reconciliation which will mean the kiss of peace between Rome and Canterbury.

CHAPTER VII

THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE AND RE-UNION : A ROMAN CATHOLIC VIEW

A CONFERENCE of Bishops in communion with the Sees of Canterbury and York, held amidst the historic surroundings of Lambeth Palace, could not be given its true value without some remembrance of recent and ancient history.

The most significant fact of ancient history needed for the true valuation of the Lambeth Conference of A.D. 1920 is the series of acts which led to the separation of Canterbury, York, and the other Sees of the *Ecclesia Anglicana* from the See of Rome. It goes without saying that after a thousand years of a peaceful union almost without parallel in the history of Christendom, the Daughter Church and the Mother Church could have been separated only by some act as violent as a revolution or an amputation.

If there is any blame to be attached to the now parted Churches, we are willing to think that the time for allotting the blame of this separation has passed into the time when men must take thought how the parting-wall may be broken down. Perhaps we shall help in this great work of reconciliation and reunion by asking

both sides to stay even their self-accusation by recalling the fact that there were not two parties only, but three parties, to this fatal dispute.

Too often the actions, emotions, passions, which cut the immemorial cable between England and the barque of Peter, are attributed merely to clerics either of Canterbury or Rome. Yet if we read the history of the sixteenth century aright the reunion which the Lambeth Conference feels to be so necessary has been occasioned by acts which originated less with clerics than with the Crown !

It would be a useful, painful task to go through the history of heresies in order to know how many of them have sprung from clerics. We are probably well within the truth if we say that the majority of heresiarchs have been priests or even Bishops—priests who were tired of their celibacy or their faith, Bishops who were galled by their subordination to their superior Bishops. In most cases these men in their disregard of orthodoxy as against licence sought the aid of the secular arm, which after a time brought the heresiarchs or their successors into a furnace of thralldom seven times hotter than before.

But it would be flying in the face of facts to think that this common course of separation between ecclesiastical root and branch is to be found in the events which separated Canterbury from Rome. No matter how many clerics (and laics) played the part of timeservers to Tudor

monarchs with no conscientious objections to hanging or beheading, it is fair to say that these clerics, if they did not resist, did not initiate the movement which broke the unity of Western Christianity. "The Crown," when represented by a Henry, an Edward, or an Elizabeth, had too clear (and false) a conscience of its Divine Right to care much what clerics thought of a policy which commended itself to the royal will, and thus the Crown, not the Church, was in the main responsible for the breach between England and Rome.

For the moment we leave this truth in its undeveloped stage lest a hasty effort toward development might mar its truth. We only ask the unbiased mind to realise all the hopeful consequences of this truth. The ecclesiastical misunderstandings which Tudor autocracy begot and fostered have a hope of coming to an end when they are recognised as an intrusion of the secular into the ecclesiastical sphere. Tudor policy was the *mailed fist* in matters of faith, or religious unity by dint of the gallows. We owe something more charitable than contempt to the rank and file of clerics who accepted the latest ecclesiastical *status quo* in their desire to help souls, and in their hope that Tudor wilfulness would soon contradict its contradictions. After all, the rank and file of men, and even of clergymen, are neither saints, nor heroes, nor geniuses. The English clergy of Henry or Elizabeth were too obviously normal either to

foresee that separation from Rome might stabilise or to accept the Divine call to mount the gallows. We do not, of course, think that they are to be judged by the principle, "Tout connaître est tout pardonner." But to know all the human factors in the Crown-begotten and Crown-fostered separation is to prevent the enterprise of reunion being made a punitive expedition.

This is the lesson or light to be gathered from ancient history by a modern mind anxious to see the Lambeth Conference in the round. Recent history is no less helpful. We may state this helpfulness in the form of a dialogue between the present writer and a high dignitary of the Church of England.

We were talking seriously and as brothers of the deep-sea channel parting England from Rome. Quietly but very emphatically my companion said :

HE : "We should have no hesitation in accepting the Pope as our Patriarch."

I : "Indeed !" Though I knew this feeling to be far from rare, for Gladstone had expressed it publicly before his death, yet the position of the speaker and the emphatic clearness of his statement made me wonder if the words were not now charged with more significance than they had been for three centuries. My mind was deeply moved by this sudden challenge to recall the tragedy of the sixteenth century, now in its full harvest of misunderstanding.

HE : " To speak frankly. If we were asked to reunite with Rome, I think I am right in saying that our greatest practical difficulty would be in accepting the autocracy of the Pope."

I : " This is quite intelligible. But might I suggest that perhaps you have overcome a greater difficulty in accepting the supremacy of the Crown ? "

HE (smiling) : " Ah ! But that does not now matter much ! "

I (returning the smile) : " That is what, though perhaps in a deeper sense, we say of the supremacy of the Pope." We had a quiet interval, relieved by smiles. I believe we both felt for the moment that realities were being faced. He seemed to wish me to continue. In deference to him I went on :

I : " In point of fact the supremacy of the Crown, as against the supremacy of the Pope, has been something real. The Crown has lowered the status of Bishops and priests. The Apostolic See has exalted the position of Bishops and priests. Nowhere have the clergy such honour as in the Church of Rome. The official doctrine of Trent and Vatican is that Bishops are the successors of the Apostles."

HE (interrupting) : " Some of our people deny this."

I : " But the See of Rome, which holds it, cannot be said to depress the power of Bishops."

HE (smiling) : " I see your point."

I : " The second point is that whereas the

Crown lowered the status of Bishops and priests by submitting the clergy to physical force, no sooner has the pressure of physical force been lessened than the clergy naturally express themselves in terms kindred to those of Rome."

HE : " I do not see."

I : " Let me put it to you this way. You said that the supremacy of the Crown does not now matter. But, at any rate, it did matter. It mattered so much that the unity and union of a thousand years was snapped in less than a thousand weeks. Our inheritance of misunderstanding is of Tudor birth. And as you recover freedom you recover your old historic position."

HE : " I do not yet see."

I : " Well, in order to see, ask yourself this plain question : Could the Bishops in communion with Canterbury and York have issued the Lambeth Report in A.D. 1570 ? "

HE : " Ah ! I see the point. . . ." There was silence for a space. I think both sides of the discussion were united in prayer.

Those of our readers who can see the Lambeth Report in this atmosphere of ancient and recent history will not fail to detect its significance. They will recognise that even if this group of 252 Bishops in communion with Canterbury is only what it professes to be, a non-authoritative body, it is not a non-influential body. Its very profession of non-authoritativeness is of value. The claims it does not urge give it a claim to be

heard. Indeed, by ingenuously professing to have no authority, it is merely pleading that when the Tudor Crown laid violent, sacreligious hands on the Ecclesia Anglicana, the Church was not only fettered, but struck dumb.

The Lambeth Conference, then, is not of no consequence. In its efforts towards religious peace it may perhaps be likened to the delegates whom nations at war send out with powers, not to decide, but only to discuss. These delegates are of some, and indeed of great, importance. Even if they cannot make and sign Articles of Peace, yet no Articles of Peace have ever been signed without their preliminary discussions.

It is for this reason that we see in the semi-official utterances of the Church of England, not only a gradually recovered power of speech and self-expression, but a gradually asserted recovery of an historic position from which it was driven by the Crown. We are of those to whom official and semi-official acts mean much. We believe that the English mind is so law-abiding that unscrupulous law-makers could intrigue it into believing almost anything or into refusing to do almost nothing. Not to understand this besetting virtue of the English mind is to see the events of the sixteenth century through a refracting glass. The vital change which took place in the relations between Rome and Canterbury took place through processes of law. These processes of law seemed so inno-

cently inevitable that men no more saw them in their deadly consequences than men of to-day see the ill-consequences of much of our recent legislation. For example, some thoughtful statesmen look upon the Insurance Act with its compulsion as the effective beginning of the servile State. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the men who had this political insight were in a hopeless minority. Yet if their foresight is authentic the process of servilisation will inevitably happen, in spite of the inculpable ignorance which allowed it to be begun.

If, then, the process of dividing the Daughter-Church from the Mother-Church was begun and consummated by official acts of the Crown, there is every reason to hope that the harm done will be undone by official or semi-official acts of the Church. No Bishop, no priest, no cleric, of the Church of England was wholly or mainly responsible for its isolation; none will be responsible for its reunion. Official acts unmade the unity of a thousand years; official acts will remake what once was. Behind these official acts and utterances will be the patience, the humility, the prayers of holy men, who long to see the walls of Jerusalem rebuilt. But it will be some solemn meeting of the Bishops of the Church of England such as forgathered at Lambeth in the summer of A.D. 1920, that will give back to their country the pearl of great price which Tudor autocracy coveted for the Crown.

CHAPTER VIII

HUMAN MACHINERY

The *Times* of September 18th, 1920, had a paragraph entitled "Human Machinery: Aid for St. Mary's Scheme. By our Medical Correspondent."

Amongst the many marvellous things it said or assumed may be selected the following :—

"It is proposed to train doctors in the care of the human machinery much as engineers are trained to look after the machinery in factories. The result will be a department having the welfare and health of our working community as its special care. America¹ has now six separate chairs on this subject, which is assuredly destined to an important place in industrial development." (p. 5, col. 4.)

If the "working community" had the will and wealth to read the *Times* we would ask its editor why the present labour unrest should be still more justified than it is by a paragraph of such brutality or futility. This medical correspondent, whoever he is, has such a hereditary or acquired lack of humour and humility that he is a danger even to the *Times*. Does neither he nor the editor see the grim antinomy between their materialism and St. Mary, whose name is quite unconsciously dragged in the mud?

¹ United States.

At the base of the matter rests a principle which we can enunciate thus: "To express the primary (higher) in terms of the secondary (lower) is to demean it." The obverse of this principle is: "To express the secondary (lower) in terms of the primary (higher) is to ennoble it."

I take it that the principle is not only true, but self-evident. Examples abound for the conviction of those who see neither the self-evidence nor the truth of the principle. Thus the law of gravity, which is almost a cosmic generalisation, will account for much. But if we were to state the falling of rain (which is due to a thousand other forces) in terms of gravity, we should be doing an injury to the rain. Again, Freud had found in his Austrian psychological laboratory that a great deal of the activities brought under his notice were sexual. But when he expressed all human emotion and activity in terms of sexual activity he disproved himself either a psychologist or a philosopher.

It is quite clear to thinkers that no attempts to express the chemical in terms of the mechanical will approve a man either a mathematician or a chemist. Nor is it sound thinking but intellectual charlatanism to express the phenomenon of life as functions of matter. And Sir Bertram Windle has lately drawn our attention to the fact that as regards the possibility of life being a form of material energy, it is the biologists who affirm it, and the natural scientists who deny it !

These principles and facts were becoming so undeniable to the few men with leisure and mind to think that there was chance of the intellectual quarrels of two centuries coming to an end in an armistice, the preliminary of intellectual peace. But there is a danger that industrialism, which has degraded qualitative production into quantitative, and has substituted token wealth for real wealth, may arrest the crystallisation of peace by seeing everything in the artificial light of the factory and by stating even human activity in terms of a machine. If this abomination of desolation ever comes to pass industrialism will have swung full circle. It began, with its unit of *horse-power*, by stating machines in terms of vital energy, and it will end by stating the energy of a man in terms of a machine.

It is a subject of great thankfulness to those who are not "captains of industry" that Nature still begets human beings with the same wilfulness that made Shakespeare a child, not of London but of Stratford-on-Avon, and not of Tudor, but of village blood. No arrangement of molecules has ever given us a genius made to order. Before man is born Nature is so subtle that we do not know what man will be, and after he is born his will is so free that we do not know what he will do. We should merely give our ignorance a cloak and a name by calling this incalculable being a machine.

True, he has some sequences which are calculable because inevitable. If you starve him or

shoot him he will die. If you overwork him he will waste and ail. If you overcrowd him in sunless smoke-skied factory towns his offspring will be fewer and weaker. Moreover, if you deprive him of all property, if you take him away from a home and a homestead, he will, as a rule, be powerless to bargain as one freeman can bargain or barter with another. He is free. Yet because even freedom has its necessities it is on these necessities that are based the elaborate industrial gradings of man as a machine. The sequences of the strange being can be tabulated with a practical accuracy that enables a modern captain of industry to calculate those chances of serious accidents to his workers that are due to the workers' inattention.

Yet, after all, this being whose sequences have a limited inevitableness which can be the basis of a science, is yet so united by these sequences that he is free, with a freedom with which no machine is free. This is the drama of the man. He is called by the Greek philosophers a rational animal, not because he is always rational, nor even because he is always rational when he ought to be, but because he can be rational when he likes. But usually what can be, can also not be. Free will is no more common than free won't. "Our working community" sometimes won't work. It is in this that man differs from a machine. If a machine will not work it is because it cannot work. (Here the English future with "will" is ambiguous. A machine

has no *will* and no *will not* ; but only *can* and *cannot*.) On the other hand, if a man will not work, it is not always because he cannot work ; but, with all grammatical accuracy, because he *will* not work. Perhaps he refuses to work because the high wages he earns do not, though they ought to, satisfy him. Perhaps the wages are all right, but work has got on his nerves, or he wants to get drunk to forget being jilted, or he wants to have a bit of his own back from the " boss," or he wants to back up the cleaners in the shed, or there is a wedding in the family, or any of the ten thousand psychological " jams" that never trouble the interior of an AI machine.

So he is not, never has been, never will be a machine. You cannot express him in terms of a collection of cranks and levers. Nor can he be cared for as " engineers look after machines in factories." The only man who knows him best is not a captain of industry, nor a politician, nor even a doctor, but a priest. Yet even the priest does not know man all or well. But at least he does not degrade man by calling him a machine or even a body. Thus he does not express what is primary in terms of what is secondary. Indeed, he dares to express the secondary in terms of what is primary—the lower in terms of the higher—a promise in terms of its fulfilment—the finite in terms of the Infinite—when he calls even the body of man " the temple of the Holy Ghost."

CHAPTER IX

THE NEGLECT OF SEERS

It is as the neglect of salt.

Some time ago the Head of a foreign monastery determined to keep Lent strictly in the olden way by going without. In a week or two the doctor of the monastery had to call in a specialist to diagnose a rare and peculiar ailment which was affecting every one of the monks. After a searching examination the two medical men found out that the Head of the monastery had settled that the monks should go without salt !

Seers are as old in the world, and as necessary to it, as salt. In saying this, I presuppose that other things are also essential. When it is said that salt and seers are one thing necessary, it is not said they are *the* one thing necessary.

Nor do I maintain, though I know a man in Jerusalem who does maintain, that where the seer is and is heard, no grievous hurt can befall the commonwealth. I am the less minded to agree with him because, firstly, the word harm is as many-meaninged as, say, faith, liberalism, or bread ; and secondly because Golgotha is a suburb of Jerusalem.

I see no reason for maintaining that the neglect of seers is responsible for everything from a solar eclipse to the loss of the *Titanic*. But having dwelt with seers for a long time I begin to look out with their eyes and to see human affairs, as they saw them, glassed in *speculo aeternitatis*, "in the glass of Eternity." This same glass, be it known to all, is neither telescope nor microscope, neither far-seeing nor small-seeing, though it has the rare quality of making things and men at once greater and smaller. Nero seen in this glass is sometimes taken to be a flaw in the eye-piece; whilst Lazarus crouching on the doorstep becomes great like a Pyramid.

The strangest power of the "Glass of Eternity" is to show things in their place. It is for this reason that the cheaper sort of churchmen, statesmen, business men, cannot abide it.

For man's chief function, like that of a meddlesome child, is to displace things. The glass directed towards as motley a collection as a secondhand bookstall, a rummage sale or an autumn session, puts things, however impertinent, firmly and quietly in their places. Moreover, it shows the looker, in spite of his disappointment, that things are in their places.

I now seem to have reached a point where it becomes reasonable to say what is a Seer.

In spite of a good deal of polysyllabic mysticism with an antinomian flavour, we may say that a seer is a person who has the genius to

discover, if not the heroism to keep, the Ten Commandments. Ultimately he is a person who realises that the Ten Commandments are a Revelation. This is the supreme point of Wisdom with him, namely, to know whose gift they are.

This definition has caused me great heartache, seeing that it rules out a number of my personal friends and not a few claimants for seerdom. Thus it is fatal to Mr. Bernard Shaw, who must be content to belong to Comedy and the Fabian Society. Surely that is enough for any professor of paradox.

* * * *

It might be urged especially in the days of that blessed word Progress, that a seer is one who sees—that is, sees ahead ; and that seeing ahead has as much to do with the Decalogue as with the Binomial Theorem.

But if my readers go on thinking in this way there is nothing they may not come to accept. They may mistake an order of the Local Government Board for a revelation and may look upon St. Stephen's as a school of Prophets.

Now in matters of men and men's deeds seeing astern is of equal need with seeing ahead. History is a novitiate for prophecy ; and both are necessary to the politician. The future has no surprises for the seer who knows the past. Only people with a reactionary prejudice for reading nothing but the daily press think that to-day is the most wonderful day of

the world and that news is new. History is a catacomb of to-days ; and have we not unearthed reinforced concrete at Thebes and suffragettes at Pompeii ?

I am not digressing. I have so much to say that too much must be said. The point is that in the Middle Ages there was a seer on every embassy and that we have nothing better than work-leaders, work-masters and politicians on our Conciliation Boards ! It is quite right that these three groups should be on the Board, just as bread, butter, coffee and eggs should be on the breakfast-board—but where is the Salt ?

These three groups on the Conciliation Board are all looking mainly to their immediate interests—the work-leaders to their influence, the work-masters to their dividend, the politicians to their career. But who is looking after the ultimate interests of all three ?

Even in pagan days not a camp was pitched nor a town staked out without the seer. But we are trying to build up a people without the only class that have ever built up a people.

To be practical I would insist on having some seer or priest or monk on every Royal Commission or Conciliation Board of first magnitude. Care must be taken to find one of the right type. Your politician-seer who is merely lobbying for a career should be given the Potter's Field—and the price of a halter. He will do the rest.

When you have found the right man give him a commission to keep an eye on the Ten Com-

ments ; especially "Thou shalt not steal." This may be called the Seer's Opening. In the course of the game it will lead to interesting developments.

I do not promise that with him we shall have the Millennium ; but without him we shall have Pandemonium, that is, the servile state.

CHAPTER X

THE DOCTRINAL WITNESS OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

THE Conference of Church of England Modernists held in Cambridge in July, 1921, drew attention to the Fourth Gospel. In calling it the Fourth Gospel we are not minded to deny that it is the Gospel of St. John, the Beloved Disciple—indeed, we should be doing violence to our reason or our reasons if we did otherwise than believe it to be the eye-witness and ear-witness of him who leaned on the bosom of the Master. But our chief aim is to denote the historic value of this Gospel, which, if it is not the eye-witness of the last years of Jesus was assuredly the eye-witness of the first years of His Church. In both cases it is of supreme value as a witness to that consciousness which has been the unique claim of the Catholic Church.

Two preliminaries will clear a way to the centre of our thesis.

A. The Fourth Gospel is a product of Eastern, not of Western, Christianity. It is a delicate point of history to decide whether it came from Jerusalem or from Ephesus ; in

either case its witness to the historic development of the Church can hardly be overrated. If it sprang from Ephesus, it arose out of a Christian consciousness which was definitely the work of St. Paul ; if it sprang from Jerusalem, it arose from a Christian consciousness which, at the time of writing, owed little or nothing to St. Peter.

B. The oral instruction which Jesus had given His Apostles had its limitations ; although it may well be doubted whether it had the limitations of written instruction. It is clear that human intelligences could not retain in a state of active consciousness all the sayings and doings of some three years so filled with activity as to leave little time even for food-taking. But the human mind is so constituted that it can retain in a state of inactive memory impressions which any passing phenomenon may rouse to activity ; thus even such a passing phenomenon as the scent of a wild flower may reawaken the memory of such a disparate impression as a song or a friend. It is evident that if Jesus had the design of founding a Divine Society and had given instructions to His followers about carrying out this design, His followers could hardly be expected to keep all the details of His plan in a state of active remembrance. If a master entrusts his workman with the setting-up of a complicated machine, he puts it together and again undoes it piece by piece, meanwhile giving his workman

instructions as to the fitting of each part. At the end of all this fitting-up, undoing, and explaining, the workman has no very explicit remembrance of any one piece or process ; but he is confident that in the mere act of piecing the various parts together the master's minute directions will suggest themselves. Something analogous would of necessity happen to the men whom Jesus entrusted with the delicate fitting-up of the Kingdom which was to be of no nation and was to have no end. They could not carry in their minds the explicit remembrance of all he commanded them ; but time, with its unfolding needs, would recall what He said, and sometimes the very words of His direction.

It is significant that our Blessed Lord explicitly taught this doctrine in speaking of the function of His Holy Spirit. "The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and bring all things to your mind (ὑπομνήσει), whatsoever I shall have said to you" (John xiv. 26).

This throws light upon the following texts :

Matthew xxvi. 75 : "And Peter remembered (ἐμνήσθη) the word of Jesus which He had said : Before the cock crow, thou wilt deny me thrice."

Luke xxiv. 6-8 : "Remember (μνησθητε) how He spoke unto you when He was yet in Galilee, saying, The Son of man must be delivered unto the hands of sinful

men, and be crucified, and the third day rise again. And they remembered (ἐμνήσθησαν) His words."

John ii. 17 : "And His disciples remembered (ἐμνήσθησαν) that it was written."

John ii. 22 : "When therefore He was risen again from the dead, His disciples remembered (ἐμνήσθησαν) that He had said this."

John xii. 16 : "These things His disciples did not know at first : but when Jesus was glorified, then they remembered (ἐμνήσθησαν) that they had done these things to Him." (This is a singularly valuable text, showing a period of unconscious memory which was awakened to consciousness by the event.)

Acts xi. 15, 16 : "And when I" (*i.e.* Peter) "had begun to speak, the Holy Ghost fell upon them, as upon us also in the beginning. And I remembered the word (ἐμνήσθην δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος) of the Lord, how He had said, John indeed baptised with water ; but you shall be baptised with the Holy Ghost." (This is perhaps the most striking passage. It shows how events in the life of the Church recalled to the memory of the Apostles the words and directions of Jesus.)

DIVISIONS OF DOCTRINE

It is clear that the growth of the Church rapidly recalled to the mind of the Apostles the directions for forming the Church which Jesus had given. We may sum these doctrines up under three heads :

I. Sacramental Truth. II. Dogmatic Truth. III. Ethical Truth. This seems to be the meaning of John xiv. 6 : "I am the Way (Ethical Truth), the Truth (Dogmatic Truth), and the Life (Sacramental Truth)."

I.—SACRAMENTAL TRUTH

We have called attention¹ to the striking sacramental doctrine of St. John. The earliest years of the Church witnessed a rapid development of the sacramental system. It would be natural that timid souls should demand the assurance that this development was within the intention of Jesus: the Fourth Gospel seemed written to reassure them.

Only a patient study of the series of chapters from the first to the sixth will give the full value to St. John's sacramental doctrine :

Chapter	I.	Holy Orders (Calling of the Twelve).
„	II.	Matrimony (Marriage Feast of Cana).
„	III.	Baptism (Confirmation) (Dialogue with Nicodemus).
„	IV. (V).	Penance (Dialogue with the Samaritan Woman).
„	VI.	Holy Eucharist (Dialogue with Jews and Peter).
„	(XII. 1-8.	Extreme Unction ?).

I. According to St. John, it is clear that Jesus chose not only Twelve Apostles from the people, but chose one Apostle, St. Peter, from the Twelve (John i. 42). “ He (Andrew) brought him (Peter) to Jesus. And Jesus, looking upon him, said, ‘ Thou art Simon, the son of Jona : thou shalt be called Cephas, which is interpreted, Peter.’ ” It is hard to exaggerate the witness of the Fourth Gospel to the Petrine

¹ In *Theology* for September, 1921.

claims : indeed we venture to suggest that even if the Fourth Gospel be not of St. John, its witness is hardly less strong. It must ever remain perhaps the greatest argument for the claims of St. Peter that within a few years of his death the powerful Eastern Church should have accepted as authentic Christianity a book which singled out St. Peter as much from the Apostles as the Apostles were singled out from the rest of the Church.

2. The Eucharistic doctrine of the sixth chapter is significantly completed by the teaching of the Crucifixion as a Sacrifice. The Church of to-day teaches emphatically that the greatest of the Sacraments, the Holy Eucharist, is also a Sacrifice. Now, with the exception of the phrase, "This is My blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins" (Matt. xxvi. 28 ; *cf.* Mark xiv. 24 ; Juke xxii. 20), there is no insistence on the sacrificial character of our Blessed Lord's death on the Cross in the Synoptic Gospels. The Epistle to the Hebrews had insisted on the fact that Jesus was a High Priest ; it remained for St. John to add that this Priest was Victim as well as Priest. The Beloved Disciple had learned this from his first master, the Baptist, who, when "he saw Jesus coming to him, said, 'Behold the Lamb of God ; behold Him who taketh away the sin of the world.'" The liturgical development within the Church which colours so deeply the strong imagery of the

Apocalypse is responsible for the Fourth Gospel recalling those otherwise unrecorded testimonies to the sacrificial character of the death—and indeed of the life—of Jesus.

II.—DOGMATIC TRUTH.

The two great dogmatic doctrines are: A. The Incarnation: B. The Blessed Trinity. St. John's witness to both these doctrines is of supreme value.

A. THE INCARNATION

Two main doctrines had to be safeguarded:—

1. The Divinity (and Personality), of the Son. We have elsewhere pointed out ¹ that the Fourth Gospel is essentially written for the Hebrews, to whom it reveals the fact that in God there is a co-equal and consubstantial Son. To the Hebrew mind, "Word of God" would convey the idea neither of consubstantiality nor—what is of greater importance—of personality. To the Hebrews, therefore, the revelation could come only in terms of "the Son of God." This is the thesis of the Fourth Gospel.

But the phrase "Son of God" would convey no revelation to the Greek mind, saturated as it was with bodily and even incestuous begettings of the gods of polytheism. To the Greek mind it had to be made clear that the Son of

¹ *Our Reasonable Service*, pp. 88, etc.

God had not a corporeal but an immaterial begetting. The first fourteen verses of the Fourth Gospel are but a preface in which St. John, the Hebrew, says to the Greeks : " Son of God = Word as God ; do not interpret Sonship as a corporeal but as an immaterial relation." It is the necessary preface of a Hebrew Gospel to a Greek world.

II. The second doctrine to be safeguarded in the Incarnation was the humanity of Jesus. It is significant that though modern rationalistic criticism has seen in the Christ of the Fourth Gospel only a transcendent being who scarcely touches the earth, the facts are so clean contrary that Arianism found in this Gospel its chief foothold amongst the books of the New Testament. No other Gospel gives such perplexing proofs of the humanity of the Logos !

It is only after realising St. John's insistence on the humanity of Jesus that we can appreciate his doctrine of Mary, the Mother. It is our own personal opinion, based on texts and arguments too manifold to be set out at length, that no other Evangelist gives St. Peter or the Blessed Virgin the exalted functions given by St. John. It is this Apostle of the Divine Eternal Sonship of the Word who has recognised as no other Evangelist has recognised, the Mother's function not merely over the birth (Matt.) and bringing-up (Luke) of Jesus, but over His apostolic life (John ii.) and His sacrificial death (John xix. 26).

B. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY

This doctrine of the Undivided and Co-equal Three is complete only when it is recognised that the Holy Spirit is a Divine Person distinct and proceeding from the Father and the Son. Had we only the Synoptics, we should know only the function of the Holy Spirit in the hallowing and mission of the Sacred Humanity of Jesus. To St. John alone do we owe the idea that the Holy Spirit was the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, and that He was to be sent by Father and Son alike (John vii. 39 ; xiv. 16, etc.) This completes the doctrine of the Trinity.

III.—ETHICAL TRUTH

It is significant that nowhere is the doctrine of the three Theological Virtues more developed than in St. John's Gospel. His Moral Theology which deals sympathetically with the forgiveness of adultery (chaps. iv. and viii.), easily ascends to the heights of Mystical Theology (chap. xxi. 15-19). But to speak on this is to touch a theme almost unsuspected by modern students of Mystical Theology.

This bare undeveloped outline of what is taught in the Fourth Gospel must be of supreme interest to a generation which is realising that Christianity did not come into the world as a Book, but as a Person. Moreover, this Person publicly trained and taught a group of persons

to whom He promised a Spirit which would recall to their minds, in the event, whatever He had said to them. It is surely an astounding thing that within a few years of His dying this Spirit-guided group should have "recalled" all the great principles which are the very essence of a Church claiming to be not merely the Body, but the mouthpiece of the Master.

CHAPTER XI

THE LAND REDEEMED AND REDEEMER

A PLAIN TALK WITH A COUNTRY PRIEST

HE was poet as well as priest. For this reason no one who is not a poet or in sympathy with poets should read what he said. The following words, like the pacification of Erin, demand imagination. Mere intelligence will fall short.

He used to say of himself : " Poet and priest ; and priest because poet." To hear him speak of these two in one was to be drawn into a poet's holy of holies, in the company of the high priest. Once he said :

" Every month I read a work of Shakespeare, *ad perpetuam Rei memoriam*, in everlasting gratitude for the Thing. And seven times every day I praise God in His own inspired verse, in everlasting gratitude for God. The Breviary is the world's best anthology."

Some wind of the same subtle spirit drove him out into the country. His talents and influence could easily have made him rector of one of the best city parishes. But he fled into the country, to a parish where he called himself the ploughman's parson, the *servus servorum*, the Bread-giver of the bread-givers of the world.

He had moods and a vocabulary. Not all his moods were the common moods of mankind ; not all his vocabulary was King's English. There were seasons of storm, when great angers thundered and roared in his being ; and his speech became as a hammer smiting the rocks or as lightning rending the sky. These were rare, but terrible to hear and behold.

I let him speak on, only too content, like the chosen people, to gather a double portion of manna against the dearth of to-morrow, when I should go back to my cell on the banks of the Trent.

The look in his brown eyes forecast thunder. But fortunately for me the thunder never quite unchained itself from its lair in the centre of the soul. Still the unfulfilled forecast of it made me tremble. He said stridently :

“ Listen to God speaking to Cain, that is, to the modern man : ‘ What hast thou done ? The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the earth ! ’ . . . From the Earth. What murder had earth done that it should drink murdered blood ?

“ Ever since the sin that begot thorns and thistles in the fallow fields, ever since the sin that made the innocent soil drink human blood, man has degraded the earth by making it a partner in his sin.

“ Look at every acre of the earth where man has pitched his tent, or built his furnace, or dug his mine, or laid out his city. Think of Wigan, Leeds, Sheffield, the Tyne, the Mersey, the Thames ! Augh ! Think not only of pit-heads and slums, but of deer-parks and Mayfair ! ”

Here the thunder seemed on the point of breaking its chains. But he laid compelling hands on it by turning his thoughts towards the Hill of Redemption.

“ St. John Chrysostom has said nobly of the World’s Redeemer : ‘ He offered Himself outside the City that you might know His sacrifice was for all.’ Thus did He, the Maker of the sinless earth, remember and atone for the grievous hurt done to the earth by the sin of Cain. And turning His back even on the Holy City, He redeemed first by His Blood, the Earth.”

“ The War—with, alas ! its wounded fields in Belgium and France—has driven us all to the land or to the thought of the land. Not that War has done more than underline with unflinching scarlet what had become obtrusive even before the War. One of the consolations of my life is to have seen that even before the first shots were fired on the Belgian frontier, or the Bank Rate soared to eight—or was it twelve?—per cent., or yet a Food Dictator had been appointed, the better sort of statesmen were realising that only in the redemption of the land would be the redemption of the people.”

He dwelt on this for some moments with almost the precision of a Parliamentary Report. Then he shook himself a little and said :

“ But I refuse to see the Land Problem in less than its true light. It is not just a problem in soil, seeds, manures, education, housing. It is not a question of how much per cent. land-capital will yield, or how many tons of wheat an acre will grow—or even of how many men, women and children, the earth’s finest crop ! that the land will rear with joy. It is a question of Jesus Christ ! It is the eternal question : ‘ What think ye of Christ ? Whose Son is He ? ’ ”

The look on my astonished face confessed me mystified ; though indeed I need not have been mystified if I had recalled his habit, his genius for lightning-quick transitions.

He came to my aid at once.

"Think of Nazareth," he said, in a tone almost as solemn and rhythmic as the ferial preface. "There Jesus wrought His flesh and blood from the most pure blood of Mary—the Rose and Lily of Nazareth. And there, perhaps, in the fields near His Home on Earth, grew in their sinlessness the yellow wheat and the purple grapes that shared with the Sinless Maiden the honour of providing the Redeemer with the Body wounded for us and the Blood shed for us."

The thunder had long since quitted his voice. The lightnings that had begun to flash in his eyes had given place to some other light that reminded me of a spring sun shining through spring showers. He kept quiet.

I began to realise why it was that only one tree was allowed to cluster on his church wall—and that a vine ; and that in the five-acre field he called his paradise there was always a patch of wheat.

He broke the silence :

"The earth will not be redeemed by man, nor man redeemed by the earth, until man has ceased to be a farmer and has become, if not a minister of the altar, then a minister to the altar. The Land Problem will go from bad to worse—thorns and thistles will grow apace as long as the man who tills the soil is looked upon as a mere rent-payer or supporter of some sluggard in the city.

“ By right divine the tiller of the soil is one who provides bread for the Body of Christ and wine for the Blood of Christ ! Let him sink to less than this, and the world is again in flood. Let him rise to this height, and the earth shows its gratitude to redeeming man by redeeming its Redeemer.”

I said distractedly : “ This is a mere vision. But have you a programme ? Even the Sermon on the Mount of Vision is a programme.”

He laughed a little.

“ Programmes are now almost a disease or a superstition. Yet I have been somewhat smitten with this disease and superstition. Indeed, I have already suffered for them. Programmes are not always a joy to the world.

“ Have you considered that although we Catholic folk, we clerks and nuns, own many acres of plough-land in England, we buy the altar-wheat from the nearest grocer or the Stores ? It has not yet entered into the heart of any monk or nun, or yeoman or yeowoman, to grow enough wheat to provide the bread for all the altars in England.”

I began to see with his eyes. It was adventurous. I gasped : “ But we could not make the wine ! ”

Again he laughed a little, then turned swiftly with a poet's instinct towards place-names.

“ Have you ever seen the Cotswold Hills near Wootton-under-Edge ? No ; you have not seen them, except from the train. Very good.

“ Let me, then, tell you a piece of history. The terraced hills that face southwards were once covered with vines. Even now they are called the Vineyard. England, the old Merry England of faith, was one of the wine-growing countries of Europe. We are told that the monks who came

with the world's good tidings to our coasts brought Jesus Christ and the Vine. But I needed no history to tell me this much. I felt convinced that the men who first planted a vine-shoot on the southern slopes of the Cotswolds had no design of furnishing the King's cellar, but wished nobly to provide for the Table of the Lord.

"And what England once did, England may do. It is not the vine-stock or the soil that is wanting, nor indeed the faith. It is only the vision of faith. Our eyes are still held by the gloom of the penal times from which we have only of late come forth.

"But my thought has moved even beyond the bread and wine for the sacrifice. I have seen in a sober vision of faith the vestments of the priest and the linen shroudings of the Victim. Is it not a little painful that most of the linen used at the Altar is, in all likelihood, woven in non-Catholic looms to the sound of songs that I cannot recall without anger?

"Once upon a time, in a passing gust of enthusiasm, I tried to find for the Body of the Lord some hand-woven linen. My first search was for linen woven by the hands of cloistered nuns. But I need not say that my search was in vain. I have hardly the heart to add that the only group of souls who could offer me something like what I sought was a society of non-Catholic craftsmen and craftswomen for whom Art and hand-craft were almost a Religion.

"Let me tell you of an architect whose strange behaviour begot the mirth of his fellow-architects. He had built a church. On the opening day, after the first High Mass, sung by the Bishop, he stayed in the church whilst all the people poured out into the street. As he did not come to eat with the Bishops and the many priests and layfolk, they went in search of him. He was found in the last bench of the church, his head bowed. When he looked up his eyes were filled with tears. They said: 'What has happened?' He said: 'I have built a Home—for God.'"

Here I began not merely to see with his eyes, but to see what his eyes saw. His following words seemed strangely to be spoken not to me but within me ; as if not he, but I myself, were the speaker.

Only religion—that is, the belief in God and the love of God—has kept freemen on the soil. But since Jesus Christ has come and taken the wheat and the vine unto the flesh and blood of God made Man, only belief in Jesus Christ and love of Jesus Christ will keep Christian freemen on the soil.

CHAPTER XII

BETHLEHEM AND JERUSALEM

THE CURSE AND DOOM OF GREAT CITIES

THE birth of the Son of God in a stable of Bethlehem is a yearly lesson which the Christian consciousness has perhaps not yet fully realised either in thought or deed. Yet a strong call to thought and deed is to be found by the hearing ear in the simple words spoken to the simple-minded shepherds of Bethlehem: "This day is born to you a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord in the City of David."

David had, indeed, two cities, Bethlehem and Jerusalem: one the city of his birth, youth, and innocence; the other the city of his choice, his sin, and his death. The city of David's birth was but a hamlet of shepherd homes on one side of a valley within walk of the mountain stronghold of the Jebusites. On the slopes of the hills that hemmed in the valley David the shepherd-lad went afield with his father's sheep. In guarding them from the wild beasts that often beset them he found himself a hero with strength and heart enough to overcome "a lion and a bear." Thus he learned the skill and daring that was one day to stand him in good stead against Goliath of the Philistines.

Some of those who love David as one of the world's greatest heroes and leaders are not sure that he did well to exchange the lot of a shepherd lad for the brilliant part of a king's favourite. Even the change from country life to town life brought its inevitable coarsening. David, the leader of some flocks of sheep, and singer of the world's undying songs, would have left less to be regretted than the slayer of Urias.

Gradually with his success grew the shepherd lad's ambition and sin. When he took the Jebusite stronghold and named it Jerusalem it may well be thought that his ambition was at its crest. His downward path was not arrested even by his noble wish to make Jerusalem at once the military, administrative, and religious capital of the Jewish people. No doubt in his desire to give the ark as rich a resting-place as his own palace he was prompted by one of the best instincts of a spoiled child of Jehovah. But we cannot say that only the highest and most unselfish motive prompted a design which was sure to honour David almost equally with Jehovah.

However this may be, in the event Jerusalem, which was intended to unite all the political, military, and religious forces of the Jewish people, soon led to the splitting up of that people into two kingdoms which have ceased to exist as kingdoms without being reunited. All this would go to show that although the Jewish people, or rather the followers of David, looked

upon Jerusalem as the City of David, and indeed as the Holy City, it is not easy to say how the city was looked upon by God. From the first it seemed to bring, not a blessing, but a curse upon the people. It seemed to mark by its national failure the passage of a people from a simple pastoral life into the sterilities of commerce and imperialism.

What is certain in all these uncertainties is that in the plan of the Incarnation the City of David was not the City of Sion, with its Temple and palace, but the hamlet Bethlehem, with its sheepcotes and shepherds' huts. In this mean village, which was near enough to be almost a suburb of Jerusalem, the Son of God was minded to be born. Nothing in the royal palace or in the Temple was pure enough to be His resting-place.

It thus becomes significant that the four Evangelists represent our Blessed Saviour as cursing rather than blessing Jerusalem ; or, at least, as denouncing its sin and prophesying its doom with a clearness which was charged against Him in the day of His condemnation. Indeed, St. John, the last of the Evangelists, is the most insistent on his Master's denial of all that Jerusalem worshipped as success. It is St. John who represents Our Blessed Lord, on His first visit to the Holy City, cleansing the Temple by driving out the buyers and sellers with a scourge.

Indeed, the Evangelists almost succeed in

dividing the apostolic life of their Master into two periods—the first, a period of comparative success ; the second, a period of failure and crucifixion. It is significant that the first period is passed amongst the simple country-folk of Galilee, the second amongst the citizens of Jerusalem.

If, then, the Saviour of the world twice passed over Jerusalem—once when He chose to be incarnate in the mean Galilean hamlet of Nazareth, and again when He chose to be born in the mean Judean hamlet of Bethlehem, no wonder He prophesied that not a stone of Jerusalem should rest upon a stone. Ambition and sin had created it. Deicide would finally degrade it. The accursed thing must end by a destruction which would tell men unto all time the curse and doom of great cities, and the blessing and bliss of little hamlets of simple folk who serve God as ploughmen in the furrow or shepherds on the wolds.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ETHICS OF BIRTH CONTROL

SUCH teaching as we should wish to give on the ethics of birth-control may be introduced by a quotation from one of the most active promoters of neo-malthusianism in England, C. Killick Millard, M.D., D.Sc., Medical Officer of Health for Leicester.

“ For many years a small band of thinkers, known as the Malthusian League, has almost been alone in advocating the practice of family limitation, chiefly as a remedy for poverty. Prior to the war, however, it made comparatively few converts. This fact may have been partly due to the fact that its chief exponents happened to hold politico-economic ideals of a strongly individualistic character, which no doubt tended to estrange the Socialist movement, which otherwise should have been specially interested. To-day, however, under the name of Birth-Control, the movement is making much more rapid progress. No doubt, in the past, the opposition of religion, and especially of the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches has been a considerable stumbling block. Unless the religious difficulty can be overcome, the position will remain most unsatisfactory. There is such a difference between public precept and private practice that it is difficult to resist a feeling of insincerity.

“ The Churches have taught that it was the Divine wish that human beings should multiply and population increase—the more rapidly the better ; the traditional authority

for this being the instruction given to Noah and his family, after the Deluge, to 'be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth.' The Churches have continued to teach that the duty of man was *to obey the Divine command* and still *to increase and multiply*, and until recently any attempt by married couples to restrict or regulate the birth-rate was denounced as sinful.

"This is still the orthodox attitude, I believe, of the Roman Catholic Church, with its celibate priesthood, but as it is clearly useless to reason with those who claim infallibility, it is unnecessary to discuss the question further so far as Roman Catholicism is concerned. It may be mentioned, however, that the fall in the birth-rate has been very noticeable, even amongst Catholics.

"As regards the Church of England which makes no claim to infallibility, the case is different, and discussion is permissible." (*The Ethics of Birth-Control*, in *The Modern Churchman*, May, 1919).

Everything about this quotation makes it clear that the question of birth-control is now one of the most important the Church has to face. The writer of this article in *The Modern Churchman* is not a "nobody." He is a qualified doctor of Medicine and Science. He is *the* official medical man of one of the large and progressive cities of the country. As Medical Officer of Health he belongs to that group of medical officials whom the new Ministry of Health have raised to supreme importance in the nation.

Moreover he bears witness to the fact that the neo-malthusianism which his school of thought advocated for many years, with slight success, is "to-day under the name of Birth Control

making much more rapid progress." This progress is all the more noteworthy because of the past opposition of organised religion, especially the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches. As for the Anglican Church, its profession of fallibility allows the question to be discussed. Therefore, in the columns of one of its respected and scholarly reviews, *The Modern Churchman*, the neo-malthusian Dr. Millard freely discusses neo-malthusianism. Even amongst Roman Catholics, in spite of their infallible principles "the fall in the birth-rate has been so very noticeable that it is difficult to resist a feeling of insincerity."

Before dealing directly with the errors in this neo-malthusian birth-control, let us set down the principles of marriage.

Marriage is an indissoluble state of life wherein a man and a woman agree to give each other power over their bodies for the begetting, birth, and upbringing of offspring. The natural and primary end of marriage is this duty towards offspring. But, as sin has despoiled the human will and disturbed human relations, marriage has now the secondary end of allaying sexual lust.

But it is a principle of ethics that what is primary cannot be set aside as if it were secondary, nor can the secondary be sought as if it were primary. To invert the ethical order is to bring in that disorder which is called sin. If the human act brings in a slight disorder, it

is venial sin ; if the human act brings in a grievous disorder it is a grievous or mortal sin.

It is a grievous disorder, and, therefore, a grievous sin, to desire satisfaction in such sexual intercourse as could not result in the begetting of offspring.

As the wedded pair have given each other power over their bodies it would be a grave sin for one to refuse either altogether or for a considerable time the fulfilment of the marriage debt. But it is not a sin if by mutual agreement the wedded pair refrain from the marriage debt for a time, or for ever. As a rule, and speaking objectively, it would be heroic virtue for a wedded pair to abstain for a long time, and still more for ever, from the marriage debt. To counsel such a practice indiscriminately would be a sinful want of prudence, and, in a confessor, of professional knowledge.

It is quite clear that by mutual consent, even without any further motive, the wedded pair can abstain from marital intercourse. Still more may they abstain for a time or for ever, for a good motive, *e.g.* in order to have time for prayer, for good works, for bringing up such family as they already have to support.

When Dr. Millard says that "until recently any attempt by married couples to restrict or regulate the birth-rate was denounced as sinful" he is wrong. The Catholic Church has never taught this. On the contrary it has taught, by its greatest doctor, St. Thomas

Aquinas, that the essence of marriage is not primarily in the begetting of offspring, but in the indissoluble union between husband and wife.

What the Church has taught may be formulated in the words of His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, spoken to the annual conference of the National Council of Public Morals, May, 1919,

“ . . . the Christian tradition, which has prevailed and which we must regard in relation to what is spoken of as the limitation of the birth-rate, is that the only accepted method which is allowable is, first voluntary continence by mutual consent; and, secondly, that life is so sacred a gift of God that any direct interference with that life, even in its pre-natal condition, is a grievous sin.”

It will be seen from these authoritative words of the Cardinal Archbishop that the Roman Catholic Church does not condemn birth-control. What she condemns is neo-malthusian methods of birth-control. These methods include two elements—marital intercourse with full sensual satisfaction, and such physical or mechanical interference with the marital act or its effects that generation is stifled or prevented. It will be seen at once how, by the adroit phrase “ birth-control ” we are almost prevented from realising that the course of action propagated by the neo-malthusians is really *lust uncontrol*. Indeed, the whole literature of this neo-malthusianism reeks with literary de-odorants, which fail to be disinfectants. It is significant that this sinful crusade against the child, and, there-

fore, against both the parent and the family has to express itself in terms of its opposite. Being sin, it expresses itself as "good." Being filth, it expresses itself as "beautiful." Being race-suicide, it expresses itself as "the service of the race."

For example : few of the readers of the *Daily News* would have expected that its courageous championship of social righteousness would have blossomed into the neo-malthusian propaganda of Mr. Herbert Ashley, Secretary of the London Council of Social Service ! Fewer still would have expected that this writer in the *Daily News* would have tried to recommend his convictions with such arguments as these :

"To social workers who are willing to sweep aside *false modesty* and to think with courage, one fact is apparent. That the mother of the poorer classes who bears unwillingly, rebelliously, bitterly, and with anguish is not she who best serves our race . . . With such thoughts in my mind I called at Dr. Marie Stopes' clinic in Holloway. In a drab neighbourhood, it is a beautiful place . . . The whole atmosphere of the place is one of confidence and purity." (*Daily News*, 20th June : "Knowledge for Mothers," by Herbert Ashley).

What is to be thought of the good sense, or goodwill of an adult writer who speaks of mothers bearing children *unwillingly* ? Does Mr. Herbert Ashley believe that children are brought into existence by fairies ? Or does he believe that the marital union is an act which human beings can perform only in a state of unconsciousness ?

To suggest that a modern mother does not willingly co-operate in the act of pro-creation is to belittle her intelligence. Her unwillingness does not extend to the act, but to the effect, *i.e.*, to pro-creation. Mr. Ashley's account of the modern mother who unwillingly begets children would be persuasive if he spoke of a woman who threw herself over a precipice and was then very unwillingly killed by the fall !

His further account of the " beautiful place " where these women may learn how to *will* effectively is on the same plane of goodwill or good sense. Yet this "*beautiful* place, filled with an atmosphere of confidence and purity " is where men and women are taught race suicide by mutual masturbation ! This home of knowledge for mothers is where women are taught how to have the bodily pleasure of wives without being mothers. This wisdom-seat of birth-control is where daughters of Eve and sisters of Mary may learn, not how to control their acts, but how to control, *i.e.*, prevent the God-made consequences of their act, so that they may give uncontrolled rein to their passions.

The Church, in condemning by the unanimous voice of its theologians this crime of neo-malthusianism, has good ethical reasons for her action. These may be summarised thus : "*malthusian* " birth-control is sinful :

1. Because it sets aside, or rather it deliberately frustrates the primary end of marriage, which is the begetting of offspring.

2. It tends to encourage the sexual passions of husband and wife, by depriving them of the safeguard of "the time of pregnancy" and of the care of children.

3. It tends to promiscuity by teaching the husband and wife how sexual gratification can be obtained without the publicity and responsibility of child-birth.

4. It tends to weaken the marriage bond by making the chief marital relationship one of mutual sex excitement, and not of common care over offspring. Sexual intercourse deliberately frustrated of offspring is harlotry rather than wedlock. St. Thomas says trenchantly "*Voluptates meretricias vir in uxore quaerit quando nihil aliud in ea attendit quam quod in meretrice attenderet.*" (Suppl. Qu. 49, Art. 6). ("A husband seeks from his wife harlot pleasures when he asks from her only what he might ask from a harlot.") This loosening of the marriage bond through abuse of the marriage act is now a matter of national experience.

5. It, therefore, tends to destroy the *home*. But *homes* are the greatest national riches of a nation.

6. Though it may now and then, and here or there, lessen individual poverty, it neither ends nor lessens, but increases national poverty. The first and fundamental wealth of a nation is the number of its citizens. France, which has been the pioneer of neo-malthusianism, has had the national impoverishment borne in upon it

so convincingly that it is making financial sacrifices to encourage large families.

7. It tends to the economic servitude of woman. The child-bearing woman, as such, can not be put upon the industrial market as such. During child-bearing age she must be guaranteed support by her husband. This is the primary economic charter of woman.

But the woman who knows how to have sexual excitement without motherhood can be put very successfully upon the industrial market. Indeed, she tends more and more to supplant the man. The ultimate tendency of this would seem to be what has happened in some pagan and savage nations. In these nations the man tends more to be polygamous ; living in a leisure supported by his woman-kind.

For these reasons, and others, the Roman Catholic Church, whilst upholding both vowed religious celibacy, and vowed conjugal chastity as lawful states, forbids this return to a pagan degradation of wedlock into scientific harlotry.

CHAPTER XIV

THE MISSION OF ST. DOMINIC

HAVING been invited to write a short article on the above subject, I find, as I have so often found, that St. Thomas has been some six or seven hundred years beforehand in saying what I covet to say.

Hidden away in the marvellous treatise on the Incarnation in the *Tertia Pars* of the *Summa* there is an unobtrusive Question (Q. xl.) "On Christ's Manner of Life." The terse, clear, unemotional phrases would give good cheer and plenty for a priests' retreat. The opening article is: "Whether Christ should have associated with men, or led a solitary life?" To a son of St. Dominic it would seem clear that our brother, the Dull Ox of Aquino, could not have written this daring, profound, incomparable article had he not been the authentic child of his father. Everywhere in the words of the son speaks the spirit of the father—the apostolic spirit of the Friar Preacher.

The three objections which St. Thomas urges against Our Blessed Lord leading other than a solitary life were not mere archaeological revivals. They were alive and powerful when the young Dominic Guzman left the Sub-

prior's stall at Osma for the battle-ground of the Albigensians. Nor were they dead when Bro. Thomas Aquinas, still in his teens, refused the Pope's offer to be at once a Friar Preacher and Abbot of Monte Cassino.

The first objection is that Jesus came to show that He was God. But Aristotle in his *Politics* summed up the wisdom he learned at the court of Alexander the Great, in the saying: "He who lives alone is either a beast—or God," perhaps the Stagyrte's most trenchant epigram. To this philosopher sick of court life, and not yet wholly enamoured of the desert, the man who flies the fellowship of men for the fellowship of beasts is himself as a beast in wildness of life, or is a God by contemplating truth.

Moreover, Solitude is best suited for the contemplative life, which is the perfect life. Hence Jesus ought to have sought solitude.

Lastly to these two abstract reasons St. Thomas adds a concrete third. In point of fact, Jesus fled from the active life for the solitude of the sea, or the hills or the desert: as if He was fleeing from the good to the best.

It was the force of these three objections upon the best minds and hearts of the twelfth century that threatened the very existence of the Church. Men who wished to give themselves to God in a quest of perfection had little choice but to enter one of the great monastic or canonical orders whose main work was the contemplation and liturgical worship of God.

The nature and duties of the then parochial clergy offered little adventure to souls seeking the Holy Grail of perfection. A parish priest whose income was assured and whose duties could be fulfilled by a few hours' work each day or each week, had a position in life so stable as to deserve and still retain the name of a "living." In days when the Catholic Church was the Church by law established, and heresy was not only an ecclesiastical but a civil crime punishable by death, the parochial unit as such was too stable to be apostolic. It was a strongly-fortified medieval city, hard to overthrow, rather than an active army ready for assault. Its emoluments, such as they were, bound up with the very nature and stability of the State, gave that sufficiency and security which the soul avid of perfection begins by treading under foot. All the security of the parochial unit in the early middle ages was drawing men to seek the *vita perfecta* in the contemplative cloisters.

To measure the effects of this movement and this stability let us turn to the principles St. Thomas lays down in answer to contemporary objections. He begins by saying that "Christ's manner of life had to be in keeping with the end of the Incarnation." Thereupon the Angel of the Schools with something like the morning knowledge of the angels gives the three ends of the Incarnation. I. "That He might publish the truth." (To St. Thomas this was the

primary end.) II. That He might "free men from sin." (This was the secondary end, although it was the primary occasion of the Incarnation.) III. That "We might have access to God" (Rom. v. 2). These three ends are in series: the quality of accessibility being the condition of the two preceding ends.

It required something akin to intellectual heroism to apply these principles of the friar preacher to the objections of the thirteenth century. In his reply to the first objection St. Thomas insists that the Truth vouchsafed by the Incarnation was not primarily meant to be contemplated, but to be preached. The commission was: "*Euntes docete*—Go and preach"; not: "Be still and contemplate." The future of the Church was left in the keeping, not of the contemplative, but of the preacher.

St. Thomas in answering the second objection broaches the principle that the apostolic life is not merely more necessary, but is more perfect than the contemplative life, "since such a life is built on an abundance of contemplation, and consequently such was the life chosen by Christ."

Not that the apostle can despise being a contemplative. Indeed the apostolic life must lean heavily on the contemplative, which it should have in abundance. Hence the Word made flesh would sometimes break His preaching journey and retire to the silence of the sea, or the hills, or the desert; that He might renew

His body with rest, or His soul with prayer, or might escape the praise of men.

St. Dominic began his life as a Canon Regular of the Cathedral of Osma. When he looked forward to the coming years he could see most of his time spent in a round of liturgical services which gave God the noble worship of contemplative souls. A brief stay in Languedoc, where the Albigensians were making headway, convinced him that the God-appointed way of spreading the truth was first by preaching it. "In the beginning was the Word." He realised that all growth and defence of the Church must begin with the word preached. Errors that he saw hardening into heresies had begun by ignorance of the word. Taking the spread of God's truth for his life's work, all his preparation was but in the knowledge and love of God's truth. Part of the genius of his design was to make the chief elements of the contemplative work of enlightening with the truth the minds of those within and without the Church. His chief devotion to any doctrine of the Church was to the truth of it. All that was true in the teaching and practice of the Church was to him of first importance. Filled with a contemplative's desire to know the truth, and aflame with an apostle's desire to make known the truth, he made his priories schools of liturgy, theology, preaching. *Nox Deo ; dies proximo* was the accepted description of the ideal friar after the heart of St. Dominic. It was

an ideal too like that of the Word made flesh to be fully realisable by flesh and blood. Yet it was and is an ideal which even when only partially realised challenges eager hearts everywhere, because it is so authentically a crusade to "enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death ; to direct our feet into the way of peace."

CHAPTER XV

A SOCIAL CREED

I believe in the Holy and Undivided Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Amen.

I believe that the transcendent Life is thus a Social Life.

I believe in God who is Our Father—in God who became our Brother, in God who, with our free choice, may become our Spirit.

I believe the transcendent Life is thus an immanent Life.

I believe in the Brotherhood of Man, because I believe not merely in the Fatherhood of God, but in the Brotherhood of God.

I believe that all men are free in will, immortal in destiny, redeemed in soul.

I believe that for a free spirit moral failure is moral fault, and social failure is social fault.

I believe that the highest social principle is the existence of infinite Good, to wit, God, and the first social fact is the existence of an almost infinite evil, to wit, Sin.

I believe that Political Economy is not an exact mathematical or mechanical Science, but is a part of Ethics ; its sanctions are moral sanctions, its motive power is moral power, its results are moral good or moral evil.

I believe that the good man is the good citizen.

I believe that in the economic world, as in the spiritual world, the most needed reformation is self-reformation.

I believe that the natural life of man, like the natural life of God, is a social life.

I believe that man by his existence has God-given rights with God and his fellow-man ; and on his attainment of reason has God-appointed duties towards God and his fellow-man.

I believe that man's only claim on the perfect life of rights fulfilled, is through the perfect life of duties fulfilled.

I believe that the Family gives a fuller life to the Individual ; the State gives a fuller life to the Family, and the Church gives a fuller life to the State.

I believe that the main social certainty about the Individual is the freedom of his will ; the main social certainty about the Family is the indissolubility of the Wedding bond ; the main social certainty about the State is its authority over men's chattels and bodies ; the main social certainty about the Church is its authority over men's souls.

I believe that the Individual and the Family have rights independent of and prior to the State ; and that to understand and safeguard these rights of the Individual and the Family is the first duty of the State.

I believe that the State's chief care is to protect the rights of those who are poor.

I believe that bad laws are no laws.

I believe that "Statesmen are artificers of freedom"; and that, therefore, the greater the freedom of the citizens the greater the State.

I believe that the Individual and the Family have a right to some minimum of consumptive property in food, clothing, dwelling, and other bodily or spiritual goods as a means of existence and development.

I believe that ownership is stewardship; because all ultimate ownership of goods is in the hands of their Maker, and because all opportunity is a call to service.

I believe that when a man's living is through work, his wage for work should be a Living Wage.

I believe that the Living Wage of the worker is the first charge upon the work, and therefore upon the national Income which is the result of work.

I believe that temporal prosperity should not be an aim but a result; and that nations like individuals should not seek to reach happiness but to fulfil duties.

I believe that the perfect State is a Kingdom of God on earth; and that this Kingdom is the Reign of Righteousness.

I believe that this Kingdom of God on earth will not be begun until man's relations to his fellow-man are ruled by justice; nor will it be perfect, until all the duties and claims of

justice are fulfilled by charity, which is man's perfect relation to God.

I believe that thus the fullest social synthesis is: "Love is the fulfilling of the Law."

I believe that this perfect charity which is the fulfilling of the law of justice, is "the Following of Christ," who is God, blessed unto ages of ages. Amen.

CHAPTER XVI

THE OBEDIENCE OF AUTHORITY

WITH great diffidence I will set down what appears to me one of the most fundamental, yet forgotten, principles of Social Well-being. The principle is drawn from two quotations from Saint Thomas Aquinas. He says :

“ It is impossible for the Commonweal to be well unless the citizens are good ; at least, those citizens on whom rests the Government. But it is sufficient for the Commonweal that the others should have goodness enough to obey the command of their Governors.” (*Summa Theologica*, Pars 1^a, 2^a ; Qu. 92, Art. 1, ad. 3^m.)

The other quotation is :

“ A man is bound to obey the secular powers in so far as the order of justice requires. And therefore (a) if these (secular powers) have a usurped and not a just authority, or (b) if they command what is unlawful, these subjects are not bound to obey them, except, by accident, in order to avoid scandal.” (*Ibid.* 2^a 2^a., Qu. 104, Art. 6, ad. 3^m.)

I. From the second of these quotations it is seen that the sin of the subject is neither so great nor so dangerous as the sin of authority as authority. Provided that the subjects have sufficient obedience to obey, with external obedience, the necessary minimum of all human

commonalties is secured. Their internal attitude towards things in general or towards authority is not a grave menace to any but themselves.

2. It is otherwise with those who are in authority. In so far as these are superiors and not subjects, they are bound to initiate and command rather than to follow and obey. For this reason their personal lack of virtue is likely to have its effects on the Commonwealth. A spendthrift or sensual king may mean the ruin of his people. The amours of Henry VIII lost the Blessed Virgin Mary her Dowry. If, as Plato suggests, the four cardinal virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance are as necessary for the State as for the citizen of the State, then they are especially necessary for those who have authority in the State. The personal, and still more the official, sins of authority are of much greater menace to the State than the personal or even the official sins of the citizens. From this it would appear that if the ills of the commonwealth seem critical and almost irremediable, the likelihood is that authority is yielding to some personal or official sins.

3. The second principle of S. Thomas introduces us to rightful and wrongful authority, rightful and unrightful commands.

As only the supreme authority of God is infinite Power, guided by infinite Wisdom and exercised by infinite Love ; in other words, as

only God's Authority is self-limited, all other authority must be limited by another person or by a law. Some higher person or law must authorise and control all created authority whether individual or collective.

No Authority is rightful if it has not been chosen or appointed and authorised by the will of some one in higher authority. No command of authority is rightful unless commanded or authorised by the will, explicit or tacit, of some ultimate person or law.

4. From this follows the momentous principle, which we may enunciate thus: **NO AUTHORITY HAS THE RIGHT TO COMMAND, UNLESS IN COMMANDING IT IS ITSELF OBEYING.** In other words, authority can command obedience only when its act of command is an act of obedience.

This obedience of authority is perhaps wider than the obedience of the subject; because as S. Thomas suggests, the commonweal is not greatly hurt where the citizens have at least sufficient obedience to obey those persons who have authority over them. But these persons who have authority in the Commonwealth have a duty not merely to persons but to laws. They must know and keep the laws which govern themselves or safeguard the rights of their subjects. All this requires an attitude of obedience which is the more heroic because it seems to be wholly self-determined and self-controlled.

5. But it may be urged that this is very dangerous doctrine to preach, seeing that much of the authority in the world and many of the commands are unrightful. Subjects therefore are largely absolved from the duty of obedience. But any public preaching of such a doctrine would mean the total overthrow both of obedience and authority.

The answer to this difficulty will serve to bring into clearer light the doctrine it is meant to disprove. This answer is found in the very doctrine of S. Thomas that even an unlawful authority or the unlawful command of a lawful authority must sometimes be obeyed "in order to avoid scandal." In other words even when the citizens of the commonwealth have no duty of direct obedience to an unlawful authority or an unlawful command yet indirect obedience may be due to the Commonwealth.

6. From this, again, it follows that **AUTHORITY MAY HAVE NO RIGHT TO COMMAND WHAT THE SUBJECT HAS THE DUTY TO OBEY**: or again, "Authority may be wrong in commanding what the subject would be wrong in disobeying": or again, "The subject may sometimes have the duty to obey even when authority has no right to command": or again, "It does not follow that because the subject has the duty to obey, therefore authority has the right to command." These principles rest on the further principle, which we have already proved,

that the laws or commands of any person in authority have a right to obedience only when they themselves are in obedience to some higher person or law.

7. We greatly wonder if the various authorities in the world of to-day are stating their duties and even their rights in terms of obedience. Is Westminster "greatly troubled to be wise" in seeking out the Will of God, or in listening to that law of ethics which can be disregarded by nations only under penalty of national death?

8. Many evils are now militant and indeed for the moment, triumphant in the world: evils of those who should obey and of those who should command. In other words the capital evils of a world *in extremis* are the disobedience to authority and the disobedience of authority. But the greater evil of the two is the disobedience of authority.

CHAPTER XVII

THE ORDER OF FRIAR PREACHERS

It may well be questioned whether the cleric, Dominic Guzman, has ever been equalled as a clerical reformer. Perhaps his greatest reform and greatest work was the Order which he left in being at his death in A.D. 1221. Something of the genius of this father of geniuses may be seen in the astounding fact that he organised his Order in six years. That his Master organised His Church in three years will always remain one of the greatest proofs of His Godhead. St. Dominic, in this as in much else, followed his Master with bewildering fidelity. Moreover, like his Master, he left no written Rule. He did not consign his thoughts to dead parchment ; he stamped them magisterially on a group of living minds and hearts, to whom was committed the trust of carrying these thoughts intact through the centuries. It is surely one of the greatest proofs of the Godhead of Jesus Christ that in a short three years He was able to affix for ever on the minds of fishermen the transcendant ideas which have made the Catholic Church the chief phenomenon of every subsequent century. St. Dominic was so

frankly of his century, and so humbly self-diffident in matters of detail, that he legislated for all peoples and all time not by a book but by a chapter or parliament of his fellow-friars. In this again he followed faithfully the Master Who, though the Word, left no new Bible but an *Ἐκκλησία* or society of fellow-men.

The Order of Friars whom Dominic chose were given a name chosen by a Pope. When Innocent III addressed Dominic and his friars as "Friar Preachers" a new thing had been created in the Church. The office of preaching which had been hitherto officially committed to Bishops was now extended to priests, with the duty of scattering the Word broadcast on the fallow field of the Western Church. No cleric could have chosen such a title either for others or for himself. The name of Preacher could be granted only by the Supreme Pontiff, who had authority under the divine commission to teach all nations unto the consummation of the world.

The Church of St. Dominic's day was in danger, not through lack of good men, but through lack of apostles. St. Dominic, having been from his earliest childhood a cleric amongst clerics, instructed in all things of doctrine and liturgy, could not fail to realise the profound truth of the words: "Instruct thy son and he shall refresh thee and shall give delight to thy soul. When prophecy shall fail the people shall be scattered abroad" (Prov. xxix. 17, 18). He felt that the Church is visible not so much

by one of its four notes as by all four. To be seen it must be not merely One, Holy and Catholic ; it must also be Apostolic.

To insist on this fact was to challenge the opposition even of those in whom the note of Holiness was most manifest. Few centuries have ever witnessed a more remarkable development of that external, liturgical sanctity which made the monasteries of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries homes of almost " *laus perennis*," unending prayer. It needed courage of an uncommon degree to challenge this official Holiness as being, by its excess, a hindrance to the work of harvesting souls. St. Dominic's ecclesiastical training and even his diplomatic training enabled him to bring back the Apostolic life to its old supremacy in the Church, without creating for the moment any serious opposition. What befell his idea after his death is a vexed historical and ecclesiastical problem.

St. Dominic's Order of Friar Preachers was based on two principles. The first was that knowledge is good, and ignorance evil. Knowledge can only accidentally become evil, and ignorance can only accidentally become good. Moreover, though we are taught to adore God's attribute of Humility, and even of Simplicity, a child of St. Dominic and a brother of St. Thomas denies that we have yet been asked to adore the divine Ignorance !

The second principle of St. Dominic's apostolate was that psychologically the first

dealings of God with the adult human soul are an illumination of the mind. This principle had been formulated by the Schoolmen: "Nil amatur quin prius cognoscatur" (Nothing is loved till it is known). The first need of the Apostolic Church is for apostles, who will advertise the human mind of the good tidings of great joy.

So clearly was this master-thought in the soul of Dominic that six short years impressed it indelibly on the mind of St. Dominic's children. From him they soon learned that as Truth, with its appeal to the intelligence, is the soul's first need, and as intelligence is not distributed according to any social or economic classification, the Order of Preachers must appeal to human intelligence as such. That appeal reached the aristocracy of thinkers in the "Summa" of St. Thomas Aquinas; which the official law of the Church has canonised in these words, "Philosophiae rationalis ac theologiae studia et alumnorum in *his* diciplinis institutionem *professores omnino pertractent ad Angelici Doctoris* rationem, doctrinam, et principia eaque sancte teneant" (*Codex Juris Canonici*, 1366, § 2).

If the children of St. Dominic provided the aristocracy of thought with the strong meats of the Summa, the manifold democracy of the Church was given the milk of the Rosary. Pope Benedict XV, in his recent Encyclical, *Fausto appetente*, has recalled to the Universal Church, "how deeply the Queen of Heaven

loved her most devoted servant (*i.e.* St. Dominic) may easily be seen from this, that she employed him to teach the Most Holy Rosary to the Church the Bride of her Son." Only after careful examination would the ordinary mind discover in the Rosary an appeal to the intelligence of the simplest Catholic. Indeed, so simple does the Rosary appear that, far from seeming to be an intelligible thing, it seems to be only a senseless gabble. Yet its recitation is at once such a union of vocal and mental prayer as to appear to other critics too intellectual ! Moreover, it still remains the unique prayer of the Church, which impresses on the minds and hearts of even the most unlettered the stigmata of Christ's life and death, and life after death.

A devotion to God's noble creation, human intelligence, was but another name for devotion to Truth. St. Dominic left to his children a crusader devotion to Truth—no matter under what disguises or with what alloy of error truth might be found. If a martyr is, etymologically, and historically, a witness to truth, no man is nearer martyrdom than he who has taken truth-telling as his craft. No wonder that in one century alone some ten thousand of St. Dominic's children won the martyr's crown. Again, few groups of men, or even of Churchmen, have toiled as St. Dominic's children have toiled in the hard ways of reuniting Christendom. A son of St. Dominic has left on record "Blessed are the peace-makers, for they may

be wounded by both sides." Yet in every serious effort to bring back the other sheep to the One Fold, some child of St. Dominic has been found.

A love of truth has been the spring of that passionate zeal for social rightness which has given us Savonarola and Las Casas. These men were not temperamentally lovers of reform, still less of revolution. They were, above all else, children of St. Dominic who, having caught some of his devotion to truth, essayed the hard task of applying it to the social injustice which had hardened into a Pharisaical tradition. If not every action of these passionate lovers of social right and truth is beyond criticism, this is but to say that human virtue, even when heroic, is compatible with slight momentary sin. But their example in the lurid years which ushered in the rending of the seamless garment of Western Christianity reminds St. Dominic's children of to-day that at risk of scorn or death the sinking world must be again saved by men dedicated to Truth.

Lastly, the mystical life which is essentially concerned with the contemplation of this truth, has flourished amidst St. Dominic's children. But it has grown up in harmony with the doctrine of St. Thomas that, here on earth, the most perfect form of living is not the contemplative, but the apostolic life. The essence of Dominican Mysticism is in St. Catherine quitting her cell in Siena for the harvest-field of the Church in

ruins and keeping only a little cell in her heart. Or again, it is in B. Henry Suso leaving the vision of Jesus in the chapter-house to help Jesus in the person of a beggar at the door. Or again, it is in the poet-author of the *Pange Lingua* dictating theological truth to three and four secretaries. But most of all it is in the Master of all these mystics whose life was summed up nobly by his fellow-friars, "Nox Deo ; dies, proximo." "God had his nights ; man, his days."

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FRIAR-PREACHERS AT OXFORD

WHEN the young Spaniard, William of Montferrat, had met his fellow-countryman, Dominic Guzman, at the house of Cardinal Ugolini Conti, afterwards Pope Gregory IX, and “had taken to love him,” he talked over a plan of life with Europe’s most experienced apostle. His own sworn witness after his master’s death tells the story :—

“It seemed to me that Brother Dominic was holier than anyone I ever saw, though I have talked with many holy men. Moreover, it seemed to me that he was the greatest lover of man’s salvation I ever saw. That same year I went to Paris to learn theology ; because first I had promised and agreed with him that after I had *learned* theology for two years, and he had settled his brethren in the Order, we should both go to convert the pagans in Persia and the other parts of the Southland.”

The spirit that sent a little group of Friar-Preachers to Oxford on Sunday, August 15th, 1221, is in this story of the young man whom the Apostle of the West was training to be an apostle of the South. Surely a new spirit was abroad when the man who was wearing himself out in the harvest field of Europe prepared his follower for work amongst the pagans by sending him to the most renowned university in the

world ! To prepare an apostle for the Foreign Missions by giving him the best university education available, is not without its challenge to the apostles of to-day.

It is characteristic of the medieval love of anonymity that we know neither the name or nationality of the little band of Friar-Preachers who entered England's most famous university with apostolic designs for the conversion of England ! St. Dominic, who had himself planned the enterprise and chosen the band of adventurers had made choice of Oxford with something like prophetic insight. Years of apostleship in Languedoc had shown him how a people with a tradition of faith reaching back through centuries could spiritually die through lack of teaching, as the sturdiest trees will sometimes wither through one prolonged drought. Whatever may be said of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it seems undeniable that the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were not conspicuous for the learning of the clergy or for the plentifulness of the spoken word of God. To those of us who are accustomed to the modern minute organisation of ecclesiastical studies which last for some years, the clerical education of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, outside the universities, would seem of the scantiest. To raise the level of priestly education, and thereby to raise the level of parochial education, St. Dominic saw to be the main defence against the oncoming Reformation.

Oxford may be proud of having probably given the Friar-Preachers their first teacher. At Toulouse, when St. Dominic took his first six friars to hear theology, the professor was no other than the Englishman, Alexander Stavensby, late professor of theology at Bologna. Stavensby, consecrated by Honorius III Bishop of Lichfield (April 4th, 1224) was one of that group of great prelates who welcomed the new spirit brought into the land by the children of St. Dominic. These men included Langton, St. Edmund of Canterbury, St. Richard of Chichester, St. Thomas of Hereford. If we are right in assuming that the Ankren Riwe is due to one of the first and greatest of the Oxford Friar-Preachers, Robert Bacon, it is evident that a spirit of scholarly asceticism and mysticism began to radiate from the great English university. Moreover, if, with Edmund Bishop, we accept St. Edmund of Abingdon, and not St. Osmund as the master-mind that definitively re-modelled the Sarum Rite, we are probably not far from the truth in associating St. Edmund's work with the liturgical revival which has left us the rite of the Friar-Preachers.

The coming of the Friar-Preachers to Oxford began the growth of that collegiate system which still gives the two great English universities a place apart. Moreover, the example of the Friars, who offered to their novices the advantage of university education, was quickly

followed by the Benedictines of South and North, the Carmelites and later by the Cistercians.

John of St. Giles, doctor, theologian, professor at Paris, having become a friar, was afterwards sent to Oxford. So great was his reputation that he was allowed to add a second chair of theology. These two chairs were filled by men who made the name of England famous throughout Europe. Robert Bacon, Fishacre, Simon Bovill, Kilwardby, Bromyard and Trivet, Claypole and Hotham are names of note at a time when the level of English theology was at its highest.

What happened in the sixteenth century to the friars has taught us the stern duty of reviewing what happened in the thirteenth. Nowhere more than in England were the Friar-Preachers favoured by the King and nobles. It is the penalty of scholarship in every age to be pressed into the service of mediocrity and sometimes even of Mammon. All was not well with the Church when the children of the apostle who had left a diplomatic for an apostolic career were forced by an unkindly obedience to be the friends and even the messengers of kings. A fraternity dedicated to, yet largely dependent on doles, from a sovereign, and especially from a Tudor, is not beyond sight of Scylla or Charybdis. It is, no doubt, an exaggeration, but only the exaggeration of a truth to say that the English Friars of the thirteenth century rested their material basis on the Crown and the Peerage.

But there is only the unexaggerated truth in recording that the breath of a Tudor sovereign in the sixteenth century unmade within a year what three centuries had brought to maturity.

During the three centuries that passed between the coming of the Friars to Oxford and their suppression by Henry VIII, the spirit of St. Dominic had won countless victories. The man who has been called " the first Minister of Education " was living too manifestly in his children not to instruct many unto the adventure of instructing the world in righteousness. English children of St. Dominic had a zeal, not untempered with pity, for the Jews ; were pioneers in the instruction of women, even of devout women, as witnessed by the Ankren Riwele ; were on fire to spread the good news even by the stage, as when they fostered the mystery-plays ; were devoted to the task of raising the level of clerical scholarships, as may be traced in every act of their long life at Oxford.

Yet it may have befallen them as some students of their founder's life think that it befell him. To most Catholic historians it has seemed that St. Dominic's apostolate to the Albigensians was such a success that he coveted to apply elsewhere the methods which he had proved efficacious in Languedoc. To some of us, his children, he seems, on the contrary, to have failed ; and to have realised his failure most when the thing he detested most had come to pass, and the dogs of war had been unleashed

to supplant the dogs of the Lord. Having failed to convert Languedoc he felt he must convert the world. His schemes of victory grew greater by his defeats.

There are still some of his children, perhaps, even here in England, who are only lifted up to hope by the thought that the little band of thirteen Friar-Preachers who brought into Oxford the fire they had borrowed from their father's torch failed in their effort to enkindle the land. The England which sank so speedily in the sixteenth century can only be excused of its betrayal by the words, "They knew not what they did." But this plea of ignorance which is probably valid and therefore satisfactory, must mean that by some happening, whether culpable or inculpable we know not—God knows—the message of St. Dominic to Oxford and to England had failed.

To men of desires failures can be lessons. For them defeats are not absolute, but relative. The children of the man who dreamed of converting the world when he had failed to convert a corner in one kingdom in one continent, think to serve him with renewed loyalty by a new effort to change defeat into victory, in the Home of Lost Causes.

CHAPTER XIX

LIBERAL CATHOLICISM

THE late Bishop Brownlow in forwarding to his clergy the "Joint Pastoral of the English Hierarchy on Liberal Catholicism" added the following words :

"It is possible that the term 'Liberal Catholic' may be misunderstood by some, and be supposed to be equivalent to 'Catholic Liberal'; and the Pastoral may thus be supposed to strike at Catholics who are Liberal in politics. Nothing could be further from the minds of the Bishops; for the Catholic Church has among her most faithful children, persons of every political party; and there are Catholic Liberals who are quite as loyal and devout members of the Church as Catholic Conservatives. There is a propensity in human nature which prompts us to apply ecclesiastical censures to other people; instead of taking the warnings home to ourselves. The faithful cannot be too much on their guard against imbibing the poison of Liberal Catholicism; but they should be equally careful to abstain from stigmatising others as 'Liberal Catholics' who may be as loyal to the Church as themselves." (Jan. I, 1901.)

The wise words of a wise prelate are but a reminder that nowhere more than in ecclesiastical politics and doctrine do words prove themselves the veils of thought. In saying what must be said on the present subject the writer must trust that his readers will go beyond the

spoken word to the unspoken thought ; and even beyond the thought to the thing if real ambiguity is to be avoided. For on a subject surrounded by undefined frontiers and teeming with unsettled terminology, a writer could hope to avoid ambiguities only by leaving the realm of realities for that of intellectual logarithms. So that though I shall not hope, I shall expect to be somewhat obscure ; whilst still expecting and hoping to leave the matter a little less obscure than before.

Thus I shall ask you to allow me to condemn once for all whatever we find ourselves obliged to condemn by the Joint Pastoral. Yet I need not add that we are not therefore obliged to condemn the whole of Liberal Catholicism merely because we are obliged to condemn it as a whole. Nor are we therefore to anathematise the thing because the word is suspect. Have we not heard warm denunciations of the phrase " Catholic Socialism " ? yet in point of fact the Church in her relations to religious orders not only approves but favours a form of Socialism ; and not only Socialism but Communism ! Thus they may be, and the Joint Pastoral says there is, in ecclesiastical matters a definite intellectual or political atmosphere known as " Liberal Catholicism " ; this is indeed reprehensible ; and yet a certain tone of Liberalism amongst Catholics is allowable in theory and wise in practice.

It may help us to clear the matter in hand if

we begin by distinguishing two spheres of Liberalism, viz. : the speculative and the practical, the sphere of thought and the sphere of action, the sphere of culture and the sphere of politics. A man may be liberal in one ; and a reactionary in the other. Thinkers are not necessarily statesmen. Nor are there many Prime Ministers who could write or perhaps appreciate the *Foundations of Belief*. In ecclesiastical affairs a Catholic may be a liberal to excess in matters of thought, and medieval beyond endurance in matters of policy. Again, boldness in ecclesiastical policy is not necessarily the outcome of originality in thought. A safe secretary of the Index might play havoc with the Propaganda. A broad-minded Canon-Penitentiary might almost strangle the Holy Office. St. Thomas Aquinas was never elected Prior. St. Gregory and St. Leo are the only Doctors to wear the Tiara. Plato's ideal of statesmen-philosophers viewed historically has remained one of the most foolish dreams of one of the wisest men ; so far removed is the sphere of deed from the sphere of thought.

Another distinction is of hardly less practical importance. Liberal Catholics of the exaggerated type are not confined to the laity. Just as it is naive anthropomorphism that adjusts the categories of Church and world by identifying the Church with clerics and the world with laics or with the reigning dynasty, so it is the same immature thinking that identifies liberalism

with the lay minds and conservatism with the clerical. For though it may be true to say that that somewhat indefinite thing, the world, cannot flow into the mere abstract Church, still Our Blessed Lord's own gracious parables lead us to expect tares in the broad concrete field, and fruitless branches on the wide-spreading concrete tree of the Church. False liberalism is not a parasite of the mere lay mind. It has no prejudices against clerics. Indeed if we take the heresiarchs such as Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches and the rest to be classical examples of the liberalism we would condemn, it is regrettable to find that they are not laymen. Most of the wrong thinking from which the Church has suffered has come from clerics; and as a class we are tolerable to our Master only because in spite of the grievous hurt we have done, He has commissioned us to be the salt of the earth. The very greatness of our mission and of our powers has brought about the evil we have wrought. For all power wherever found is power for evil as well as for good; and the greater the power, the greater the evil.

A definition of Liberal Catholicism either of the sound or unsound type will hardly be expected from one to whom in both its forms it appears rather as an attitude than an opinion. To the true liberal Catholic false liberalism is something a little less intolerable than heresy and a little more dangerous than schism; for

as the Ancren Riwe observes, "a foe that seems a friend is a traitor beyond all traitors." And it not seldom happens that the severe sentence passed by the true liberal upon false liberalism is passed in turn upon the true liberal by those who repudiate both the name and the reality of liberalism.

Liberalism is sometimes so defined as to be synonymous with that definite *mentalité*, to quote a phrase of Fonsegrive—which measures all intellectual propositions or statements, whether dogmas or scientific conclusions, by the principles and standards of experience. So used, Liberalism becomes identical with what the Vatican Council has called Rationalism. Undoubtedly there is some infiltration of Liberalism into Rationalism or *vice versa*.¹ But a

¹ Newman would seem to identify Liberalism with Rationalism in the following passages: "My battle was with Liberalism; by Liberalism I mean the anti-dogmatic principle and its developments." (*Apologia*, Chap. II. I). "Liberty of thought is in itself a good; but it gives an opening to false liberty. Now by Liberalism I mean false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters in which, from the constitution of the human mind thought cannot be brought to any successful issue. Among such matters are first principles of whatever kind and of these the most sacred and momentous are especially to be reckoned the truths of Revelation. Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word," (*ibid.* Appendix, Note A.) The following passage would seem to confirm the distinction between Liberalism and Rationalism: "The most oppressive thought in the whole process of my change of opinion was the clear anticipation verified by the event that it would issue in the triumph of Liberalism. Against the anti-dogmatic principle I had thrown my whole mind; yet now I was doing more

clear distinction may be made between both ; and it is no part of a philosopher's duty to ignore or obscure distinctions. Rationalism as a word never bears a good meaning ; Liberalism may mean something good or something bad. There are no orthodox rationalists ; but there may be orthodox liberals. It is not easy to state wherein the distinction between the two lies, even though we are quite sure that a distinction does lie between them. Perhaps we shall be near the truth if we say that Liberalism is a leaning, and Rationalism is a bent ; or that Liberalism is a tone of thought and Rationalism is a dogma ; or that Liberalism may be the raw material and Rationalism the finished product. A rationalist is one who looks on himself in theory and practice as everywhere free from the bridle of authority ; a liberal Catholic is one who merely acts as though free from the limitations of here and now. A rationalist is a high priest and prophet of reason ; a liberal Catholic acknowledges himself the student and even the servant of faith. And if the rationalist has no limitations but those of the mind thinking and the objects thought, the liberal Catholic makes light of the limitations or restrictions of time and place. For, Liberalism not being a dogma but an attitude, the same dogma may to-day

than anyone else could do to promote it. . . . But this was not all. As I have already said there are but two alternatives, the way to Rome, and the way to Atheism : Anglicanism is the half-way house on one side and Liberalism is the half-way house on the other." (*ibid.* Appendix, Note A.)

characterise an advanced liberal and to-morrow betoken the most orthodox Catholic. Arianism, Nestorianism, Lutheranism are dogmas or denials subject to no change. But the unsafe liberal Catholic of the twentieth century may anathematise his fellow liberal of the nineteenth ; and may deserve a like anathema only by his forgetfulness that to anticipate is often as dangerous as to delay ; and that the twentieth century must not too hastily take up the methods of the twenty-first.

This leads us to one of the chief elements of Liberalism, false and true. A true liberal is a true loyalist. But his loyalty is to the Church's future no less than to its past. He does not look on to-day as the tomb of yesterday but as the womb of to-morrow. Though the Church's past is one of splendour he looks forward to a more splendid future. For him Christianity is indeed the fulfilment of the promises ; but still more is it the bringing in of a better hope. Jesus Christ is a midpoint ending and beginning divine promises. The world the Church covets most is a world that is to be. Its daily prayer is " Thy Kingdom Come ! " Its eyes in apostolic days were not turned back upon an Eden but forward to a millenium. Thus the true liberal does not look on Christianity as a crucifixion, though it dies daily ; but as a resurrection, for behold ! it lives. Nor can he see in the Incarnation merely an episode ; but an institution. Jesus Christ is the same yesterday,

to-day and forever. A true liberal does not rest his faith on a dead past but on a living present ; nor on an historical fact but on an existent reality ; nor on an empty tomb but on a Real Presence. Sometimes he seems to disregard history ; but this is only his human way of saying that the future is almost more to him than the past. He is impatient when a certain class of Catholics boast of their loyalty, thereby expressing a mere sentiment for what has been, as though loyalty like memory was only retrospective. In Lacordaire's strong phrase, he is "a citizen of the future," and he bows down before the New Era that is to be.

Therein lie his strength and weakness. Because the future is not the past, he is tempted to think that it must be other than the past. Unless closely watched and wisely guided, this feeling may grow to mean that between past and future there must be a break. In his zeal for continuance he may be led on to hold a break of continuity ; as if the Church had persistence only at the cost of consciousness. In other spheres this would not matter much, but the Church must be a continuous consciousness. For she has the mind of Christ, and what He was yesterday He is to-day and will be forever.

This element of expectation which is the life—and may be the death—of sound liberalism is joined with a certain insistence on doubt and difficulty. If to look into the present state of the economy of Redemption is to peer through

a glass darkly, what must it be to look through the added darkness of to-morrow ? A true liberal is a man whose face is set eastward. As he journeys onward he is always an hour's march before the rising sun, in that darkest hour before dawn. He will scarcely allow himself the consolation of seeing each day's sun at mid-day, for that would be to rest on the way, and to falter in pressing forward toward the goal ; and for him life and especially spiritual life is movement ; and " Not to go on is to go back." He lives in an hour of darkness ; and makes his dwelling place amidst the clouds.

This again is his strength and weakness. Unless he has the true philosophic attitude of faith he will allow difficulties to usurp the jurisdiction of doubts ; ignorance will become error ; and, in spite of " *malo esse quam videri* " things will be taken not to be, because they are not seen to be. In matters of doctrine this attitude leads some men to leave entrenchments and to go out in the open in the hope of cutting off an enemy who has made a feint of flight. How often have lines of defence been abandoned for no better reason than that they were built yesterday, and now it is to-day ; or that they were thrown up in the night and now the sun is shining on them ; or that the defenders know better than their foes the weak parts of the defence. Never was a fortress equally strong everywhere ; and never was it defended by men who were conscious only of its weakness. But it

does not cease to be defensible merely because all its parts are not equally strong ; or because no one knows its weakness so well as its defenders. Part strengthens part ; nor is it taken until every bastion has been won.

In practical matters the frame of mind which allows difficulties to weigh like doubts, will allow the defects of persons to compromise institutions. But whilst a loyal Catholic may well turn his eyes towards the future, he must not fret his soul because others have the official duty of turning towards the past and looking warily to the Church's steps.

To the elements of Liberalism in general we may now add those of modern Liberalism ; which we shall find to take their shape and colour from the modern social and intellectual environment.

Liberalism in ecclesiastical politics would seem to be identical with or begotten of a reaction against medieval feudalism. It is profoundly interesting that in feudalism, *i.e.*, in the first definitely Christian civilisation we have seen, society is found resting on something like a social pact ; and labour is associated not with slavery but with free serfs bound by oaths to military service. In pursuance of something like the same principle, the relations between Church and State were fixed by Charters or Concordats, whereby the civil and ecclesiastical powers so bound each other to mutual aid that we find Bishops and Abbots leading troops,

and secular judges meddling with theology. In spite of the politic toleration of Jews the common teaching of feudalism was "One Kingdom : One Church." All this reminds us that the age of crusades and charters bore within its heart something of the romantic idealism that had led the Church of Jerusalem into a premature effort after communism. The crisis of feudalism came when Protestantism brought western civilisation face to face with the still more complex problem of dealing with men not in the abstract but in the concrete, not with idealised rational animals but with German monks and English sovereigns. But even after three hundred years of struggle feudalism has not yet taken leave of Europe. In some states it still serves to embody the relations between civil and ecclesiastical powers. Every year however adds to the frailty of its tenure. Even as we speak its last foot-hold in a great continental nation is being washed away by the floods of uprising Socialism. Comparing these feudal relations to a dying man, over-cautious conservatism is the child who will not see death approaching, being blinded by the memory of his father's long years and many illnesses ; the false liberal is the child who would hasten the father's death by withdrawing the pillow or by a bustling preparation for the funeral. The true loyal liberal is the child, who, whilst doing his best to keep life as long as possible,

would yet prepare for the death which he has so long foreseen and dreaded.

Just as Liberalism in ecclesiastical politics is a counter-current to feudalism, so in ecclesiastical thought is it a counter-current to formalism. Carried beyond its limits this liberal current broadens out into merely destructive criticism. It is significant that Descartes the Gaul and Kant the German, the two most influential thinkers since the sixteenth century, should have given us the practice and theory of criticism. But criticism is naturally if not necessarily formless and amorphous. Its aim is to make debris ; it sometimes ends with chaos. It should not end there, if critics were true to the etymology of their name. For if a critic is a judge, his judgments should be decisions and should stand. The true Catholic liberal thinker recognises that though the Church is founded on a rock, men build thereon "gold, silver, precious stones, wood hay, stubble." From time to time an examination has to be made not of the foundation "which is Christ Jesus" but of the lower courses of masonry laid down by man. This inspection of the lower courses of masonry and rejection of what is old or crumbling is a critical work worthy of the best intellects of the Church. Nowadays much has to be done in the sphere of philosophy and history. Philosophy has to be translated into modern forms of thought or to be revised by a new synthesis of psychological and cosmological

data. History has almost to be re-written. In great part only its outlines remain true to fact; and large regions of eventful history have for the first time to be welcomed within its frontiers. Strangely enough, exaggerated liberalism of thought sometimes flees to philosophy and sometimes to history in its protest against the formalism of the past. For the most dominant current in modern philosophy is singularly amorphous and even nebulous; whilst history has almost shrunk back to a bare index and précis-making of past events, shorn of all the formal and ideal valuations of former ages.

A further element in modern Catholic liberalism is the recognition of rights. It would be straining a threadbare theme to insist on the fact that Christianity has practically created the theory of man's unchartered rights. Medievalism, whether in thought or action, was not altogether freed from the thralldom of petty intellectual and social tyranny. Plato and Aristotle were in the sphere of thought what Constantine and William the Conqueror were in the social sphere. Few, even of the boldest thinkers, dared cast aside the over-lordship of these two "tyrants" of thought. But theirs was a mild Hellenic thralldom, tempered by their graceful *καλοκαγαθία*. And in spite of the subtleties of commentators their philosophy is the nearest approach the world has yet seen to organised good sense.

But the sixteenth century at one stroke broke away from the statutory to the natural rights of man as man. Exaggerated liberalism, which is but an over-development of this birth-throe, is too insistent upon its claims and too unobservant of its duties. Sound liberalism is more concerned to grant freedom than to claim it. And outside these two classes a third class is still found for whom the modern and essentially Christian idea of a human being freighted with duties growing into rights and rights resting on fulfilled duties is a disloyalty to a past Christian civilisation.

So far we have assumed that Liberalism is loyalty to the future equally with the past—that it is therefore a keen realisation of difficulty. Moreover in its modern form it concludes a democratic counter-current to feudalism and a critical counter-current to formalism joined to an explicit assertion of the social and intellectual rights of man.

The nineteenth century gave us a notable example of true ecclesiastical liberalism in two men born within a few months of each other, John Henry Lacordaire and John Henry Newman. Both were converts; both had been smitten in different degrees by unbelief. Lacordaire was a liberal in action; Newman, in thought. Lacordaire had few difficulties with the Creed; Newman hardly touched ecclesiastical politics. Lacordaire was neither attracted nor repelled by the dogmatic side of the Church.

Of his conversion he could write, "I have reached Catholic belief through social belief; and nothing appears to me better demonstrated than the argument: Society is necessary; therefore the Christian religion is divine, for it is the means of bringing religion to its true perfection." Newman was actually kept back by the political action of the Church at the time when he was being drawn to acknowledge her as the covenanted guarantee and guide of dogmatic developments. Lacordaire called himself a "Citizen of the Future" and found a journal entitled *The New Era*; Newman left behind the outline of a vast scheme of development. Lacordaire sprang from a nation that was breaking the bonds of feudalism in Church and State; Newman belonged to a State-church that hardly felt its feudal fetters in the profession of dogmatic liberalism. Both the Gallic tribune of the Church and the Anglo-Saxon thinker insisted on the rights of action and thought—Lacordaire, in his phrase, "Liberty is not given, it is taken"; Newman in his phrase, "Conscience first, Pope afterwards." Yet both men made their claims for others more than for themselves: Lacordaire thrice bowed to the stern voice of obedience; Newman could write "My own Bishop is my Pope."¹ "A Bishop's lightest word *ex cathedra* is heavy."² Lacordaire, although he could say on his death-bed "I hope to live and die a repentant Catholic and an unrepentant liberal,"

¹ *Apol.* Ch. II.² *Ibid.*

did not recognise that his liberalism energised mostly in his outer life of action ; Newman, because he was geographically and ecclesiastically associated with Tory feudalism, detested liberalism in politics to such an extent as not to recognise that he was a Sir Galahad of dogmatic liberalism. Lacordaire was before his age in demanding and employing the three freedoms, of the Press, of Education, and of Church Government ; Newman in his *Grammar of Assent*, *Development of Doctrine*, and *Essay of Inspiration* has laid down liberal lines of thought in the sphere of Philosophy, Theology and Scripture. Lastly, Lamennais, the apostate French Abbé, throws into relief the sound liberalism of Lacordaire ; and Darwin, the spoiled priest of the Establishment and author of a purely biological theory of development, is subtly contrasted with Newman, his pioneer in the sphere of theological development.

From the lives of these two great souls and true liberals it would seem that a lesson is taught to us whose path is beset by even greater dangers than those they so fully overcame. Lacordaire the fearless man of action stands in contrast with Newman the quiet thinker. The man who held Notre Dame spell-bound by his eloquence was above all an ascetic ; the seer who won England by the story of his change of soul was a mystic. In that as in so much else their lives and especially their inner lives are still symbolical. Some of us are beset in the sphere

of church government by temptations to an unrestrained political liberalism. Too intent on to-morrow, we are fretful with to-day. For such of us even the terrors of Lacordaire's inflictive asceticism are not without a stern lesson. The student of St. Sulpice who threw the quaint college-caps behind the fire, and the sub-editor of *L'Avenir* who wrote impassioned pleas for disestablishment had to practise many an hour of rude *ἄσκησις* before his soul brought itself to its final childlike pliancy in the hands of authority. So steeped in the love of freedom as to allow it no small share in his choice of a religious order, he yet undertook the life of vowed obedience; nor did his life ever lag behind his vow. "Child of an age that knew not how to obey," he felt that it could learn and he could teach no better lesson than that of the Son Who was obedient unto death. The dangers springing from the applause of thousands of his fellow-citizens whom he was leading to faith, he stifled under the feet of some simple lay-brother to whom he poured out the humbling story of his sins. He first lived, then preached, Christ crucified. Social theories and ecclesiastical politics became simple to this passionate wooer of the Cross when he recognised that his Master's divine diplomacy was to live what He preached and to give His life for His foes. Personal rights and privileges came to him coloured by the thought that the One Who had all rights and privileges emptied Himself of all

save that of claiming to be loved by loving unto death those who hated unto death. His whole inner life has been summed up in these striking words: "His love for the Cross was exclusive, passionate; not a platonic love, but a fire that led him to copy the pattern shown him on Calvary. All his mysticism was reduced to this simple principle: To suffer:—to suffer in order to satisfy justice—to suffer in order to prove love." He was a true ascetic; and could therefore dare to be a true liberal. For he bore in his soul the marks of Christ crucified; he sought to blot out the handwriting against the world he lived in by nailing it to the cross; and everywhere as he moved amongst men his life and word preached the truth that the Cross of Christ is alone the redemption and enfranchisement of man.

If Lacordaire was an ascetic, Newman was a mystic. As Lacordaire's sound liberalism grew out of his true ascetism, so did Newman's sound liberalism grow out of his true mysticism. For him a vision was the object and the reward of life. Had he been rapt with St. Paul to a sight of the third heaven, had he seen things which even his golden tongue could not utter, he would have spoken of his rapture as "seeing through a glass darkly" in comparison with the vision he was to see. Death, to such a soul, could only seem the swift passage "from shadows and symbols to the Truth." Yet he wasted his life in no vain mood of regret for a vision he could

nowhere descry in this world of shadows. He had the seer's gift of seeing beyond and within ; and of seeing first of all, the dim frontiers of further fields of light. Nature was sacramental to him ; it was the garment of God. It was even liturgical and " chanted to his soul with solemn voice." Things did not therefore cease to belong to nature because they proved to be divine. And as the meanest flower—a spray of snap-dragon on a college-wall—had thoughts too deep for tears, so did the simplest revealed truth, no matter in what half-forgotten language enshrined, open up vistas of thought along which his great mind ranged to the Infinite. Such a simple phrase as " The Word was made flesh " he could not read without seeing three fathomless mysteries yawning under his feet. To him the formulas of faith were not too shallow but too deep for thought. He had the sensitiveness of those mystics who could not hear the name of God by whomsoever spoken without being borne against their will into high regions of superconscious thought. Filled with the bliss of the divine cloud he showed no fretfulness under the dim lights of the Credo. There were no mysteries for him ; but one all embracing mystery—God. And in that light he saw light, and in that shadow he bore meekly with all shadows. Like St. Teresa, whose soul thrilled whilst chanting the Creed at Mass, his whole mind swayed to the balanced antitheses of the Creed of Athanasius. He

looked upon it almost as the grandest song of faith ; for whilst he chanted it, his mind leaped beyond the word to the divine reality and there found itself flooded by the " Blessed Vision of Peace."

Visitors to the Convent of the Carmelites in Paris are shown the cell where Lacordaire prayed; and upon the wall, are still pointed out the blood-marks of his pitiless self-conquest. You have but to go an hour's walk along the Iffley Road from Oxford to see the brick-floored cell where Newman knelt to see and stood to write the " master light of all his seeing"—the vision that led him on. Such of us as would dare to tread the way of these two great souls and do some little of the work they left undone, must one day kneel down at least in spirit within those two shrines and learn their lesson. For only when some of the Master's ascetic and mystic self-denial—some of the sorrows or shadows of Golgotha—has mastered our soul may we hope to be true to our freedom and our responsibilities, to our past and our future, to ourselves and to God.

CHAPTER XX

TOWARDS TRUER ETHICS

FOR the purpose of stimulating thought on a subject worthy of our thinking let me set down some detached ideas.

I

Philosophy is largely in ill odor because it has ceased to be Ethics and has become Metaphysics.

In the classical days of Grecian philosophy the dominant subjects were Logic and Ethics ; indeed there were no other subjects in the higher ways of thought.

Logic was a science that put order into a man's mental activity.

Ethics was a science that put order into a man's mental activity.

Logic had sway over the mind ; Ethics over the will. Grecian education was based on a liberal schooling in these two noble sciences ; and gave us many masters of sublime thought and noble wisdom.

But nowadays the science of Ethics has largely disappeared from the Schools. Its place has been taken by Metaphysics. Even Logic has outgrown itself. Far from being what it

once was, to wit, a practical science or art that put order into a man's thoughts, it has become but an outwork of a subtle Metaphysics, only calculated to put disorder into a man's thoughts.

Practical Logic might still be sought and taught by many in the universities if only it was practical. But it has become so abstruse that its chief achievement is to discourage thinking.

In the olden days just as men began blacksmithing by learning the processes of blacksmithing, so they began the craft of thinking by learning in outline the processes of thinking. Of late, however, these processes have become so subtle that logic instead of being suited to introduce thought is almost more calculated to stifle thought. The scientific way of teaching smithing is to make the student know the processes say of wielding a hammer, beating a rivet, fashioning a horseshoe. If the university methods were to obtain, the would-be smith would spend several years studying the chemistry of the hammer and rivet and the natural history of the horse !

The strange fate that has befallen Logic has also befallen Ethics ; but has befallen it in another way.

Logic is now largely ignored because it has been taught too much ; Ethics, because it has been taught too little.

Even such a book as Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, whilst seeming to weaken this statement, really strengthens it. The fault of this *Prolegomena to Ethics*, as the author would be the first to admit, is that there is too much Prolegomena and too little Ethics. If one may use a "bull"—it is not Ethics but the Metaphysics of Ethics.

Add to this that for the most part Ethics has been handed over to the care of the theologians. It has become "moral theology." In consequence, the ordinary university student does not feel called to supplement his overstocked syllabus with a course in theology !

Again, Ethics has provided so many sites for disagreement that it has become embittered with controversy. It has almost become the "Apologetics of Ethics," and a science is *in extremis* when it has become Apologetics.

Yet this lack of Ethics is a serious want in all liberal or university education.

The chief schools in a modern university are Theology, Medicine, Law, and (what for want of a better word I shall call) Pedagogy.¹

It need not be urged, for it goes without saying, that Ethics is of supreme importance for the theologian.

Yet it is hardly of less importance for the doctor, lawyer, teacher. Nowadays it is the

¹ By this I mean a classical or scientific knowledge enabling a man to become, not a doctor or a lawyer, but a teacher or professor.

moral aspects of medical science that are of supreme importance. Doctors are already crossing the frontiers of their medical science into Ethics, with little or no ethical training.

Lawyers, too, are drafting and interpreting laws with little or no reference to the eternal laws of Ethics.

II

Speaking accurately, Ethics is not a science, nor yet an art, but a life.

There is a "Science of Ethics." This necessarily is a science, but the essential Ethics is a life.

To explain. A science is what the Scholastics call an intellectual habit. The nature of intellectual habits has not yet been sufficiently analysed, that we may venture upon any lengthy explanation. But it may be enough to say that an intellectual habit such as the science of Algebra, Geology, Botany, History, consists in a number of accurate facts, a number of general principles, and a certain intellectual power and ease in seeing facts in principles and principles in facts.

An art is different. Whilst it includes certain intellectual habits, it requires certain qualities of mind or hand which are creative. Thus the art of the painter is not merely an intellectual knowledge of the principles and technique of painting, but an intellectual power of conceiving

pictures and a hand-power of carrying out the pictures conceived.

But Ethics is something still more than a science or an art. It is not mere organised knowledge, though it is accompanied by organised knowledge. It is not a mere eye and hand-power to make external things or carry out practical ideas. It is above all a practical power of controlling the human will for good or evil in all matters where the human will may enter for good or evil. Its aim is not to make good scientific judgments or to make good artistic products but to make good men. Ethics then differs from art inasmuch as its product is not an external thing but an internal state; and from science, inasmuch as this internal state is not a faithful copy of some external thing but, as it were, a definite attitude towards things for good or evil.

To those who have grasped these truths what has been said will probably be clear; to those who have not grasped these truths, what has been said will be almost unintelligible.

Yet the obscurity is but a proof of the thesis which these words are aimed at developing.

For it is evident that the seat of science is the intelligence and the seat of Ethics is the will. It need hardly be proved that the intelligence is not the will; their processes are not identical. Moreover one process of intelligence is not identical with another. Ratiocination or reason-

ing is not like intuition ; the secondary is not like the primary.

Hence just as it is never quite satisfactory to express the greater in terms of the less or the primary in terms of the secondary, so it cannot be satisfactory to express processes of the will in terms of the processes of the intelligence. Neither intuitions nor desires act syllogistically.

If then Ethics is essentially and primarily a quality of the will and, as we have called it, a life, it is not fully expressed in terms of a science. We do not deny that there is a science of Ethics ; though we deny that Ethics is essentially and primarily a science. But we urge that even as a science and especially as a life it differs very materially from all essential sciences.

Thus, it is futile to attempt to prove by reasoning the validity of our intuitions ; for the very fact that our reasons rest on the validity of our intuitions. Reason can show only that the arguments against the validity of the intuitions are " Not proven " ; and can protest that if this validity of intuitions is not assumed reason itself can make no headway.

In the same way it would seem futile to attempt to prove the validity of our ethical intuitions, or, as to be more accurate, our moral instincts. No science proves its principles ; all that it can do is to verify its principles.

No merely intellectual process, and especially no mere ratiocinative process is adequate to a

moral or ethical activity. Ethical principles must not be merely thought about and reasoned about ; they must be lived. Indeed these principles have received a more vital evolution in the heart of some ploughman who lives them without knowing them than in the mind of some philosopher who knows them without living them.

This was the final fault of Greece, that it made Ethics a science and not a life. In the end it died, not for want of knowledge, but for want of life. As we sometimes say of the dead, "His mind was clear up to the last." Had thought been life, Greece would never have known the tomb.

III

In modern times there is much arguing about Ethics. People hotly dispute about the Decalogue. The discussion is heartening inasmuch as it betokens interest ; but it is disheartening inasmuch as it is discussion and reasoning. It seems to be quietly assumed by the men on the right and wrong side of the discussion that it is quite relevant to argue about Ethics. This assumption is probably an immense error and therefore an immense crime.

For example. Hot discussions rage about the simple commandment "Thou shalt not commit adultery," with its implicit restrain on other sexual indulgences. Few monthly magazines

of the weightier sort lack monthly articles showing by many cogent reasons that this commandment is antiquated ; and that having been adapted to an earlier stage of civilisation it is unfitted for to-day.

By such a writer and by the ordinary writer of an answering article it is assumed that we can prove the validity of invalidity of these ethical intuitions. But as we have said before, these ethical intuitions are not patient of rational proof or disproof. If a writer attempts to prove that the doctrine of the Trinity is absurd, our apologetic does not take the form of attempting to prove the Trinity, for we know that it cannot be proved. It can be believed only on its being declared by competent authority.

Though reason has not the power to prove or disprove the intuitions or principles of Ethics, reason has (1) protective and (2) explanatory duties toward Ethics. It must (1) protect Ethics against the attacks of reason. Arguments seemingly powerful against ethical principles must be shown to be a mere seeming. Reason must be sent in pursuit of reason. Again and again it will turn out that the very arguments used to deny our ethical instincts turn out to their help.

(2) Reason must explain Ethics : in other words, reason must state Ethics in terms of reason in order to reconcile reason ; just as a

man must explain his wares in Chinese if he wants to barter them with the Chinese.

How futile then seem the many attempts to give a logical, that is, a ratiocinative evolution of Ethics. Yet it is being attempted day after day. Now one thinker, and now another, attempts to evolve Ethics from some one principle. The assumption of such an attempt is an original fallacy. This is all the more patent when the attempted activity starts from and rests upon an intellectual activity such as consciousness. Assuredly, as St. Thomas accurately puts it, the intellect moves the will "specificative"; and the will moves the intellect "effective." These truths are simple in their truth. But it is a constructive fallacy to assume that, granted such an intellectual concept as "consciousness," one can evolve the "Science of Ethics."

Such an evolution of Ethics would have as much relation to reality as the mathematical and mechanical thinking of the Utilitarians had with Political Economy. Their thoughts were a paper-science; political economy is the life of flesh and blood.

IV

Nowhere is the essential difference between Ethics the Life and Ethics the Science more discernible than in the profound doctrine of the END (*finis*).

St. Thomas often lays down as a truism, "*Finis est principium in operabilibus.*" "In practical matters the end is the beginning." It is of the nature of a paradox.

The paradoxical form of this truism is due precisely to the fact that the Doctor is attempting to state an ethical process in terms of an intellectual process. In such cases it must always happen that the nearest approach to the truth will be a paradox.

It is to be noted that in rational processes as distinct from intuitive processes the beginning (*initium*) is a rational principle (*principium*). It happens that in Latin the word *principium* may mean (1) any beginning or (2) especially any intellectual truth of a general nature, from which particular conclusions may be deduced.

But in Ethics the words *Finis* and *Principium*—End and Beginning—have their own untranslatable meaning. The Moral End (*Finis*) is almost nothing that the ordinary end is ; it is not the close or finish of a process, it is not the restingplace after movement ; but it is a beginning and the occasion of the highest activity.

Moreover the process by which the human will that seeks an end seeks also the means is not a mere syllogistic process. No doubt, as all moral processes are accompanied by mental processes, there are accompanying syllogisms. And the reason can express, indeed must express,

the moral process in terms of a syllogism. Nevertheless it remains true that the process whereby the free will goes forward from end to means is a purely moral process which no mental phraseology can adequately express.

V

We have already called attention to the inconsequence of demanding from reason the proofs of ethical intuitions. We suggested that reason had the important duty of meeting with its own artillery of defence the attacks of reason. A more concrete instance of this may lead to a valuable train of thought.

Nowadays, as we have said, the well-to-do and leisured folk have largely wearied of the Sixth Commandment, "Thou shalt not commit adultery." In most countries they have succeeded in passing divorce laws which legalise "successive polygamy"; so that, to quote a barbed witticism, "Polygamy is an informal institution of modern civilisation."

In olden days the severe attitude towards adultery was a great safeguard of monogamous marriage. Where every man had one wife and it was a heinous crime to sin with another man's wife, polygamy, was practically impossible, in default of numbers.

Polygamy however is now pushing itself back again into prominence, under the time-old plea of modernity and progress. A powerful argument is urged in these terms :

"Indissoluble marriages were suited to the childhood of mankind when men's relations were those of rapine and uncontrolled individualism. Nothing save a legal justification of indissoluble marriage could have saved those centuries from ruin. But now law and order have taken the place of uncontrolled individualism. It is no longer ethnically desirable to limit the more developed individuals. If progress is to be maintained these opportunities should now be provided for the intellectually and physically fit to develop their parenthood without the legal restraints of an earlier individualistic age. The field of opportunity should be open to all those who feel the divine call to active or passive parenthood."

This specious reason—which indeed is not a reason—has all the gins needed to trap the unwary. All the phrases that shake a man's conscience find a place in its rhetoric. "Law, order, individualism, progress, parenthood, divine." With such recommendations, it is little wonder that men and women pining under restraint welcome the cheerful gospel "Increase and multiply."

We have cited this argument only that it may be seen how narrow and indirect is the sphere of reason in the things of Ethics. We do not suggest that, if this reason does not prove the thesis, arguments may be found to prove the opposite thesis. We merely direct the attention of reason to the fact that, if it is true to the principles pressed forward in this argument, it will find a number of conclusions not at all to its liking.

For we have said that it is chiefly the rich and leisured folk weary of restraint who urged

that in the matter of women man should pass from the individualistic institutions of primitive times to the higher collectivism of the twentieth century. In other words the Decalogue needs to be revised on an altruistic and communistic basis in face of modern progress.

Well and good ! But let us listen to a number of men whose revisionary activity centres not on the Sixth Commandment, "Thou shalt not commit adultery," but on the Seventh Commandment, "Thou shalt not steal." These men say there is far less to be said for individualism in wealth than for individualism in women. "The right to private marriage is more obvious than the right to private property." If wives are to be in common, a thing very difficult to arrange ; than property should be in common, a thing comparatively easy to arrange. They therefore consider that the revision of the Decalogue should begin not at such a central thing as a wife and mother but at an outlying thing, to wit, private property.

St. Thomas makes a shrewd commentary on St. Matthew v. 21-32 :—

"Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those precepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand . . . For they thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered the external act only, and not the internal desire. *And they held this opinion about murder and adultery rather than about theft and false witness, because the movement of anger tending to murder and the movement of desire tending to adultery seem to be*

in us from nature somewhat, but not the desire of stealing or of false witness." (Summa Theologica, Pt. I, II., Qu. 108., Art. 31, ad. 1.)

It is evident that all the arguments used to defend the revised Sixth Commandment are available for the revised Seventh Commandment. But it is wonderful with what unanimity the wealthy defenders of the first revision denounce the second revision. They appeal to law and order; they denounce the seventh-revisionists as miscreants who would ruin the superb fabric of modern civilisation; they plead that such suggestions should be met by a countermove upon the personal liberty of the misguided men who would interfere with private property.

All this is proof that reason, if inadequate to prove or disprove Ethics, is capable of arresting attacks. If it is not shot and shell it at least is a covering fort.

But we are now in a mood to say what kind of proof may be offered to those who would deny ethical principles.

It is clear that the nature of proof depends largely on the nature of the thing to be proved; if indeed the thing is open to proof. An Intuition is not capable of the same kind of proof as a deduction, and an intuition may be said to be proved when it is verified in its deductions, just as a deduction may be said to

be proved when it is led back to and verified in its principles.

In the sphere, not of science, but of art, proof becomes a very subtle and intangible thing. The crafts as distinguished from the arts are proved by the subsistence of their work. A well-built house lasts. A well-made door is not easily worn out. A well-shod horse does not easily become unshod. The arts, strictly so-called, are proved merely by being approved. As their aim is the beautiful and as no canons of the beautiful have yet been formulated or accepted, the ultimate proof of the arts is their common acceptance. Hamlet is a masterpiece because the competent judges judge that it is. Fra Angelico is a consummate artist because that is the judgment of the men who know. In matters of art there can be no such proof as obtains in the mathematical or mechanical arts. The final court of appeal is the judgment of the artists. Hence when final judgments differ, the artists have no means of proving their conviction. Thereupon they ordinarily betake themselves to abuse and superlative language. This is but an effort to convict their opponent of something akin to artistic sin.

Now Ethics is not a science nor an art but a life. Its means of proof are then unique. As it shares somewhat in the nature of a science and an art it shares somewhat in their mode of proof. Yet on the whole its proofs are peculiar to itself.

Ethics is a life. Its proofs are therefore proofs and appeals to life. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Fruits are an effect and sign of life. "If you wish to enter into life, keep the Commandments." The corollary of this is "The wages of sin is death."

It has often been said, and recently said with authority by the Vatican Council, that a proof of Revelation is through miracles and prophecy. What is true of Revelation is true also of Ethics, which are part of the subject-matter of Revelation. The great proof of Ethics must ever be formulated thus: "If you keep the Decalogue, you will live. If you break the Decalogue you will die." The ensuing life is itself the primary miracle; and the forecast of that life is the primary prophecy.

Thus when a nation wishes to undermine the Sixth Commandment under any plea of sanitation or hygiene or eugenics the official custodians of the ethical idea can only say:

"Follow up your breach of the Sixth Commandment and the nation will gradually die. Soon there will be racial suicide. The nation will die by its own hands. Its power will pass into the keeping of those who have kept the Commandment."

It might also be said that the faithful followers of the higher Ethics cannot convince their opponents; they can only breed them out!

Thus they will fulfil the word of the Ethical Teacher : " The meek shall possess the land."

These are some of the thoughts that occur to one who looks with pain on the low state into which Ethics has fallen. May truer, higher notions of the nature and proofs of Ethics bring it back unto its own !

CHAPTER XXI

OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST'S KNOWLEDGE OF HIS DIVINITY

By the modern non-catholic mind the problem of Our Lord Jesus Christ's knowledge of His Divinity is stated in terms of Consciousness. In other words, the mass of non-catholic writers on the nature and work of Jesus Christ ask, and in various ways answer, such a question as this : " Was Jesus Christ conscious of His Divinity ? " For example, this statement of the great problem of the Jesus Christ of the Gospels was dominant in the recent conference of Modern Churchmen at Cambridge.

The Dean of Carlisle, whose historical scholarship is not necessarily akin to theology, said " that Jesus did not claim divinity for Himself. He may have called Himself, or more probably allowed Himself to be called, the Messiah or Son of God ; but never in any critically, well-attested sayings was there anything suggesting that His *conscious* relation to God was other than that of a man towards God " (*Daily Telegraph*, 13 Aug.). Here the phrase " conscious relation to God " seems to mean that Jesus Christ did not know and did not believe Himself to be God. He knew and believed

Himself to be merely a man. In Dean Rashdall's recent explanations he seems to assert that Jesus was God. We await his explanation of how Jesus could be God and not claim Divinity.

The Rev. H. D. A. Major, Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford, said in effect " . . . as to whether Christ claimed to possess a pre-existent *conscience* and knowledge which the Fourth Gospel answered in the affirmative, the speaker thought that to-day they must be strong to declare that the *conscience* of Christ was a full human *consciousness*, leaving the question of a pre-existing conscience unsettled " (*ibid.*).¹ Here we have a perplexing confusion between the word conscience and consciousness. This is all the more perplexing because the English language in this matter has one of its rare victories over other languages—even over Peripatetic Greek and Scholastic Latin, the two most precise languages yet elaborated. In English we quite clearly distinguish between "Conscience—Consciousness—and Conscientiousness"; a feat not equalled in any other tongue. But it is quite clear that the Principal of Ripon Hall in using the word Conscience is speaking, not of the faculty of moral judgments, but of the faculty which knows human acts or activities. In other words, he wishes to agree with those who say

¹ In *The Modern Churchman*, Sept., 1921, the word *conscience* does not occur. Our criticism on this point is therefore superfluous.

that Jesus Christ did not know and did not believe that He was God.

Dr. Bethune Baker, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, did not clear the confusion by his words. "He did not think that the assumption in our ecclesiastical interpretation of the Gospels, *that Christ knew He was God* was either justified by the evidence or required by the logic of the doctrine. He did not for a moment suppose that He ever thought of Himself as God. The whole content of His consciousness was rightly styled unique ; but it was human " (*Sunday Times*, 14 Aug.). Here, again, the problem of Jesus Christ's knowledge of His Divinity is stated in terms of Consciousness, rather than of knowledge. Dr. Bethune Baker, however, is nearer the most valid formula of enquiry when, before plunging into the confusion caused by the word Consciousness he speaks of " the interpretation of the Gospels that Christ knew He was God."

It need hardly be pointed out how much confusion arises from the use of the word "Consciousness." Of more value will it be to point out that the confusion arises from the general and undivided use of the word. Philosophy uses the word Consciousness generally and not particularly, as science uses the word animal. But whereas Science also gives us the words horse, cow, zebra, and thousands of other words for particular animals, Philosophy does not give us particular words for particular kinds of

Consciousness. Indeed, so undeveloped is the terminology that in most languages but our own the same word has to express on the one hand the high faculty of moral judgments and categorical imperatives, and on the other hand, the homely faculty whereby we recognise that sugar is sweet and that stone is hard. It says much for the courage of some of our contemporaries that with this primitive terminology they undertake to be assertive about the intricate relationship between God and the "Mind of Christ." We have deep sympathy with their effort and even with their failure. We realise that they are suffering from their heredity, or at least from their ancestry; which if it is not responsible for their thought, is responsible for their thought's environment. But our sympathy with their honest doubts will oblige us to state the problem and its solution: the question and its answer not in terms of the confusing word Consciousness, but with St. Thomas Aquinas, in the less confusing and more accurate terms of Knowledge. For this reason we have entitled this study "Our Lord Jesus Christ's Knowledge of His Divinity."

The irreducible minimum for solving this question must be an elementary yet accurate acquaintance with Psychology. We are not of those whom Dr. Rashdall rightly condemns of Apollonarianism. We do not deny that Jesus Christ had a human soul. We accept it as an article of Catholic faith defined by the Second

Council of Constantinople. Moreover, in accepting it fully with all its implications we see in it the only principle for solving the problem of Jesus Christ's knowledge of His Divinity.

If we apply this principle that Jesus Christ had a human soul, we shall agree that Jesus Christ's human soul had two main kinds of knowledge: I. Sensitive Knowledge, and II. Intellectual Knowledge.

I. It is clear that Jesus Christ's human soul could not have Sensitive Knowledge, either external or internal, of His Divinity. The five external senses and the four internal senses are not competent to know the Godhead. Thus St. Thomas says: "It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight or by any other sense or faculty of the sensitive power. . . . The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God" (1 Pars., Qu. 12, Art. 3—Eng. trsl.). We need not further labour this point. It is clear that if Jesus Christ was God, His Divinity could not be heard by His ear, seen by His eye, imagined by His imagination; in a word, His Divinity could not be known by His external or internal senses. Jesus Christ could have no sensitive knowledge of His Divinity.

II. It is different with His intellectual knowledge. It is clear that if Jesus Christ was God, His human soul *could* have intellectual knowledge

of His Divinity. Granted this possibility there remain two further questions :

1. Whether the human soul of Jesus Christ did actually have intellectual knowledge of His Divinity ?

2. Granted that Jesus Christ's human soul had intellectual knowledge of His Divinity, how did this take place ?

1. As regards the actual fact, we pass it over, for the moment, as a matter of Biblical exegesis, more suited to a Biblical expert than to a theologian. But in passing it over we do not mean to suggest that it is a matter of secondary importance or that it is a thesis with slender scriptural basis. We merely record the theological principle that even if the Gospels or the other books of the New Testament contained no words of our Blessed Lord clearly affirming His Divinity it would nowise disturb the basis of our faith, which is summed up in the formula, " Jesus Christ claimed to be God."


Here we may be allowed to comment on the ambiguous formula used by some of the speakers at the Cambridge meeting. They speak of the " human soul of Jesus Christ." With Dr. Rashdall they (rightly) deny that such a human soul had any existence previous to the Incarnation. They deny that this human soul of Jesus Christ had any knowledge that He was God. Now it may be granted as a mere possibility that the Son of God could have become incarnate

in a human nature whose human soul was ignorant of the Divine union. But this leads us to formulate two distinct questions : If God the Son was incarnate in a human nature, could HE (the Divine Person) be ignorant of His Divinity ? and 2, Could IT (the human nature) be ignorant of His Divinity ? In answer to the second question we may provisionally agree that, as a mere psychological possibility, the Incarnation could have taken place in a human nature ignorant of the Divine Union.

In answer to the first question we must ask our readers to follow Thomas Aquinas in his subtle analysis of the Knowledge of Jesus Christ. With the Catholic Church St. Thomas believes that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, true God of true God. He, therefore, believes that Jesus Christ has all the attributes of God—infinity, omniscience and the rest. Jesus Christ as God has, therefore, that knowledge which we call Divine. This Divine knowledge of Jesus, being infinite extends to all things not only actual, but possible. It is, therefore, clear that Jesus Christ, as God, knew His own Divinity.

But Jesus Christ, as man, has none of the attributes of God as God. Neither His nature nor His knowledge is, or could be, infinite. His knowledge is essentially finite. If we are asked the question, “ Did Jesus Christ as man—or did the human intelligence of Jesus Christ—have knowledge of His Divinity ? ” we cannot give one answer, since we are asked not one, but three

questions. These three questions arise out of the three kinds of Knowledge which, according to St. Thomas, are to be found in the human intelligence of Jesus Christ. Let us represent this schematically.



The human beatific knowledge of Jesus Christ comes of His human intelligence being supernaturally united to the Divine Essence by the Beatific Vision. This knowledge is not infinite. By it Jesus Christ does not know all things, possible and actual. But, according to St. Thomas (confirmed by a recent decision of Rome,¹) by His Beatific Knowledge, Jesus

¹ A Decree of the Holy Office, 5 June, 1918: "*Utrum tuto doceri possunt sequentes propositiones:*

I. "*Non constat fuisse in anima Christi inter homines degentis scientiam quam habent beati seu comprehensores?*"

II. "*Nec certa dici potest sententia quæ statuit animam Christi nihil ignoravisse, sed ab initio cognovisse in Verbo omnia præterita, præsentia et futura, seu omnia quæ Deus scit scientia visionis?*"

III. "*Placitum quorundam recentiorum de scientia animæ Christi limitata, non est minus recipiendum in scholis catholicis quam veterum sententia de scientia universale?*"

To these questions the Holy Office replied "Negative." This

Christ knows all actual things, *i.e.* all things that actually are, or were, or will be. It is again clear that by His human beatific knowledge Jesus Christ had certitude of His Divinity.

The human infused knowledge of Jesus Christ comes of His Human intelligence being united to the Divine Essence, not directly by the Beatific Vision, but indirectly by infused intellectual species, such as prophets and seers are vouchsafed in this world. This knowledge is not infinite. Nor is it as extensive as the human beatific knowledge. It extends neither to all things possible, nor to all things actual. Indeed, its extent may well be made the subject of theological investigation. But we are within the common teaching of the theologians in saying that by His human infused knowledge Jesus Christ was certain of His Divinity.

There now remains the natural and acquired knowledge of Jesus Christ. This acquired knowledge comes of His human intelligence working without supernatural light on objects presented with no supernatural guarantee. This natural and acquired knowledge is not infinite, does not extend to all things possible or actual, and is not co-extensive with His supernatural infused knowledge.

The extent to which it could reach may be

decision of the Holy Office confirmed the doctrine of St. Thomas in his *Summa*. By his beatific knowledge "the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision; but not all things that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence" (III^a. Qu. 10, Art. 2, ad 3—Eng. transl).

gauged by its mode of action. It could act only on empiric facts. It could reach conclusions from these facts only by a process of ratiocination. For the moment we may refrain from judgment merely to ask the last momentous question: "Did or could the human soul of Jesus Christ know His Divinity by means of His natural, acquired knowledge?" It may well be argued that in view of the divisions and distinctions already made the answer is already given. It would seem impossible that by His human natural acquired knowledge Jesus Christ could have any but a *conjectural knowledge* of His Divinity. The phrase *conjectural knowledge* is used by St. Thomas to signify any knowledge which does not amount to undeniable certitude. The human intelligence of Jesus could reason, as any human intelligence could reason, about the empiric facts of the Incarnation. But it could not arrive at certitude; just as our human reason cannot arrive at certitude about the truths, such as the Incarnation, which are essentially matters of faith.

It is admitted that in such a view of faith there is much to baulk our imagination. Yet it is not to be expected that our imagination is adequate to the work of faith. Nevertheless, there are analogies which may satisfy at once our faith and our imagination. St. Thomas teaches that the human soul which is actually united to God by Divine grace has only a con-

jectural knowledge of its union. It is not certain of its state of grace. It can make inferences from the empiric facts and affections of its being. But none of these facts or affections as recorded empirically justify it in being certain that it is united to God by grace. In an analogous way the human natural reason of Jesus could make inferences from the observed facts and affections of His being. But unless we are to make it possible for reason to prove with certainty the things of faith, we must admit that these inferences would lead not to certitude, but to what St. Thomas calls conjectural knowledge. We may then ask: "Was it possible that by His human acquired knowledge Jesus Christ was not certain of His Divinity?"

The problem of Christ's acquired knowledge led St. Thomas to a change of opinion which he has humbly acknowledged in his *Summa*: "Therefore if in the soul of Christ there was no habit of acquired knowledge beyond the habit of infused knowledge, as appears to some and *some-time appeared to me* (III. Sent. Dist. 14), no knowledge of Christ increased in essence but only by experience. . . . But because it seems unfitting that any natural intelligible action should be wanting to Christ . . . it follows . . . that in the soul of Christ there was a habit of knowledge which could increase.

(Ad 1^m) . . . The acquired knowledge of Christ is caused by the ^active intellect which does not produce the whole at once but successively; and hence by this knowledge Christ did not know everything from the beginning but step by step, and after a time, *i.e.* in His perfect age;—and this is plain from what the Evangelist says, viz. that

He increased in *knowledge and age* together " (III^a. Qu. 12, Art. 2, Eng. tr.)

Moreover " By this Knowledge the soul of Christ did not know all things simply, but all such as are knowable by the light of man's active intellect. Hence by this knowledge He did not know the essence of separate substances nor past, present, or future singulars " (*ibid.* Art, 1., ad 3^m.).

If for the purposes of discussion we maintain that by His (1) Divine, (2) Beatific, (3) Infused knowledge Jesus was certain of His Divinity ; and that only by His (4) Acquired knowledge was He certain of it, we go on to ask if these doctrinal principles have an influence over our statements.

We are at once confronted by the marvellous doctrine of the Θεοτόκος. The Council of Ephesus condemned the doctrine that Mary was Χριστοτόκος, Mother of Christ, and proclaimed that she was Θεοτόκος, Mother of God. By this daring and almost paradoxical formula the Catholic Church proclaimed not so much the dignity of the Mother as the Divinity of the Son. At once a series of astounding propositions became possible. Mary was the Mother of God, because Mother of Jesus. In other words, if God had a mother, because Jesus had a mother, then God was born, suffered, died, because Jesus was born, suffered, died. That these statements were the verbal opposites of other statements seemed not to disturb the Christian mind. God was impassible : yet God suffered.

God was everywhere ; yet God was born, not everywhere, but in Bethlehem. God was immortal ; yet God died. God had no beginning ; yet God had a mother.

These verbal (not real) contradictories were not tempered by any verbal (but only by mental) restrictions. Even when the Church meant that Mary was the Mother of Jesus only in His Human nature, she said merely, " Mary is the Mother of God " ; and did not add, even though she meant, " in His human nature." She took the same great way of verbal contradiction in all the other statements about the Incarnation, and with His birth, suffering, death and resurrection.

We are then faced with the further question : Granted that by His acquired natural knowledge alone Jesus was not certain of His Divinity, could we use the simple phrase, " Jesus Christ was not certain of His Divinity " ? Would such an expression be less sufferable than the phrases, not only " Jesus died. Jesus had a human mother," but " God died. God had a human mother," although we must also say " God cannot die. God cannot be born of human parenthood." The principles of terminology in this difficult matter are in the following words of St. Thomas : " With us and heretics the very words ought not to be in common lest we seem to countenance their error. Now the Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and less than the Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His divine Person.

And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a *creature* or *less than the Father*; except with a qualification—viz. *in His human nature*.

But such things as could not be considered to belong to the divine Person in itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of His human nature; as we say simply that Christ suffered, died, and was buried" (*ibid.* Qu. 16., Art. 8.).

The question becomes all the more complicated because by the common teaching of theologians the Incarnation meant a certain limitation of the normal effects of the Hypostatic Union. Thus because of the Beatific State to which the manhood of Jesus Christ was raised, the human body and soul of Jesus should have been impassible. But by a distinct and miraculous interference of God this effect of the Beatific State was impeded, for the purpose of Redemption. If this doctrine of theologians is correct, then it is seen that for the purposes of the vicarious suffering of Redemption certain effects of the Hypostatic Union were suspended. The conscious Beatific knowledge of the Godhead was miraculously confined to some plane of the humanity where it was compatible with bodily and mental suffering. This would lead us to ask whether, unless the suffering of Redemption were mainly in the body, it was not largely in the human intelligence, and especially in the natural work-

ings of the human intelligence of Jesus that this redemptive suffering was wrought.

We are further led to wonder at the Church's action in deciding against the Monothelites, whose reverence for the Divinity of Jesus made them deny that in Him there was more than one will. By deciding that Jesus had really two wills, and that in its natural instinctive workings His human will might not coincide with the Divine will, the Church was really deciding that the (*ἀγωνία*) Agony In the Garden was not an unreal but a real struggle, made possible by a miraculous suspension of the effects of the Hypostatic and Beatific Union. It would seem only a continuance of this principle of the Church to interpret the cry of Calvary, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" (Matt. xxvii. 46), as some echo in the intellectual plane of the agonising cry of His will, "My Father, if it be possible let this chalice pass from me. Nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt" (Matt. xxvi. 39). Such a principle would take nothing away from the dignity and Divinity of the Redeemer; but to some devout followers of the Crucified it would seem to add incalculably to the agony of the Redemption.

To sum up :

By His Divine knowledge Jesus was certain that He was God.

By His Beatific human knowledge Jesus was certain that He was God.

By His Infused human knowledge Jesus was certain that He was God.

By His Acquired human knowledge Jesus may not have been certain that He was God. By a special miraculous interposition this ignorance might have been allowed to cause some of His pain and to occasion some of His words.

If by His acquired human knowledge Jesus was not certain that He was God it might be lawful for us to say, "Jesus was not certain of His Divinity," provided that we understood (though we did not express) the conditions; even as it is lawful for us to say the greater things, "God had a mother. God died." although we do not express but merely understand the conditions.

CHAPTER XXII

DID JESUS CHRIST CLAIM TO BE GOD ?

WE may imitate the method of our master St. Thomas by setting down the opinion from which we differ. Dean Rashdall of Carlisle has given us a full and perhaps final expression of that opinion in his paper read at the Cambridge Conference of Modern Churchmen under the title "Christ as Logos and Son of God." He writes :

" Jesus did not claim divinity for Himself. He may have called Himself, or more probably allowed Himself to be called, the Messiah or Son of God. But never in any critically well-attested sayings is there anything which suggests that His conscious relation to God was other than that of a man towards God. . . . The speeches of the Fourth Gospel where they go beyond the Synoptic conception cannot be regarded as history, valuable as they may be for theology. The doctrine of our Lord's divinity must be taken to express the Church's conception of what Jesus is or should be to His followers and to the world, not His own theory about Himself.

" *Note 2.* . . . If we accept the Synoptic discourses as substantially correct (though not, of course, in every detail, for there are considerable discrepancies between them), it is impossible to regard the Johannine discourses as equally accurate reports ; and even in this Gospel few sentences (when taken apart from the Preface, which does

not pretend to represent the words of Jesus, and other comments of the Evangelist) imply actual Godhead in the sense of post-Nicene theology. . . . The claim to be the Son of God does not necessarily imply *Godhead*" (*The Modern Churchman*, Sept. 1921, pp. 278, 279).

1. We wish to set on record our conviction of the spirit of reverence which seems present in this and the associated pronouncements on the divinity of Jesus Christ. Whilst we shall be at pains to show the untruth and therefore the objective heresy of these statements, we willingly admit the reverent spirit of the men to whom the statements are the expression of truth. Some of those who admit the full Catholic doctrine of the divinity of Jesus can see only blasphemy in the doctrine that He who is true God is only a man. But these defenders of the truth should be able to see that from an opposite point of view to call Jesus Christ God if He is only a man is almost a greater blasphemy.

2. "Jesus did not claim divinity for Himself." As far as we can judge, Dean Rashdall's proof of this statement is this: "The Four Gospels (and indeed the rest of the books of the New Testament) do not record any clear claim to divinity made by Jesus Christ." This proof used by Dean Rashdall rests on the principle of "The Bible only." Those who accept the principle that only the Bible is the rule of faith would find it impossible to deny that Jesus Christ did not claim divinity for Himself if that claim was not clearly expressed in the New

Testament. But we need not remind our readers that this principle has never been accepted by the Catholic Church. We should then be beyond the reach of this Modernist argument, even if, in fact, the New Testament nowhere recorded Jesus Christ's claim to divinity.

3. But we do not agree that the Gospels contain no record of this claim. We hold that the claim to be " the Son of God " is the claim to divinity.

I. It must not be forgotten that the doctrine of the divinity of Jesus has been defined in terms of " the Son of God." Modern exegetes have been so concerned with the Johannine Logos that they have looked upon it as the highest expression of the divinity of Jesus ! But this is far from the theological and historical fact. Theologically speaking, the word Logos does not imply personality, which Son implies. It might mean—as, indeed, in all non-Christian works it did mean—a mere divine activity or concept with no more personality than the thought of an intelligence. But " Son of God " unmistakably implied personality ; so that, theologically speaking, " Son of God " was the highest expression of the divinity of Jesus.

Moreover, historically speaking, Son of God was the more important term. When the Council of Nicea defined the divinity of Jesus it was, not by saying that the *Λόγος* was *ὁμοούσιος* but that the *Υἱος* was *ὁμοούσιος*.

It is therefore antecedently possible, if not

probable, that the claim to be not A Son of God, but THE only begotten Son of God, was a claim to be divine.

II. Indeed, if Jesus Christ was, what the Catholic Church holds that He is, the consubstantial Son of God, it is difficult to see how a better formula for expressing His claim to Sonship could have been found. Criticism is surely at the crossways if its main objection to a doctrine is that this doctrine has been expressed in the most accurate mode of expression. If Jesus Christ is the Son of God—if this formula is the highest expression of His Godhead, if He claimed to be the Son of God—it is hardly an argument against His claim that He formulated it with accuracy.

III. But it is urged that the formula “the Son of God” was taken by the Jews to mean “the Messias.”

a. Dean Rashdall uses a more careful phrase: “The claim to be the Son of God does not *necessarily* [italics: Rashdall] imply Godhead.” But the claim to be the Son of God may *possibly* imply Godhead. The intention of the Speaker must be determined.

b. If it is urged that (some of) the Jews understood the phrase to mean “the Messias,” we are at a loss to know what this argument proves. We are far from certain that the Jews contemporary with Jesus called the Messias THE Son of God. But even if they did identify the Son of God and the Messias, this would not prove

that Jesus made the same identification. To say that by the phrase " Son of God " some Jews meant the Messias, and *therefore* Jesus must have meant the Messias, is a plain *non sequitur*. Dean Rashdall has the scholarly instinct to avoid this unsound reasoning by the cautious phrase "does not necessarily "(but does possibly) " imply Godhead."

c. It was almost a law with Jesus Christ to lead His hearers on from a true but imperfect meaning to a truer and more perfect meaning. As He was the Messias, it was not an error to think either that He was what He claimed to be or that He claimed to be what He was. Error would creep in only when men denied that He was even the Messias or agreed that He was the Messias, but denied that He was the Son of God. Times and moments, habits of thought and dispositions of will, entered so largely and so professedly into our Blessed Lord's manifestation of the truth, that in leading the Jews from the true but incomplete idea of His Messiahship to the true and complete idea of His divine Sonship He was but carrying out one of His own formulated laws.

IV. The claim to divinity is seen by us at its clearest in the Gospel of St. John. This witness of St. John is so valuable and noteworthy that we must confine it to certain heads.

a. It is agreed that the first eighteen verses of St. John's Gospel (the Preface : Rashdall) are a claim to divinity. We agree that they are a

claim put forward, not by Jesus, but by St. John.

b. We have elsewhere (BLACKFRIARS, Nov., 1921) pointed out that the *Λόγος* is not the thesis of the Fourth Gospel. That thesis is the *Υἱός*. The word *Λόγος* is used only *four* times (verse 1, thrice; verse 14, once). The word *Υἱός* is used some twenty-four times in twelve chapters. Moreover, St. John uses the word "Father" with an insistence which gives new force to the word "Son."

Son is so emphatically the thesis of the Fourth Gospel that St. John says explicitly: "These are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ,¹ the Son of God"² (John xx. 31).

The various attributes which, taken collectively, show the Godhead are everywhere outside the Preface predicated, not of the Word, but of the Son.

a. Jesus is *pre-existent*, not as Word, but as Son: "No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that hath descended from heaven, the Son of Man" (iii. 13). "And now glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was, with Thee" (xvii. 5).

β. Jesus is *omnipotent*, not as Word, but as Son: "The Father loveth the Son; and He hath given all things into His hands. He that believeth in the Son hath everlasting life" (iii. 35, 36).

¹ The Messiah is *the* Son of God.

² The Messias.

γ. Jesus sends the Spirit of Truth, *i.e.* He is *omniscient*, not as Word (though omniscience would seem natural to the Word), but as Son : " I will ask the Father and He shall give you another Paraclete . . . the Spirit of Truth " (xiv. 17, 17).

δ. Jesus, therefore, is *equal in honour* with the Father, not as Word, but as Son : " That all men may honour the Son, as they honour the Father " (v. 23).

ε. Jesus is therefore *equal in nature* with the Father, not as Word, but as Son : " Hereupon therefore the Jews sought the more to kill Him, because He did not only break the Sabbath, but also said God was His Father, making Himself equal to God " (v. 18). " I and the Father are One " (x. 30).

ζ. The Jews condemned Jesus, not as claiming To be the Word, but the Son : " According to the law He ought to die, because He made Himself the Son of God " (xix. 7).

η. Belief in our Lord is belief that He is the Son : " Dost thou believe in the Son of God ? " (ix. 35). " He that believeth not is already judged, because he believeth not in the name of the only begotten Son of God " (iii. 16, 18).

A. It cannot be too often insisted on that the Preface in which alone occurs the title *Λόγος*, seems to be an introduction to the Greek mind, which was likely to interpret the title " Son " in a physical and polytheistic sense. " Son of God " was then, as it is now, the highest

expression of the Godhead of Jesus. By identifying Son of God=Word, St. John was accommodating the Greek mind at the risk of scandalising the Hebrew mind. To the Hebrews, the phrase "Word of God" would convey no idea of personality. Now, the full doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation is reached only when it is made clear that Jesus was a *Person within the Godhead*. The title "Word" rather obscured than declared this idea. The idea of "the Word" needs the idea of "the Son" in order to be complete. The idea of "the Son" needs the idea of "the Word," not in order to be complete, but in order to be adapted to the Greek polytheistic mind.

B. An examination of the texts we have grouped above will make it clear that, apart from the first fourteen verses, the Gospel of St. John shows Jesus Christ claiming the attributes, the nature, the honour, the human worship of faith claimed by God. Some of these attributes He claimed to have because He had received them. This, again, is but the accurate doctrine of the Catholic Church. As *Man*, Jesus shared finitely in the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence. He had this share because He had received it. But even as "true God of true God" He had these divine attributes, not in part, but in whole, because He had received them. Catholic faith teaches us that the Son of God is God of God. All that He has, He has of the Father. So that these

claims which seem to suggest God's gift to a Man may also mean accurately God the Father's giving of the divine nature and attributes to the Son.

C. The witness of St. John is not a new claim, but a reinforcement of the existing claim. The Synoptic Gospels had made "the Son of God" the centre of their Christology. To recognise that divine Sonship was the condition of the spokesman of the Apostles, St. Peter, receiving the keys of the kingdom. To have claimed and proclaimed that divine Sonship was the official legal death-charge on which the Jewish tribunal decreed His death.

No doubt, in the first days of Christianity, even as now, there were men who did not feel that this claim to divine Sonship was a claim to divinity. Before the end of the first century St. John had written a plain reaffirmation of that claim. But it is to be noted that he does not bring in a new claim, or state the old claim in new words. His thesis is the Synoptic thesis; and the thesis of St. John and the Synoptists is the thesis of the Catholic Church: "Jesus is and claimed to be the consubstantial Son of God."

This reaffirmation of the old Synoptic thesis is all the more striking because in so many other ways St. John's Gospel is dedicated to bringing in the new, rather than reinforcing the old. To him alone we owe the clear enunciation of the fact that the Son as such is not sent into

the world by the Holy Ghost ; but that the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of the Son as such, is sent into the world by the Son (cf. sup.). Again, it is to St. John we owe the doctrine of the death of Jesus being the sacrificial death of " the Lamb of God." To St. John we owe the fact of a series of Calls to the Apostles and of the singling out of St. Peter. To St. John we owe the unique miracle of transubstantiation and the unique discussion on the Eucharist of Christ's flesh and blood. St. John, therefore, was capable of giving something new by recalling doctrines which the Synoptists had not recorded. All this becomes of great significance when we find that in giving, as he admittedly intended to give, Jesus Christ's claim to divinity he gives it in the old accepted terms of the Synoptic thesis : THE SON OF GOD.

Here we cannot urge, with some Modern Churchmen, that St. John so differs from the Synoptists that his narrative is untrustworthy. The fact is that St. John here agrees with the Synoptists, so that their testimony and his reach the highest point of trustworthiness.

To sum up. It is agreed that the Fourth Gospel, whether written by St. John or by some unnamed and unknown leader of the early Church, was written in order to claim divinity for Jesus Christ.

This claim to divinity is admittedly in the first fourteen verses of St. John's Gospel, which speaks of the *Λόγος* or Word of God. But

these fourteen verses do not introduce any new and higher doctrine about Jesus. They merely teach the Greek polytheistic mind that "the Son of God" has a spiritual and not a carnal begetting. To the mind of the primitive Church the claim to be "the Son of God," common to all four Gospels, is the same as the claim to be the Word of God—or is a claim to divinity.

The Modernist's Jesus Christ is not an ignoble figure. He is a Person of such nobility as to win the admiration and gratitude of mankind. But He is not the Christ of the Christian Church. The old primitive Church as voiced by the Fourth Gospel saw in their Redeemer's claim to be the Son of God His claim to divinity. Modern Churchmen see otherwise. But we shall find it impossible to accept the Modernist view, however good, rather than the older view, "for the old is better."

CHAPTER XXIII

THE CHRIST OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

A CERTAIN attitude of thought towards the Fourth Gospel is summed up in the following paragraph :

“ It is quite otherwise with the Fourth Gospel, in which from the very first, the Christ astonishes Galilee and especially Jerusalem by the most astounding prodigies, whilst at the same time overwhelming them by a doctrine which no one can comprehend. The Johannine Christ is presented as a transcendent Being who is not of this earth, and who seems to speak and to act only to satisfy the terms of His definition, to prove that He is God and one with God ” (Loisy, *Autour d'un petit livre*, pp. 90, 91. Edit. 1).

It would be hard to state the theory more clearly or more pithily. But whilst there is undoubted evidence pointing towards the conclusions drawn by this school of criticism, it would be unscholarly to maintain that all the evidence points that way. Indeed, it may well be asked whether a patient and unprejudiced study of the Gospel does not go to show that the conclusions of this school of criticism run a long way ahead of their premises.

In the first place, we are confronted with the historical fact that the Arians based their denial

of the divinity of Jesus Christ chiefly on the Fourth Gospel ; if we except the famous passage from the Book of Wisdom. But this latter passage, which was more quoted than any other, was seriously weakened by its position in the Old Testament. It needed strengthening by some New Testament text. The Arians were not slow to see that the Fourth Gospel was not only a very important part of the New Testament, but was the accredited work of an apostle whose intimacy with Christ was a guarantee that its Christology would not keep to a low level. Their keen insight soon detected certain phrases wherein the beloved disciple seemed to make his Master, if somewhat more than the angels, at least a little less than the King of angels. The long stubborn fight, lasting several centuries before the overthrow of Arianism, goes no little way towards showing either that the Johannine Christ was not the " transcendent Being " of our critics, or that the authority of St. John was not all that every school of critics would admit.

That this opinion of the Arians fully bore out their character of well-informed exegetes and keen dialecticians may now be established by examining the

A. admissions, and

B. omissions

of the Fourth Gospel. In dealing with these we may be helped towards a true judgment by recalling that this Gospel, written against the

gnostics who denied or attenuated the manhood of Christ, would seem to lay stress upon facts showing that the Word became *flesh*.

A. The admissions of the Fourth Gospel are very significant ; and not in the direction of the above-mentioned thesis. The Christ does not seem to have met with the success that would necessarily have attended such a display of transcendent power. Hardly any one believed in Him. The Synoptics are nowise so insistent on the irresponsiveness of all classes to Christ, as the Fourth Gospel appears to be. Indeed, the Marcan document leaves us with the impression that Jesus met with an enthusiastic reception upon His first beginning His public ministry. The Fourth Gospel, on the other hand, gives a different impression. Its author admits that the Jews did not believe in Jesus Christ ; " the darkness did not comprehend " (I⁵) ; " the world knew him not " (I⁶) ; " there hath stood one in the midst of you whom you know not " (I²⁶).

Again, even after a prolonged discussion with Jesus, Nicodemus remains unconvinced. He is even reproached for his blindness, " Art thou a master in Israel, and knowest not these things? "

Another group of texts bearing in the same direction constitutes a problem in Christology. During our Lord's first visit to Jerusalem, after His public ministry, His strength of character in driving the money-changers and sellers from the temple had brought Him before the eye of

the city. "Many believed in his name. . . . But Jesus did not trust himself unto them" (2²³, 24). It is a singular course of action for a "transcendent Being who is not of this earth." The argument becomes stronger when the Fourth Gospel is found to repeat this statement twice more. "After these things Jesus walked in Galilee; for he would not walk in Judea, because the Jews sought to kill him" (7¹). "He himself stayed in Galilee. But after his brethren were gone up, then he went up to the feast, not openly, but in secret" (77^{9, 10}). These three passages constitute one of the most serious problems in Christology. For the moment we must deal with other topics. But we may be allowed to remark that whatever they may prove or disprove, they would seem fatal to any theory of a "transcendent Being who is not of this earth."

Hitherto we have found the Fourth Gospel admitting in no uncertain terms that the common run of Jews to whom our Lord spoke, and before whom He wrought His signs, did not believe in Him. The matter is taken still further by another group of texts. Not only did the Jews as a body remain indifferent to Him, but those nearest to Him in kindred and calling are represented by the Fourth Gospel as unmoved by His transcendental attributes. St. John Baptist naïvely confesses, "I knew Him not" (1³³). And, though it is anticipating, we may remark that the Fourth Gospel omits

the miraculous welcome given by John to Jesus when Mary visited Elizabeth.

That the text, "He came unto his own, and his own received him not" (1¹¹), was no mere generalisation is witnessed by the perplexing text, "His *brethren* said to him, Pass from hence, and go into Judea, that thy disciples also may see thy works. . . . For neither did his *brethren* believe in him" (7^{3,4}).

Even those who had been witnesses of His going out and coming in from the beginning "went in . . . to the sepulchre, and saw, and believed. For as yet they knew not that he must rise again from the dead." Almost the last scene of the Gospel is given to the doubt and subsequent faith of one of the apostles.

The texts we have brought forward are not isolated sayings, to be explained by the fact that even the most cautious exponent of a thesis sometimes forgets his premisses or his conclusions. St. John is not betrayed into these admissions; they are part of his plan. We may not at once see his thesis; but they are part of his thesis. To disprove or even to depreciate the manhood of Christ is not his aim. He gives convincing evidence that Jesus was flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone, "Jesus therefore, being *wearied* with his journey, sat thus on the well" (4⁶). The Synoptics have omitted this consoling witness to our Saviour's manhood. Again, the Fourth Gospel alone mentions the thirst of Jesus, "Give me to drink" (4⁷), and the pathetic

moan, " I thirst " (19²⁸). It is not, then, without significance that the Fourth Gospel alone has recorded the phrase, " Behold the MAN " (19¹).

But if the manhood of Christ is insisted on so forcibly, the Godhead is sometimes veiled behind phrases that have been the stronghold of heresy. " I ascend to My Father, and to your Father ; to *My God*, and to your God " (10¹⁷).

A singularly difficult text is 5²⁰, " For the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth Him all things which himself doeth ; *and greater things than these shall He shew Him.*"

On these difficult words St. Augustine's perplexity is most naïvely expressed, " Hear now a wider and more difficult question. . . . Again a difficult question arises. Is there then something with the Father which the Son had not shewn Him ? Something with the Father that was still latent from the Son. . . . This also is hard to see." (In. Joan. Trat. XIX. 4).

Lastly, we are brought to the text which, to some extent, formed the basis of the Arian denial of the divinity of the Son, viz. :—" The Father is greater than I " (14²⁸).

Arianism was exaggerated literalism. It rested for its success on its keen instinct for difficulties arising out of the letter of Holy Writ. Never were its exegetical instincts keener than when it found in the Fourth Gospel admissions which made the divinity of the Son a matter to be solved, perhaps elsewhere than in the pages of

Holy Writ itself. For if the texts quoted show anything, they would seem to show that part, if not the whole, of the plan of the Fourth Gospel was to demonstrate the manhood of Christ with a clearness calculated to refute any theory of "a transcendent being who is not of this earth."¹

B. Let us next turn to the *omissions* of the Fourth Gospel, which have often been studied, though not always completely, nor ever, perhaps, in view of the present thesis. Three remarks must be made. First, that instead of the Fourth Gospel representing Jesus as astonishing everyone with His wonders, the fact is that no Evangelist records so few miracles. Even St. Mark's Gospel, which is not more than half as long as the Fourth Gospel, contains more than twice as many miracles; St. Mark has eighteen, St. John eight.

Secondly, there were not a few miracles which would have recommended themselves to a writer whose thesis was that described above. For these miracles were especially calculated to help the thesis, by bringing out the transcendent character of Christ. Yet these miracles have been left out.

Thirdly, a group of miracles was witnessed by

¹ "The stronger human emotions of anger, pain, grief, surprise, agony, are freely attributed to our Lord in St. Mark and in St. John; for St. Peter and St. John who had known him intimately in the flesh had no hesitation in ascribing such passions to Him. But most traces of these feelings have been removed from St. Luke and (except in Gethsemane) from St. Matthew (A. Wright: *A Synopsis of the Gospels in Greek*, p. 27).

a select body of men, the Apostles, or a select body of the Apostles—Peter, Andrew, and *John*. Yet most of these are left unmentioned. Now, it can hardly be urged that this silence would go to show that St. John was not the author of the Fourth Gospel. If any other than he was its author, it is inconceivable that they would have dared to assume his rôle whilst seeming to be ignorant of some of his special privileges.

To come to the actual omissions. In 1³² he does not give the “*φωνὴ ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν*” recorded by the Synoptists. It has often been remarked that St. John nowhere gives the actual institution of Baptism and the Holy Eucharist, though he was present on both occasions. Nor does he give the sweat of blood, though he was again one of the little group that witnessed what was looked upon as an astounding miracle. Whilst describing the storm on Lake Tiberia with all its details, he has omitted (6¹⁷⁻²¹) to state that no sooner had Jesus reached the boat than the wind ceased, though he was present at the miracle, and though it was calculated to support the thesis of a “transcendent” Christ.

Again, he takes great pains to describe the attempt St. Peter made to defend his Master with the sword. Indeed, it is from the Fourth Gospel that we learn the name of the Apostle (Peter) and of the servant (Malchus). Yet he omits the very striking and almost unique miracle of the cure of the servant’s ear ; though, again, he was an eye-witness of this miracle,

which surely would have helped on the theory of a transcendent Christ.

Although he has given the raising of Lazarus, he has not given the raising of the daughter of Jairus, and of the son of the widow of Nain, though he was an eye-witness of both miracles.

Again, he has not made any mention of the rending of the veil of the Temple. Yet he was "known to the high priest"; and he must have been aware of the miracle. Had he been the only evangelist to record this dramatic fact, no doubt it would have been attributed by some modern critics to his theological reveries.

Again, he has given us no miracle over the demoniacally possessed; he has omitted the withering of the fig-tree, and the passing of Jesus through the angry crowd at Nazareth, though it will be seen at once what support the thesis of a "transcendent" Christ would have received from these striking wonders.

Lastly, there is one miracle, the Transfiguration, recounted by the Synoptics, which St. John omits. Yet again, he was one of the three privileged to behold its transcendent glory. It is difficult to see how any miracle could have given greater support to the "transcendent" Christ theory. Yet it is not even alluded to.

In thus summing up the various admissions and omissions of the Fourth Gospel we feel ourselves obliged to say that the thesis we have examined seems based upon imperfect observation. It is not a patient putting together of facts;

but a seductive generalisation which is taken as true because it accounts for many texts, yet must be taken as untrue because it contradicts other texts. We need not add that for the moment we have no theory of the Johannine Christ, or of the literary character of the Fourth Gospel, except that it deals with the historic Christ, and that its witness is not to be dismissed at once as unhistorical. But whether this theory is true or false, the theory of "a transcendent being who is not of the earth" would seem to be itself a transcendent exegesis which is not of the Fourth Gospel.

CHAPTER XXIV

BISHOP GORE'S BELIEF IN GOD

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN'S *Apologia pro vita sua* has been epigrammatically described as "the work of a French sceptic controlled by an English don—or a joint product of Voltaire and Bishop Butler." Bishop Gore's *Belief in God*, which might well be called his *Apologia pro fide sua*, is of the same dual and complementary parenthood as the earlier *Apologia*. Cardinal and Bishop alike belong to that resolute band of thinkers for whom the highest truths are to be discovered in a balance of probabilities and even of contradictories.

The younger apologist is hardly a less challenging personality than the elder. Few of the Tertullians or Origenes of our day have a life so crowded with happenings and doings. An Oxford Doctor of Divinity who identified his economic thought with Socialism, who interwove his theological thought with Rationalism, and who accepted the ecclesiastical mode of Anglo-Catholicism, had colour in his life to attract not only the undergraduate imagination of Oxford, but even the adult commercialism of Birmingham. There was no limit to the influence wielded by a man who seemed prepared to give

up everything, even a belief or a Bishopric, in his thirst for the truth. Thus sceptics were dogmatic about the power wielded over men by a man who

. . . had been very far
After where the shadows are.

Believers, too, found in Dr. Gore's synthesis of a sceptic's reason and a saint's belief the support of a leader in an hour of almost accepted defeat.

Such being the man, we should not be surprised if the interest of the later as of the earlier *Apologia* is largely autobiographical. We are not quite certain that after reading through Bishop Gore's *Belief in God* we have added anything to our knowledge and love of God. But we have added much to our knowledge and appreciation of Bishop Gore, and therefore of many minds of whom Bishop Gore is typical.

First of all, we have come to see and value Bishop Gore's rarely failing gift of "seeing the other side." We think that this gift fails him mostly when he has to deal with the doctrines and character of the Roman Catholic Church, as in the following passage, which unfortunately occurs in the first page of the first chapter of his book: "Others, again, in despair of attaining the religion which they need by any other means, take refuge under some religious authority which admits of no questioning, whether it be the Roman Catholic Church or Christian Science" (p. 1). As we have not come

upon any other reference to the Mother Church of Christendom we think that the writer of these words will sooner or later feel their inadequacy.

Nevertheless Bishop Gore's desire to enter into the mind of an opponent usually enables him to earn the beatitude of those who see the other side. Yet we think he sometimes fails to earn the greater beatitude of those who see that it is only the other side. To put it differently, Bishop Gore is a worthy follower of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas in realising that, as every evil contains some good, so every error contains some truth. But he does not always see that the main truth about an error is that it is an error; just as the most important fact about an evil is that it is an evil. This over-emphasis of intellectual sympathy, with its tendency to undo and unsay itself, is curiously reflected in Bishop Gore's one painful reference to the Roman Catholic Church and his panegyric of "Mohammed." I think myself that no believer in the reality of the inspiration of the prophets will be likely to doubt that Mohammed was really originally inspired to restore the religion of Abraham" (p. 172). It is quite evident that the moral and dogmatic system of Mohammed contains some and even much truth. But the most important truth about Mohammedanism is that it is not true. To realise the truths in Mohammedanism and not to realise that Mohammedanism is untrue is itself an error; and the greater the number of truths realised,

the more dangerous the error. To-day this danger specially besets minds cast in a mould of sympathy, who have hardly the intellectual bravery needed to recognise the number of modern errors recommended by their ancillary truths.

Secondly, we have come to see and to sympathise with Bishop Gore's lack of Christian philosophy. This lack is very humbly acknowledged in the following confession : " Most of the people who influenced my intellect when I was young were Agnostics or Protestants or outsiders to the Catholic faith—Carlyle, Ruskin, Edward Bowen, T. H. Green " (p. xii). Undoubtedly this Agnostic and Protestant education is not without its value in the witness of the writer's book. It is of no little apologetic value that a mind brought up in an atmosphere of Agnosticism and Protestantism could pen the following biographical details :

" I remember very well when I was eight or nine reading a book by a Protestant author, entitled *Father Clement*, about the conversion of a Catholic priest to Protestantism. I had always been brought up in ordinary old-fashioned English Church ways. I had only attended very Low Church services. I had never heard of the Oxford Movement. I knew nothing about Catholicism, except as a strange superstition called Popery. But the book described confession and absolution, fasting, the Real Presence, the devotion of the Three Hours, the use of incense, etc., and I felt instinctively and at once that this sort of sacramental religion was the religion for me " (pp. xi. xii).

That this (non-reasoning, intuitional) acceptance

of a sacramental, dogmatic religion has survived a long exposure to an Agnostic and Protestant climate is perhaps the chief witness of Bishop Gore's *Belief in God*.

But this valuable witness is a truth which must not blind us to the cost at which it has been bought. The lack of that Christian intellectual training which has assimilated the truths of Hebrew, Greek, and Latin thought is not without its effect even on so dogged a thinker as Bishop Gore. As we think this handicap from which Bishop Gore suffers is lamentably prevalent, we shall be at pains to diagnose its presence in his Lordship's book.

On page x are the words :

" I have, ever since I was an undergraduate, been certain that I must be, in a sense, a free-thinker, and that either not to think freely about a disturbing subject, or to accept ecclesiastical authority in place of the best judgment of my own reason, would be for me an impossible treason against the light."

(a) If Bishop Gore's whole personality and public life did not cry out in protest, he might be supposed to be using these words merely as a rhetorical appeal to the men in the street or the men in the gallery. Every detail of his Lordship's singularly public life is there to protest that this formula may be inconsistency, but it is not rhetoric.

(b) But if we did not know *a posteriori* that it was the judgment of an Anglican Bishop—and, indeed, of an Anglo-Catholic Bishop !—we might

have traced its incisiveness and subjectivity to a rationalistic parentage. Higher Criticism might have attributed it to a rationalist like Huxley, but would have had to unsay all its hermeneutic principles to attribute it to one who professed Catholic principles.

(c) No doubt it might have been possible to attribute this rationalist formula to the group of English Churchmen whose Modernism (to use Bishop Gore's own words) is "directly subversive of the foundation of the Creeds" (*Church Times*, 4 Oct., 1912). Indeed, if Faith is not so much a matter of the *credenda* as of the *credere*, Modernists such as Dean Rashdall would find this formula of Bishop Gore a full expression of their *Creed*. It is therefore one of the surprises of this unconventional book of apologetics that its very basis is a principle which Modernists would accept as an axiom, and Anglo-Catholics would anathematise as a heresy.

(d) We are not sure that Bishop Gore's Catholicism would suffer any heartburnings merely because his principle was irreconcilable with the Anglo-Catholicism of the Anglo-Catholics; nor, indeed, because it seemed irreconcilable with the Anglo-Catholicism of Bishop Gore. But we think it worth while to point out the antinomies between his rationalist principle and other of his principles in the hope that, before his trilogy of books is written, he may have answered our doubts. Nothing could be more plain than the Bishop's self-

denying ordinance not to accept *ecclesiastical authority* in place of "the best judgment of my own reason." That the Bishop's intellectual bravery is not a passing emotion, but a settled conviction, may be judged by the following cryptic words :

"We are bound to claim the fullest liberty for science and for reason in all its legitimate, because *reason is, at the last resort our only instrument of truth.* Thus we cannot play false to our reason, or be content with any crude antithesis between faith and reason, *faith we find, being only reason in the making.*"

Here is a plain instance of Bishop Gore being handicapped by his lack of Christian, and perhaps Grecian, philosophy. The word "reason" is a will-o'-the-wisp for unskilled writers. If we accept the authority of the *Oxford Dictionary*, it has some twenty meanings in English. Now, even if we grant that in this or that context it is hard to fix a precise meaning, it is not impossible to fix the meaning when we speak of it (rightly or wrongly) as the *only instrument of truth.* By the word "reason," as the only instrument of truth, we mean the human psychological faculty for apprehending truth. This faculty we commonly name *intelligence* or *intellect.* If by reason we do not mean this faculty, but mean *ratiocination*, that is, arguing to conclusions from premises, it is clear that reason is not the only or even the primary instrument of truth. Another and more fundamental instrument of

truth is intuition, whereby we accept our ultimate premises.

But however this may be, it is clear that reason is used not in one sense, but in two senses, when it is called, on the one hand, *the* only instrument of truth and, on the other, it is made correlative with faith.

(e) The confusion which exists in his Lordship's words is still more apparent in some other extracts.

" . . . The methods of arriving at conclusions which are specially characteristic of science—which Darwin called *the grinding of general laws out of observed instances*—is a part of the operations of the human mind in gaining truth . . . but we cannot consider it the whole. . . . The great artists convey to us truths about the universe . . . apprehended, conveyed, and appreciated through methods wholly different from the methods of scientific reasoning, and which scientific reasoning can neither reach nor communicate " (p. 35).

" It is by feeling or intuition that the supreme artist gains his profound vision of experience and of God. . . . The same claim must be made on behalf of the intuitions of the poets, the prophets, and the mystics . . . who have a clear intuition of God . . . reached often in utter scorn of reasoning, or at any rate not by its methods " (p. 36).

" . . . If we want to reach the whole truth we must trust the whole of our faculties—not our powers of abstract reasoning only, or only our powers of scientific discovery, higher or lower, but also the more emotional and active powers of our nature " (p. 39).

These statements make at least a verbal contradiction with the very emphatic and rationalistic statement that "reason in our

last resource is our only instrument of truth." We take this contradiction to spring from the Bishop's lack of acquaintance with Christian and Grecian philosophical language. But the contradiction, either verbal or mental, leaves us in ignorance whether it is the dogmatist or the rationalist that is the authentic Bishop Gore.

Fourthly, we have come to see how uncertain it is that Bishop Gore gives any real objectivity to the article of the Creed "Credo in . . . Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam." No doubt this first volume of the trilogy is concerned more with belief in the Person of God than with belief in the visible organ of God's revelation. But if we did not point out what we consider the gaps in Bishop Gore's position, the two books to be written might leave these gaps unfilled.

(a) There is a sense in which we defend not so much the Unity of God as the Trinity; not so much the Trinity as the Incarnation; not so much the Incarnation as the Church. In other words, just as St. James supposes the solidarity of the Ethical code, the Decalogue in the phrase, "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one, is become guilty of all" (James ii. 10), so may we suppose the solidarity of the dogmatic Code, the Apostles' Creed. Christian apologists have greater confidence in defending this Creed as an organic unity than as something manifold. We should therefore expect Bishop Gore to ground his apolo-

getic on the Catholic Church. But for the moment we register our apprehensiveness.

(b) Not a few indications, in themselves perhaps trifling, beget this apprehensiveness. A great part of the first volume is taken up with what we can only call a defence of the Bible. Indeed, of the 294 pages devoted to the argument of the book some 220 pages are devoted to prove the authenticity, if not the authority, of the Bible as a record of Revelation, Prophecy, and Miracles ! This allotment of space and speech to the Old and New Testament is too much after the manner of the older Protestant apologetic not to need explanation in the two volumes promised by Bishop Gore.

(c) There is very little explicit mention of the "Holy Catholic Church"—and none in an index which is modern enough to quote Haldane on Relativity and humble enough to include H. G. Wells's *Outline of History* ! Bishop Gore would leave us all his debtors if he discussed matters in terms not of Christianity or even of Christendom, but of the "Holy Catholic Church." Christianity tends more and more to be that residue of doctrines which the various groups called Christians accept. But as that residue tends more and more to become a minimum, it is naturally becoming of less and less influence over men who think.

(d) This significant avoidance of "the Holy Catholic Church" becomes deeply significant when seen in the light of the following words :

"What we are seeking for is a real creed—a real intellectual decision such as is formed to be acted upon. . . . No doubt we may form wrong decisions and growing experience or growing knowledge may convince us of our mistake. Then we must go through the process which James Hinton used to describe as correcting 'our premises.' Nevertheless it is better to make an intellectual decision or accept a creed on what seems to be the weight of evidence on the whole, and to use it for all it is worth, and then, if need arise, revise it or abandon it—if all this be done carefully and with due consideration—than to remain for ever uncommitted and in suspense" (pp. 33-34).

Again we suggest that this declaration of faith (or reason?) is rationalistic enough to recommend itself to those Church of England Modernists whom Bishop Gore accuses of doctrines subversive of the foundation of the creeds. His Lordship's uncertain attitude towards them may be judged by the fact that though he accuses them of these subversive doctrines, he willingly remains in full communion with them. Perhaps he feels that they are carrying out his own principles. It may be that, carefully and after due consideration, they are revising or abandoning a provisional creed which hitherto they had used for all it was worth, until they discovered its worthlessness.

Moreover, it would seem that this creed, which may in the event be revised or even abandoned, is not and cannot be a creed of the Holy Catholic Church. It is evident that for a Catholic or Anglo-Catholic a Creed is not something which a man makes for himself to

go on with—which he accepts on the weight of evidence—which may turn out to be so imperfect as to necessitate its revision or abandonment—after due care and consideration. A man-made creed is often of unique psychological interest, even when so hastily formed as to be unequal to the stress of life. But we have hitherto thought that such a man-made creed was not compatible with the Catholicism of one who, like Bishop Gore, “has since childhood been what I may call a Catholic by mental constitution” (p. xi). The Catholicism of the Holy Roman Catholic Church means that the Authority of the Church makes the creed and the subjects of the Church accept the creed. But it may well be that in the mind of his Lordship the word *catholic* connotes something which we Roman Catholics have called not Episcopalianism nor Presbyterianism nor Congregationalism, but Individualism. Be this as it may, it would be profitable to the Bishop’s readers, who will be many, if his future books will make it quite clear that he does not believe a creed provisionally and revisably compiled by himself, but authoritatively compiled by the Holy Catholic Church. If His Lordship thinks it well thus to consider his readers, he may be contented to feel that his two books to be written will, in his readers’ judgment, be well worth the writing.

CHAPTER XXV

BISHOP GORE, DEAN RASHDALL, AND ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

THE dogmatic duel between the two intellectual leaders of Anglo-Catholicism and Modernism within the Church of England is a struggle of giants made homely by irrepressible sallies of the "average man." Neither the Bishop nor the Dean can lay aside that human nature which feels and even repays a hurt.

We should have no joy in recording one of these sallies if strangely enough it did not bind into a single sheaf of words what is elsewhere scattered over the field of controversy. In the August number of *The Modern Churchman* Dean Rashdall has an article entitled "Bishop Gore and St. Thomas Aquinas," in which he wrote :—

"Bishop Gore, in his criticisms of myself, has refused to accept my statements as to what I believe. He has claimed to look down into my thoughts and pronounce that, when I say that Christ and God is man, I really think of Him as man only. Such an attitude seems to me an unwarrantable presumption. I will not, therefore, be guilty of the same presumption towards him, and will refrain from saying that I suspect that, if I could look into his mind as he believes himself able to look into mine, I should find that he practically envisages the Holy Trinity to himself as three minds, *i.e.* three Gods, not less distinct

but only more unanimous and harmonious in their thoughts and plans than any three pagan deities.

" I will not say this ; I will content myself with observing that, though he escapes formal Tritheism by using the correct theological phrases, his thought is difficult to distinguish from Tritheism " (p. 208).

" Bishop Gore (so far as I have been able to understand him) contends that no one can honestly accept the Creed of Nicea without regarding Father and Son as two separate *personalities* in the modern English sense of the word. At all events he uses the terms *person* and *personality* without a word to distinguish their theological meaning from that which they bear in common life or modern philosophy " (p. 201).

There is not lacking a certain vein of humour in this modernist Dean bluntly accusing an Anglo-Catholic of avoiding Tritheism by an inconsistent " use of the correct theological phrases." As the Modernists of the Church of England have been again and again charged with a disloyal use of theological phrases and indeed of ecclesiastical formulæ which they empty of their true meaning, this last *tu quoque* of the Dean to the Bishop is a dialectic thrust to delight the onlooker ! The element of delight in the thrust is its verisimilitude. The Bishop does not really seem as acquainted with the orthodox Trinitarian doctrine as does the Dean ! For proof of this the Dean goes on to say :

" Bishop Gore has controverted my representation of St. Thomas in this matter ; and I think he is bound to give some justification of this charge of misrepresentation or to withdraw it publicly.

(*N.B.*—The passage at arms between the two leaders is not a sham-fight. It is a pitched battle; with the British public as onlookers and judges, or at least as critics.)

“ The best way in which I can convince my readers that I am not misrepresenting St. Thomas, and that there is no trace in him of the three-mind view of the Godhead, will be to translate literally a few passages from the *Summa* ” (p. 205).

Without presuming to decide whether Dean Rashdall's judgment of Bishop Gore is correct, we are bound to say that the Dean's judgment seems, on the whole, more correct than the Bishop's when giving the doctrine of St. Thomas. It would be certainly tritheism to speak of *three minds*. It is not correct theology to say :

1. The Father, as Father, understands.
2. The Son, as Son, understands.
3. The Holy Ghost, as Holy Ghost, understands.

We must say :

1. The Father, as God, understands.
2. The Son, as God, understands.
3. The Holy Ghost, as God, understands.

Again, we cannot say :

1. The Father, as Father, loves (essentially).
2. The Son, as Son, loves (essentially).
3. The Holy Ghost, as Holy Ghost, loves (essentially).

We must say :

- 1, The Father, as God, loves (essentially).
2. The Son, as God, loves (essentially).
3. The Holy Ghost, as God, loves (essentially)

Dean Rashdall has had this idea in his mind without being able to bring the authority of St. Thomas in its support. We find this authority in the following words :

“ To be intelligent (*i.e.* to understand) belongs to the Son in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God since to understand is said of God essentially . . . Now the Son is God begotten, and not God begetting ; and hence He is intelligent not as producing a word, but as the Word proceeding, forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation ” (Ia., Qu. 34, Art. 2, ad. 2).

What is here said of the Son is said also of the Holy Ghost :

“ As it does not belong to the Son, though He understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand as the Word proceeding ; so in like manner although the Holy Ghost loves, taking love as an essential term (*amet essentialiter accipiendo*), still it does not belong to Him to spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term ; because He loves essentially as love proceeding, but not as the one whence love preceeds ” (Ia., Qu. 37, Art. 1, ad. 4).

We cannot therefore say “ There is one mind whereby the Father thinks—and another mind whereby the Son thinks—and a third mind whereby the Holy Ghost thinks.” No ; there is

but one Mind whereby the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost think.

Again, we cannot say "There is one Will whereby the Father loves—and another Will whereby the Son loves—and a third Will whereby the Holy Ghost loves." No ; there is but one Will whereby the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost love.

It may be said that this gives us an idea of the divine Persons far removed from the idea of a human person. Undoubtedly Dean Rashdall has, perhaps unconsciously, exaggerated and therefore falsified the doctrine of St. Thomas. He writes :

"When writers like St. Augustine, and still more clearly St. Thomas, speak of a Person of the Holy Trinity, they do not mean what we mean, *or anything like it*" (p. 208).

That this is an exaggeration of St. Thomas's doctrine may clearly be seen from the following extract :

"It does not follow that although relation is contained in the signification of a divine person, but not in that of an angelic or human person, the word person is used in an *equivocal* sense, though neither is it applied *univocally* of God and creatures" (I^a., Qu. 29, Art. 4, ad. 4).

St. Thomas here refers to Qu. 13. Art. 5, where he shows that no words predicated of God and of creatures are predicated univocally ; but are predicated either analogically or equivocally. But as the word "person" is predicated of God and creatures neither univocally nor yet equivo-

cally, it must be predicated analogically. Now this analogous predication implies some likeness, at least of proportion. It is therefore an exaggeration to say, as Dean Rashdall has said, that when St. Thomas uses the word Person of the Holy Trinity "he does not mean what we mean or *anything like it*."

We take note of the use of that very ambiguous word "Consciousness." It is our considered opinion that there will be little progress in English philosophy until we either clearly define what we mean by *conscious*, *consciousness*, and derivative words, or quite banish them for a century. Dean Rashdall, in using these words without explanation, merely darkens counsel. Thus he says :

" It is quite clear that for St. Augustine . . . the Trinity is always likened to the relation between different activities of one and the same divine Mind. . . . The human activities within the one *consciousness* in the light of which he understands the Trinity are not always the same " (pp. 202, 203).

" He (St. Augustine) always thinks of God as a Being whose distinct activities constitute One Mind or *Consciousness* as Memory, Wisdom and Love in a human being " (p. 204).

What we have quoted from St. Thomas on the question of how each divine Person may be said to understand and love, will throw light on the following words of the dean :

" The Holy Spirit is not a lover, but Love : so the term Person does not by itself imply a distinct *consciousness* that thinks and loves another distinct *consciousness* " (pp. 207, 208).

Again :

" The relation of the Father to the Son is the relation of a thinker to his thought. Has that the least resemblance to the relation between two human beings ? Is the speaker or thinker one *consciousness*, and the spoken word or concept another thinker, another *consciousness* ? "

Again :

" How can the love which impels a man to do anything be thought of as a separate *consciousness* from the man ? " (pp. 205, 206).

On these passages we may comment :

1. It would be difficult to fix any definite meaning in this word *conscious* as used by the writer. Perhaps in a future article Dean Rashdall will contribute to the reunion of our separated philosophers and theologians by giving us his meaning of this much-used and much-abused word.

2. If it is not quite certain what the word means, it is quite certain that it has not been used by St. Thomas to express his doctrine of the Trinity.

3. Dean Rashdall's certitude about the matter is, perhaps, in advance of the evidence. He seems quite certain that the thinker and his thoughts are one *consciousness*. Yet it would seem that *the consciousness of being the thinker* is one thing and the *consciousness of being the thought* is another. We might say that it is one being who thinks and is thought ; but it would seem to be two consciousnesses.

4. Again, when one human being thinks and loves, it is, of course, one being ; but it cannot be said to be one consciousness. The consciousness called thought is not the consciousness called love ; just as the consciousness called sight is not the consciousness called taste or smell.

5. If it be replied that we are confusing the issue, we would urge that the confusion is not due to us but to the confused use of the word consciousness which not we, but Dean Rashdall and others, have used.

Dean Rashdall is not quite happy in his explanation of a passage from St. Thomas (I, Qu. 37, Art. 1, ad. 2) which he translates :

“ When therefore it is said that the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father for the Son, there is not signified anything that passes over into another, but only a habitude towards the thing loved ; as also in the Word there is implied a habitude of the Word towards the thing expressed by the Word ” (p. 207).

The Dean's commentary on this is not accurate. To explain. St. Thomas says that to *understand* (or to think or to speak—dicere) and to *will* (or to love) are not transient acts, but are immanent acts. To *create* and to *make* are transient acts. Thus a painter can *think of* (or understand) and *will* (or love) a painting he has not yet made. These acts of thinking and willing the painting are immanent acts. But the act of making the painting is a transient act.


Yet although to think and to will do not mean transient acts passing over into an object, they do include a *habitude* or relation to an object. There is no thought without an object of thinking; there is no love without an object loved. It is this *relation* between the *love* and the *lover* that is the Holy Ghost.

There is another aspect of St. Thomas's doctrine which has escaped Dean Rashdall's thought. He writes :

" While I contend that the actual doctrine of the Trinity as taught by Thomas Aquinas is both simple and rational, I think candour requires that I should admit that there are many doctrinal statements in St. Thomas which it is more difficult for a modern writer to translate into terms of intelligible modern thought. . . . When St. Thomas calls the three Persons *Hypostases*, he does not imply that they are separate conscious beings : The word Hypostasis has no suggestion in it of any of the ideas commonly implied by our modern term person—consciousness, thought, will. But it does suggest the idea of substance. . . . Yet it is the essence of his doctrine that the three Persons are three relations. . . . A hypostasis seems to mean for him precisely a thing of which something can be predicated ; but which cannot be predicated of something else. If, then, the Son means the relation of *Sonship* (*filatio*), it must seem that it must be a predicate of some other thing : you cannot have a relation without terms " (pp. 210, 211).

We congratulate Dean Rashdall on this resolute effort after scientific thinking. As a further contribution towards scientific thinking we venture to put down schematically one of the articles in which St. Thomas shows himself master in grouping words used by the scholars

of past ages or of his day. It is probably true that no writer of any age has such a vast vocabulary as St. Thomas. Yet on the other hand St. Thomas is not known to have added one word to our vocabulary ! *O si sic omnes !* In Qu. 29, Art. 2, he thus classifies the group of words commonly used by writers on the Trinity :



This scheme of the various words used in the doctrine of the Trinity is of the utmost value to everyone who is overwhelmed by the varying meanings of the various writers.

Dean Rashdall has, very excusably, fallen into an error in this matter where error is so hard to avoid. He says that

(a) The Son, as a Hypostasis, cannot be predicated of anything else.

(b) But if the Son is a Relation he must be predicated of something else (proof: "You cannot have a relation without terms").

(c) Therefore it would seem that the Son is either not a Hypostasis or not a relation.

Here the fallacy is in the proposition and proof

(b). A relation as such is not predicated of anything but of itself. Thus the relation of "straightness" is not predicated of anything but itself. We do not say "This road is straightness." We do say, "This road is straight." Again, the relations of paternity and filiation are not predicated of anything but themselves. We do not say, "Abraham is paternity, and Isaac is filiation." We do say, "Abraham is the father, Isaac is a son."

When Dean Rashdall says that "a relation has terms," he cannot mean that a relation is predicated of the terms. He can only mean that by reason of the relation something is predicated of the terms which would not otherwise be predicated. Thus Abraham could not be called father unless he had the relation of paternity; nor would Isaac be called son unless he had the relation of sonship.

But a full discussion of the philosophy of relation would lead us too far afield.

CHAPTER XXVI

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM

WE purpose (1) to set down a few passages from the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas dealing with Biblical Criticism ; and (2) to give a short commentary on them.

I

“ In discussing matters of this kind, two rules are to be observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad litt. i). The first is to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty (*certa ratione*) to be false, lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and an obstacle be placed to their believing” (I^a Qu. 68, Art. 1, Eng. Tr.).

“ As, however, this theory (*i.e.* an infinite body of waters beyond the heavens) can be shown to be false by solid reasons (*per veras rationes*), it cannot be held to be the sense of Sacred Scripture. It should rather be considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people (*rudi populo*) and that out of condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense ” (*ibid.*, Art. 3).

St. Thomas here broaches the relationship between Revelation and Reason. If anything can be shown by reason to be false, it cannot be the sense of Sacred Scripture. Not only does

St. Thomas enunciate the general principle, but he reinforces it by showing what harm may be done to unbelievers by denying the principle. Moreover, he applies the general principle to concrete cases of exegesis. This may be called St. Thomas's Principle of Science.

II

"Augustine says, 'It is our business here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of his creatures, not how far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way of miracle.' " Gen. ad. litt. ii. 1. (I^a Qu. 68, Art. 2. ad. 1^m).

"Augustine remarks (Gen. ad. litt. i.) that 'in the first founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles but for what is in accordance with nature' " (I^a Qu. 67., Art. 4, ad. 3^m. Eng. Tr.).

This wise principle of St. Augustine made appeal to the sober reason of St. Thomas. The doctrine of Sufficient Cause led him not to deny the existence of miracles, but to deny that miracles were to be sought in the origin of the Universe. To the reason of St. Thomas this would mean a confusion of the natural with the supernatural order.

III

"When it is said in Exodus xv. 18: 'The Lord shall reign for ever and ever' (In æternum et ultra) we must consider that *æternum* there means *age*, as another translation has it " (I^a Qu. X, Art. 2, ad 2^m).

"According to *one version* of the Scripture, the completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day; though, according to another version, it is assigned to the sixth. Either version, however, may stand " (I^a Qu. 73, Art. 1, ad 1^m).

St. Thomas here pays respect to the Science of Textual Criticism. So concerned is he to save at once the truth of Scripture and of Science, *i.e.* of Revelation and of Reason, that he is willing to admit faulty though semi-official translations. He is even anxious to admit that it may be the sixth or the seventh day, according as it may be settled by the Textual critics. No Biblical scholar would feel himself fettered by the principles of this prince of theologians.

A still more striking example of this breadth of principle is found in the next extract.

IV

“ There are some who contend that this discrepancy is due to the error of the Greek transcriber, since the characters employed by them to represent 3 and 6 are somewhat alike ” (3^a Qu. 46, Art. 9, ad 2^m).

The question here mooted is the hour at which the Evangelists place our Blessed Lord's death. St. Mark seemed to place it about the third hour ; St. John about the sixth. After giving an elaborate explanation from St. Augustine's *De Consensu Evang.*, St. Thomas adds the simple explanation of a false text due to a copyist's blunder ! One almost forgets that this was written, not in the twentieth century but in the thirteenth. In its quiet relevance it goes far to reassure those who are now engaged in patiently piecing together a perfect text.

V

"An angel causing an imaginative vision sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is no deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination; yet neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect of him to whom such things appear.

"Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to the people in parables, which He did not explain to them" (II^a, II^æ Qu. III, Art. 3, ad 4^m).

Only a short reference can be made to this most important principle which is of supreme value in dealing with God's supernatural dealings with the cognitive faculties of saints and seers. To solve one of the most subtle difficulties against Inspiration by an appeal to the economy of parables may well be looked upon as a triumph of Hermeneutics.

VI

"We must bear in mind that although the resurrection of these (holy men who died before Jesus Christ) is mentioned before His resurrection, nevertheless, as is clear from the text, this is to be understood as said by anticipation, *as frequently occurs in the historical books*" (Supp. Qu. 77, Art. 1, ad 3^m).

St. Thomas here deals with the question of chronology in his own broad-minded way. Not only are events sometimes narrated out of their strict chronological order, but this is of frequent occurrence in the Sacred Books. St. Thomas would therefore have no theological difficulties against the theory of Canon Van Hoonacker,

to wit, that the mission of Nehemias preceded the mission of Esdras, although according to the order of the books in the Jewish Canon it would seem not to have preceded but followed it.

But St. Thomas has himself made use of this principle in the following cases.

VII

(a) "As Augustine says (*De Consensu Evang.*, ii), '*It is not certain which happened first: whether the kingdoms of the earth were first shown to Him and afterwards He was set on the pinnacle of the Temple; or the latter first and the former afterwards. However, it matters not, provided it be made clear that all these things did take place.*' It may be that the Evangelists set these things in different orders, because sometimes cupidity arises from vainglory: sometimes the reverse happens" (3^a Qu. 41, Arr. 4, ad 5^m).

(b) "And therefore others said that the Evangelists did not always follow the precise order in their narrative as that in which things actually happened, as is seen from Augustine (*De Consensu Evang.*, iii) Hence it can be understood that the order of what took place can be expressed thus: '*Taking the bread He blessed it, saying, This is My body, and then He broke it, and gave it to His disciples*'" (3^a Qu. 78, Art. 1, ad 1^m).

Here the principle that the historiographers did not always follow the chronological order is used to meet the chronological difficulties (a) of our Blessed Lord's Temptation, and (b) of the institution of the Blessed Sacrament.

St. Matthew's account of the Temptation (iv. 1, etc.) follows an order different from the account in St. Luke's gospel (iv. 1, etc.). It is

agreed that if St. Matthew's order of the three temptations is right, then St. Luke's is wrong; and if St. Luke's is right, St. Matthew's is wrong. Both cannot be right. St. Thomas frankly admits this, but argues, on the authority of St. Augustine, his master, that these Evangelists, although historians, were not merely historians writing on a chronological plane, but were also hagiographers writing on a plane where the chronological order could be displaced for the purpose of showing how "sometimes cupidity arises from vainglory, and sometimes the reverse."

The solemn words of institution of the Blessed Sacrament were no less divergent than the two accounts of the Temptation. Indeed, instead of two divergent accounts there were four, viz. Matt. xxvi, Mark xiv, Luke xxii, 1 Cor. xi. The writer of the *Adoro Te* yielded to no one in his profound worship of Him Whom he called "*Latens Deitas*." Yet he had no hesitation in again following the guidance of his master, St. Augustine, and allowing the Scripture exegete to solve these chronological difficulties on the principle that the inspired writers did not profess to follow the chronological order, even in such sacred matters as the institution of the Sacrament of Sacraments. How this is compatible with the dogma that the Sacred Scripture contains no untruth will be best seen in the following principle of St. Thomas.

VIII

"It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion (*Aliquod falsum asseri*) is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be deprived of its certitude—which is based on the authority of Holy Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine says (*De Consensu Evang.*, ii), *"He that has the wit to understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that sense is expressed."* Hence it is evident, as he adds, that *we must not judge that someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words a thing they remember to have seen or heard"* (II^a, II^a Qu. 110, Art. 3, ad 1^m).

This display of exegetical wisdom comes in the treatise of Lying. The question to which it is an answer is so plain and pointed as to remind us of the saying of an unbeliever that "from the pages of the *Summa* (*i.e.* from the objections of St. Thomas) he could compile a Grammar of Unbelief." St. Thomas objects to himself: "It is evident that the Evangelists did not sin in writing the Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false, since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often differ from one another. Wherefore, seemingly, one of them must have given an untrue account."

To this plain difficulty, which has wrung the hearts of those who have not the true view of Scripture and the Church, St. Thomas gives a reply full of scholarship and caution. He

contents himself with the traditional doctrine that the Sacred Writers did not tell a lie; because they did not put forward as true anything untrue (*non . . . aliquod falsum asseri*). He then shelters himself behind the authority of St. Augustine by calling attention to two main factors :—

1. Scripture exegetes should pay attention, not so much to words as to meaning, *i.e.* not so much as to what the words of the writer mean, as to what the writer means by the words. It is clear that if a writer meant to write a parable and we take it to be history—if he writes down a tradition and we take it to be his personal opinion—if he writes what he looks on as substantially accurate and we take it to be meticulously exact—if he records what his fellow-countrymen hold as revealed and we take it to be really revealed—then the error, if any, arises not from his words or his meaning but from the meaning we place on his words.

2. “Different eye-witnesses give different witness.” This is good sense, as well as good exegesis. St. Thomas has no hesitation in borrowing this good sense from St. Augustine, who very accurately distinguishes in the different versions of inspired writers two elements: (*a*) a difference of order (not in the same way, *non eodem modo*), and (*b*) a difference of phrase (not in the same words, *non eisdem verbis*).

IX

" Augustine says (*Civ. Dei*, xi.) that the angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things, but are designated by the name of *heavens*, and of *light*. And they were either passed over or designated by the names of corporeal things because Moses was addressing an uncultured people (*rudi populo*) as yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature ; and if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry " (I^a Qu. 61, 1, ad 1).

" Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was purposely omitted by Moses. . . . Chrysostom (*Hom. 2, in Gen.*) gives as a reason that Moses was addressing an ignorant people (*rudi populo*) to whom material things alone appealed, and whom he was endeavouring to withdraw from the service of idols " (I^a Qu. 67, Art. 4, ad 1).

Few principles of Biblical interpretation are more important than this, which St Thomas borrowed from St. John Chrysostom and St. Augustine. No doubt St. Thomas had found the principle expressed by the Eternal Wisdom Himself in all its depth. " I told you not these things from the beginning because I was with you. . . . I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now " (*John xvi. 5, 12*). This enunciated the great principle of an " economy " in tempering or withholding truth out of mercy to the human mind. St. Paul had used the same principle of " economy " even to the intellectual Greeks of Corinth. " And I, brethren, could not speak to you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal ; as unto little ones in Christ. I gave you milk to drink, not meat ;

for you were not able as yet " (1 Cor. iii. 12). Towards the year 388 St. John Chrysostom used this principle to unlock the mysteries of the Mosaic Hexæmeron in the series of brilliant homilies from which St. Thomas took it, some nine centuries later. In a few years the same application which St. John Chrysostom had made at Antioch, was being made by St. Augustine at Hippo. We leave to students of patrology the task of finding out whether the relationship between these two applications is more than chronological. From the age of Augustine the principle would seem almost to have slept until it awoke to life under the genius of St. Thomas.

It is wonderful in how many ways St. Thomas uses it to light up the dark sayings of the Mosaic Hexæmeron.

Thus in the passage borrowed from St. John Chrysostom it is used to account for the supposed silence of Moses on the creation and existence of angels !

In the passage borrowed from St. Augustine it is used to account for Moses using the word "light" to mean "angels" in the sentence : "And God said, Be light made" (Gen. i. 3). Whatever we may think of this method of interpretation, we cannot quarrel with it for narrowing the freedom of the exegete.

Again, he uses this principle of St. John Chrysostom and St. Augustine to show that by the word "Earth" Moses meant Primary Matter

(Materia Prima) from which all corporeal things are made (Qu. 66, Art. 1, ad 1^m).

In Qu. 91, Art. 1, ad 1^m he points out that in the Hexæmeron there is no mention of fire and air. He accounts for this omission by the fact that the Scripture was given to "an unclutured people" (rudi populo).

In Qu. 68, Art. 3, he expresses the principle with great precision in these words: "It should rather be considered that Moses was speaking to an ignorant people (rudi populo) and that out of condescension to their weakness (imbecillitati condescendens) he put before them (proposuit) only such things as are apparent to sense."

An analysis of this full statement of principle would be of great value to Scripture interpretation; but it would carry us beyond the limits of our space. We may merely note how (1) St. Thomas speaks explicitly of a divine "condescensio." This is a reminiscence of the *κατάβασις*, so well known to students of the Arian and Nestorian heresies of the fourth to sixth centuries. (2) He uses the very guarded and formal word "he put before them" (proposuit). Not every meaning latent in the words of the Holy Writers is *put before* us as Holy Writ.

We can hardly overstate the significance of this principle for Biblical criticism. To an early age which had not the same knowledge of science of the forces of nature as we have, the writer of inspired Scripture used an "economy" which allowed him (1) to leave out from a summary

not a few of its most important elements (*e.g.* fire and air from the forces of nature), and (2) to use words in a sense other than that commonly accepted (*e.g.* *light* to mean *angel*).

But great as is the breadth of this canon of interpretation it is perhaps still broader in the following form.

X

"According to another theory, touched upon by Augustine, the heaven made on the first day was the starry heaven, and the firmament made on the second day was that region of the air which is also called heaven but *equivocally* (equivoce). And to show that the word is here used in an equivocal sense (*ad equivocationem designandam*) it is expressly said that *God called the firmament heaven*. For the same reason, in a preceding verse, it is said that *God called the light day*, since the word day is also used to denote a space of twenty-four hours. Other instances of a similar use occur as pointed by Rabbi Moses" (I^a Qu. 88, Art. 1, ad 1^m).

"It may also be said with Rabbi Moses that the expression *He called* denotes throughout an equivocal use of the name imposed (*significatur equivocatio nominis*)" (Qu. 91, Art. 1, ad 5^m).

We merely call attention to this almost astounding principle which reveals some of the characteristics of a mind open to truth, no matter from what point truth approached. The respect paid to the authority of Rabbi Moses Maimonides is all the more remarkable because it was during the lifetime of St. Thomas that the Dominican (?) author of *De Erroribus Philosophorum* was compiling a list of errors.

from the works of Moses Maimonides.¹ It is significant that amongst the errors of Rabbi Moses enumerated in *De Erroribus Philosophorum* we read : " Moreover he erred about the Divine attributes, believing that wisdom and goodness are in us and in God only *equivocally*."

XI

" According to Augustine (QQ. in Gen. 145), when Joseph said there was no one like him in the science of divining he spoke in joke and not seriously, *referring perhaps to the common opinion about him*; in this sense also spoke his steward " (II^a, II^æ, Qu. 95, Art. 7, ad 1^m).

" It may also be said that it was not the soul of Samuel but a demon speaking in his name, and that the wise man (*i.e.* the inspired writer of the book of Ecclesiasticus) calls him Samuel and his foretelling a prophecy, *according to the opinion of Saul and the bystanders, who were of this opinion* " (II^a, II^æ Qu. 174, Art. 5, ad 4).

" Augustine says (Gen. ad litt. xii.) it is stated in Exodus that *the Lord spoke to Moses face to face*, and shortly afterwards we read *show me Thy glory*. ' Therefore he perceived what he saw and he desired what he saw not.' Hence he did not see the very Essence of God. . . . Accordingly, when Scripture states that *He spoke to Him face to face*, this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of the people who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to mouth " (I^a, II^æ Qu. 98, Art. 3, ad 2^m).

This most valuable principle of Scripture interpretation is worthy of more insistence than we can give within the limits of an article. But a few remarks may be useful.

Already St. Thomas has insisted that the

¹ Mandonnet, O.P., *Siger de Brabant* II^e Part, pp. 21, 22.

inspired writers often shaped their words to the knowledge or ignorance of their readers. To an unlettered people who were prone to idolatry the existence of higher intellectual beings had either to be withheld or disguised under the words "heaven" or "light." In a parallel way the inspired writers sometimes shaped their words, not according to their own views nor the objective fact, but according to the opinion of the people (*secundum opinionem populi*). Now it sometimes happened that the opinion of the people was wrong.

As a principle of Biblical interpretation this opinion of St. Thomas is all the more remarkable because as St. Thomas would suggest, there is not necessarily anything in the context definitely leading us to this interpretation. It is written : "And he (Joseph) said to them . . . Know you not that there is no one like to me in the art of divining ?" (Gen. xlv. 15). It does not add "This he said in jest."

Again, Ecclesiasticus writes (xlvi. 23) : "After this Samuel slept ; and shewed him the end of his life, and he lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy." He does not add "It was not really the soul of Samuel, nor was it really a divine prophecy. But the onlookers thought it was Samuel, and that it was a divine prophecy."

Lastly, the inspired writer of Exodus wrote (xxxiii. 11) ; "And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face." But he did not add, and there is

nothing in the context to suggest "This is what the people thought; and thought wrongly."

If it is urged that this method of interpretation used by St. Augustine and St. Thomas seems to commit the Sacred Writer to an untruth, we might provisionally reply that the authority of these two great thinkers is enough to reassure us. No men had a better knowledge of the Sacred Scripture or a deeper reverence for its two gifts of Revelation and Inspiration.

But their principles of interpretation, which on examination will be found to make an organic whole, will also be found to have provided an answer to those timid minds who see untruth in the words of the inspired writers. Already we have seen that we are asked to accept as true and revealed only what is put forward by the inspired writer as true and revealed—as true yet not revealed only what is true yet not revealed. The writer of these passages which *express the opinion of the people* did not mean to express the objective fact but the opinion of the people.

Sometimes this statement of a fact *in the opinion of a group of men* is explicitly made as "The Fool said in his heart, 'There is no God'" (Psalm). At other times it is not expressed but implied, as in the three passages quoted from St. Thomas.

If it be further urged that this leaves the ordinary reader in doubt as to the meaning of much of the inspired writings, we reply that this doubt is calculated to deepen not our ignorance

but our desire of authority. Indeed, the vexed question, what is meant by certain passages, and indeed by whole books evidently owing their human side to Eastern modes of life and literature, may well be left to that patient band of Biblical exegetes who are working under the authority of the Bride of Christ.

If then one of these exegetes should ask whether or not he is free to apply these principles say to the minute, civic, social, domestic, ethical and liturgical legislation of the Torah, or again, to the historical account of the twelve tribes, or to the rise of Jerusalem as a national and religious capital, we are at a loss to know how any fettering of his exegetical freedom could be reconciled with the theological principles of St. Thomas.



McNabb, V.J.

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From a friar's cell.

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